Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The property at issue has a long history of agricultural use, initially for tobacco farming and processing. This activity predates the Town of Suffield’s zoning regulations, making it a legal nonconforming use. In 2019, the plaintiff obtained state approval to cultivate and process hemp at the property, which was determined by local officials to fall within the scope of the existing nonconforming tobacco use. Following Connecticut’s legalization of recreational cannabis in 2021, the plaintiff sought a zoning determination that cannabis cultivation and processing would also be a lawful continuation of the existing nonconforming use. The zoning enforcement officer denied this request, citing distinct licensing and regulatory requirements for hemp and cannabis.The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Suffield upheld the zoning officer’s decision, relying primarily on the legal and regulatory distinctions between hemp and cannabis. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford. The trial court applied the factors from Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals to assess whether the proposed cannabis use impermissibly expanded the scope of the nonconforming use. The court found that the regulatory differences were relevant but not dispositive and concluded that cannabis cultivation and processing were sufficiently similar to the existing hemp operation to constitute a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. The trial court reversed the board’s decision.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case. It held that a difference in state licensing or regulatory schemes is relevant but not determinative in assessing whether a proposed use constitutes an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use. Instead, courts must conduct a fact-intensive inquiry, considering the nature, purpose, character, and effects of the use. Here, the Supreme Court found no evidence that cannabis cultivation and processing would materially change the property’s use or impact the neighborhood. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment, allowing the cannabis operation as a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. View "Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

A property owner of a rental income-producing property in Greenwich, Connecticut, failed to timely submit a required income and expense form to the municipal assessor. The assessor had mailed both a demand for information and the prescribed form in April 2020 to the last known address on record, which was the property manager’s former address. The property owner did not receive this mailing because it had changed addresses in 2016 but had not directly informed the assessor. Later, when a forwarded tax bill prompted the owner to update its address, a reminder notice was sent to the correct address, but it arrived after the filing deadline. The owner ultimately submitted the form late, and the assessor imposed a statutory penalty increasing the property’s assessed value by 10 percent.The property owner appealed the penalty to the town’s board of assessment appeals, which upheld the penalty. The owner then appealed to the Superior Court, arguing it should not be penalized because it had not actually received the form before the deadline. The Superior Court found for the town, reasoning that timely mailing to the last known address satisfied the statutory requirement and that the owner bore responsibility for ensuring its address was up to date.The owner appealed to the Connecticut Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The owner then sought further review from the Connecticut Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement for the assessor to provide the form is satisfied by mailing it to the property owner’s last known address, regardless of actual receipt. The Court found that the statute does not require assessors to ensure actual receipt and that fundamental fairness is met by using the last known address. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Greenwich Retail, LLC v. Greenwich" on Justia Law

Underwood Towers Limited Partnership leased land from the city of Hartford to build apartment buildings and financed the project with a mortgage loan. After defaulting, Underwood executed additional notes and a second mortgage in favor of HUD. Following further defaults and transfers, LPP Mortgage Inc. acquired the second mortgage and notes but did not receive the original of one note—only a lost note affidavit. LPP Mortgage then brought a foreclosure action, seeking not only to foreclose the mortgage but also damages against Underwood and its management agent, CDC Management Corporation.The Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket, denied Underwood and CDC’s motion to dismiss, ruling that LPP Mortgage had standing to foreclose as the owner of the debt, even without possession of the lost note, relying on New England Savings Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp. Judgment of strict foreclosure and damages was entered. On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that LPP Mortgage had standing to pursue foreclosure as the debt owner, despite not being able to enforce the note under the UCC. The case was remanded for setting new law days. After remand, Underwood and CDC again moved to dismiss, arguing that the Connecticut Supreme Court’s later decision in Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope changed the law, requiring possession of the note to foreclose.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case after transfer from the Appellate Court. The Court held that res judicata barred Underwood and CDC from relitigating LPP Mortgage’s standing, as the issue had already been fully litigated and decided by the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court further held that Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope did not overrule Bedford Realty Corp., and thus the law had not changed. The trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Underwood Towers Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law

A property owner received municipal approval to renovate the interior of a building on its land, which was subject to a special permit allowing use as a religious institution with specific conditions. Among these, one condition prohibited a “material change” or “intensification” of any approved use without explicit authorization, while another allowed the building to serve as an operations center for security and administrative purposes. The renovations included subdividing garage and open space to create more offices, expanding an office, and converting a closet into a bathroom. Abutting landowners challenged the issuance of the zoning permit, arguing these changes violated the conditions of the special permit.The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan held hearings and ultimately rejected the challenge. The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, which initially remanded the matter so the board could consult with the Planning and Zoning Commission for interpretation of the special permit’s conditions. After this consultation, the board reaffirmed its denial. The Superior Court then reviewed the merits and dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal, finding substantial evidence in the record supported the board’s decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut assumed, without deciding, that the remand to the commission may have been improper. Nonetheless, it concluded there was substantial evidence in the original record to sustain the board’s decision. The court clarified that “material change” means a significant alteration in the character of use, and “intensification” requires an increase or strengthening in the degree of use—not merely a minor or modest change. The evidence showed the renovations did not alter the building’s footprint, number of occupants, or its approved use. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs owned a property in Mansfield, Connecticut, which they sought to have classified as “forest land” for property tax purposes. In 2005, they applied for this classification, submitting a certified forester’s report stating the property was a single 25-acre tract meeting statutory requirements. The town assessor approved the classification. In 2021, the assessor discovered the property was only 22.53 acres. Initially, the assessor allowed the classification to continue by aggregating the Mansfield property with another 14.05-acre forest parcel the plaintiffs owned in Tolland, meeting the 25-acre requirement. When the plaintiffs later sold the Tolland parcel, the assessor terminated the Mansfield property’s forest land classification, increasing its assessed value.The plaintiffs appealed this decision first to the Mansfield Board of Assessment Appeals, which upheld the assessor’s action. They then appealed to the Superior Court. The trial court found the Mansfield property was never 25 acres and should not have been classified as forest land initially, but held that under Connecticut statutes, the assessor could not terminate this classification unless the property was sold or its use changed. Since neither occurred, the trial court ordered the forest land classification reinstated.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the appeal, focusing on whether municipal assessors have statutory authority to terminate erroneous forest land classifications. The Court held that assessors lack this authority; only the state forester may correct errors in certified forester findings regarding acreage or qualifications. The Court rejected arguments based on other statutes and prior case law, concluding that unless the land is sold or its use changes, the classification must remain. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, ordering reinstatement of the forest land classification for the Mansfield property. View "Campelli v. Mansfield" on Justia Law

The plaintiff landlord leased an apartment to the defendant tenant with a concession addendum allowing a reduced monthly rent. After the landlord sought to raise the rent, the tenant filed a fair rent complaint with the Middletown Fair Rent Commission (MFRC), alleging excessive rent and deteriorating conditions. Following the complaint, the landlord returned rent checks and served a notice to quit, claiming nonpayment and other grounds. The tenant filed additional complaints alleging retaliation, and the MFRC found the landlord’s actions retaliatory, ordering the landlord to cease eviction proceedings and accept the reduced rent. The MFRC also imposed fines for violations of its orders. The landlord filed administrative appeals in the Superior Court from the MFRC’s decisions, which remained pending.The landlord then initiated a summary process action in the Superior Court, Middlesex Housing Session at Middletown, seeking eviction on grounds including nonpayment of rent. The MFRC filed a motion to intervene in the summary process action, citing its interest in enforcing its orders and protecting its statutory authority. The trial court, after reviewing arguments, granted the MFRC’s motion to intervene, finding the commission had a substantial institutional interest and that intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the proceedings. The court considered the overlap of issues between the summary process action and the pending administrative appeals.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s decision upon public interest certification. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting permissive intervention to the MFRC. The Supreme Court emphasized that rules governing permissive intervention should be liberally construed for governmental agencies seeking to protect their statutory powers and enforcement authority. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding the MFRC had sufficient legal interest to intervene and that the intervention was appropriate under established standards. View "Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor" on Justia Law

The plaintiff landlord leased an apartment to the defendant tenant, offering a discounted rent with the understanding that the rent would increase after the first year. As the renewal approached, the landlord sought to raise the rent to the higher amount. The tenant filed a complaint with the Hartford Fair Rent Commission, alleging the increase was excessive. While the commission’s review was pending, the landlord attempted to collect the increased rent and, when the tenant continued paying the lower amount, initiated eviction proceedings for nonpayment. The commission ultimately ruled in the tenant’s favor, finding the increase unfair and that the eviction attempt was retaliatory. The commission ordered the landlord to maintain the lower rent and to cease and desist from the eviction.After the commission’s decision, the landlord began a summary process (eviction) action in the Superior Court and also filed an administrative appeal challenging the commission’s ruling. In the summary process action, the tenant raised defenses of retaliation and sought dismissal based on the commission’s order. The trial court, Housing Session of the Superior Court in Hartford, granted the tenant’s motion to stay the eviction action pending resolution of the administrative appeal. The landlord’s motion to reconsider was denied, prompting an interlocutory appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, certified as a matter of substantial public interest.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court had inherent authority to stay the summary process action, despite the expedited nature of such proceedings, because the commission’s findings about the proper rent and retaliation could directly affect the merits of the eviction case. The court concluded that the trial judge properly balanced the interests of both parties, the commission, and judicial efficiency, and did not abuse its discretion in granting the stay. The Supreme Court affirmed the stay order and declined to address the landlord’s constitutional challenges and other issues not yet decided by the trial court. View "TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez" on Justia Law

The case centers on a foreclosure action brought by a bank that sought to enforce a mortgage on property owned by the defendant. The defendant had executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage with a predecessor lender. After the defendant defaulted, Bank of America became the holder of the note and owner of the debt, and the mortgage was later assigned to the plaintiff bank. However, during the period Bank of America held the note, the original note was lost while in the custody of its loan servicer. The plaintiff bank, as the assignee, initiated foreclosure proceedings and moved for summary judgment, presenting affidavits from employees of the loan servicer as secondary evidence of its ownership of the debt.The Superior Court, Judicial District of Danbury, granted summary judgment as to liability in favor of the plaintiff and subsequently rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendant appealed, arguing that the affidavits submitted were insufficient to prove the plaintiff’s ownership of the debt. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, prompting a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that the plaintiff failed to show there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding its ownership of the debt, as required for summary judgment. The court found the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff were either inadmissible due to lack of personal knowledge or were conclusory and lacked a sufficient factual foundation. The court explained that, when a note is lost, secondary evidence must clearly and competently establish ownership of the debt, which was not done in this instance. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Schulz" on Justia Law

After the death of her husband, the plaintiff became the sole owner of certain residential property previously held in joint tenancy. The plaintiff, serving as executor of her late husband’s estate, leased the property to one of the defendants, her son, under an agreement that expired in 2020. The defendants, who are immediate family members, continued to occupy the property after the lease expired. In August 2021, the plaintiff, represented by counsel, served a notice to quit on the defendants, which identified her as “executor,” and then initiated a summary process action using that same designation.The case was brought in the Superior Court, Housing Session at Stamford-Norwalk, where the plaintiff moved to substitute herself in her individual capacity, as the owner, rather than as executor. The court granted the substitution without objection from the defendants. After a bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiff and issued a judgment of possession, rejecting the defendants’ claims of a life estate and other defenses. The defendants appealed to the Connecticut Appellate Court, arguing for the first time that the notice to quit was jurisdictionally defective because it was issued by the plaintiff as “executor,” although the estate never owned the property. The Appellate Court affirmed, finding the notice to quit sufficient under Connecticut General Statutes § 47a-23(a).Upon further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed that the notice to quit strictly complied with § 47a-23(a) due to the incorrect reference to the plaintiff as “executor.” However, the Court held that this was a circumstantial, not substantive, defect under General Statutes § 52-123. Since the notice conveyed all essential information and there was no prejudice or confusion to the defendants, the trial court retained subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "Freccia v. Freccia" on Justia Law

A business in Connecticut was assessed personal property taxes from 2008 to 2016. The defendant, who had moved to California years earlier and claimed to have left the business by 2007, was never notified of these tax assessments at her California address, despite having provided it to the tax collector in 2011 and 2016. Over the years, the city’s tax collector took funds from the defendant’s bank accounts multiple times via bank executions to satisfy the tax debt, without ever sending her a tax bill or notice at her actual residence.In 2021, the tax collector initiated another bank execution against the defendant. The defendant challenged this action, arguing she had not received due process or required statutory notice. The Superior Court for the judicial district of Litchfield held an evidentiary hearing and agreed with the defendant, finding the tax collector failed to provide required notice under General Statutes § 12-155 (a) and that the lack of notice deprived her of the opportunity to challenge the tax assessment. The court granted the defendant’s exemption motion, rendering the execution “of no effect.” The tax collector initially appealed but then withdrew the appeal. After sending a written demand to the defendant’s California address, the tax collector initiated a new bank execution, again without providing a new tax bill or an opportunity to challenge it.The trial court found the new action was a collateral attack on the earlier judgment and barred by collateral estoppel. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding the issue of notice and opportunity to challenge had been actually litigated and necessarily determined in the 2021 action.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that, under Connecticut law, collateral estoppel applies to all independent, alternative grounds actually litigated and determined in a prior judgment, making them preclusive in subsequent actions. Thus, the tax collector was barred from relitigating the notice and due process issues already decided. The Court declined to recognize a public policy exception for municipal tax collection cases. View "Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley" on Justia Law