Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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A duty of confidentiality arises from the physician-patient relationship, and unauthorized disclosure of confidential information obtained in the course of that relationship for the purpose of treatment gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort against the health care provider, unless the disclosure is otherwise allowed by law.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court entering judgment in favor of Defendant, Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C., on Plaintiff’s claims of negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on these counts because the court improperly concluded that Defendant, as a health care provider, owed Plaintiff no duty of confidentiality. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant violated the duty of confidentiality under the facts of this case. View "Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C." on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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In this case arising from four deaths from a house fire the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court concluding that a jury reasonably could find that the municipal defendants were potentially liable pursuant to Connecticut’s municipal liability statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n(b)(8).A mother and her three children lost their lives in a fire in a Bridgeport public housing complex. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 29-305(b), the Bridgeport fire marshal’s office is required to conduct annual inspections of all multifamily residential units within Bridgeport. Plaintiff brought this action against the Bridgeport Fire Department and five Bridgeport city officials alleging that the decedents died as a result of Defendants’ negligent failure to inspect the smoke detection equipment in their unit for compliance with applicable fire safety regulations and codes. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that section 52-557n afforded them immunity. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a jury, considering all of the relevant circumstances, reasonably could find that Defendants demonstrated “a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances,” and therefore, that they were potentially liable under section 52-557n(b)(8). View "Williams v. Housing Authority of City of Bridgeport" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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At issue was whether an insurer was obligated to indemnify a business owner under a personal insurance policy for liability arising form his false imprisonment of his company’s employee at her workplace. The business owner appealed, challenging the appellate court’s determination that such liability fell under the business pursuits exclusion to coverage under his personal umbrella policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) neither the appellate court nor the trial court employed the correct standard for determining whether the business owner’s tortious conduct was an occurrence “arising out of” the business pursuits of the insured; (2) remand was necessary to determine whether the business pursuits exception applied under the correct standard; and (3) Plaintiffs could not prevail on their alternative grounds regarding other exclusions and public policy as a matter of law. View "Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pasiak" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment for the Town of Hebron on this complaint brought by Plaintiffs seeking damages for a temporary taking, temporary nuisance, and tortious interference with Plaintiffs’ business expectancies. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they arose out of the same operative facts as Plaintiffs’ earlier-filed claim for injunctive relief against the Town. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to identify a sufficiently compelling reason to exempt their claims from the preclusive effect of res judicata. View "Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Defendant in light of this court’s decision in Sepega v. DeLaura, __ A.3d ___ (Conn. 2017). Plaintiff, a state trooper, sued Defendant hospital for personal injuries he sustained while subduing an emotionally disturbed person who had been committed to Defendant’s custody. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s original complaint on the ground that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the firefighter’s rule. Plaintiff then filed a substitute complaint pursuant to Practice Book 10-44. The trial court sustained Defendant’s objection to the substitute complaint and rendered judgment accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the new allegations in the substitute complaint materially differ from those in the original complaint for purposes of preserving Plaintiff’s right to appeal after repleading pursuant to Practice Book 10-44; (2) as this court has recently clarified in Sepega, decided today, the firefighter’s rule does not extend beyond claims of premises liability; and (3) the trial court’s decision to sustain Defendant’s objection to the substitute complaint in this case was improper because Plaintiff alleged a valid cause of action. View "Lund v. Milford Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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The firefighter’s rule should not be extended beyond claims of premises liability so as to bar a police officer from recovering, under theory of ordinary negligence, from a homeowner who is also an alleged active tortfeasor.Plaintiff, a municipal police officer, sued Defendant, arguing that Defendant had negligently “created conditions which mandated that Plaintiff forcibly enter the premises in order to prevent harm” and resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff did not make any claim that his injuries were caused by a defect in the premises. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to strike and then granted judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the firefighter’s rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the firefighter’s rule does not apply to general negligence claims. View "Sepega v. DeLaura" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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Defendant, the City of New Haven, was entitled to a new trial on this action for indemnification. Plaintiff, a police officer with the New Haven Police Department, was acquitted of sexual assault and unlawful restraint charges for conduct that allegedly occurred during the course of his employment. When Defendant declined to reimburse Plaintiff for economic loss sustained as a result of the prosecution in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-39a, Plaintiff brought this indemnification action. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in prohibiting Defendant from using the complainants’ prior testimony, and the error was not harmless. View "Maio v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court answered questions of law certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by holding (1) Connecticut public policy supports imposing a duty on a school to warn about or protect against the risk of a serious insect-borne disease when it organizes a trip abroad; and (2) a damages award of approximately $41.5 million, $31.5 million of which are noneconomic damages, does not warrant a remittitur. In this case, Plaintiff, a fifteen-year-old private school student, sustained permanent brain damage after contracting tick-borne encephalitis during an educational trip to China. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. The school appealed, and, finding insufficient guidance existing in Connecticut law to answer Defendant’s challenges to the verdict, certified the above questions of law to the Connecticut Supreme Court. View "Munn v. Hotchkiss School" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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In this case, municipal immunity was not abrogated either by the proprietary function exception of Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n or by the identifiable person, imminent harm exception.Plaintiff appealed from a judgment rendered in favor of the Town of Plainfield after the trial court concluded that no exception to the Town’s general immunity applied. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether there was municipal immunity when the Town charged a nominal fee to a private group for reserved use of the public pool and where Plaintiff, a member of the group, slipped and fell on accumulated water in the vicinity of that pool. The trial court concluded that the Town was immune from liability because (1) the Town’s operation of a municipal pool wa sa governmental function and did not create a profit for the Town; and (2) Plaintiff was not an identifiable person and that the water on and around the pool surfaces did not qualify as an imminent harm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Town’s operation of its municipal pool did not constitute a proprietary function so as to abrogate its discretionary act immunity; and (2) because Plaintiff was not an identifiable person, the identifiable person, imminent harm exception did not apply. View "St. Pierre v. Plainfield" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury
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A party’s delay in raising a challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is an improper ground on which to deny a motion for judgment of dismissal insofar as the motion challenged subject matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff in this negligence action. The trial court entered judgment after denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of dismissal raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s stated rationale of delay and laches for denying the motion for judgment of dismissal was not a proper basis for denial. Rather, the trial court should have first resolved whether Defendant’s motion raised a colorable jurisdictional issue and, if so, whether it had jurisdiction over the cause of action. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Machado v. Taylor" on Justia Law