Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Decedent entered into a contract for the sale of a parcel of real property to Buyer. Before entering into the contract, Decedent specifically devised the property to Plaintiff, a church, in his will. After Decedent died, a botanical garden and museum claimed entitlement to the proceeds from the sale of the property by the by the coexecutors of Decedent’s estate, due to a charitable pledge made by Decedent prior to his death. The trial court concluded that title to the property passed to Buyer at the signing of the contract under the doctrine of equitable conversion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that equitable conversion did not apply because Decedent died prior to the fulfillment or expiration of a mortgage contingency clause in the contract. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the mortgage contingency clause did not preclude the application of equitable conversion, and equitable title passed to Buyer at the execution of the contract. View "Southport Congregational Church-United Church of Christ v. Hadley" on Justia Law

Defendant executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage and security agreement on Defendant's property. Guarantors guaranteed the note and mortgage. Plaintiff later foreclosed on the property. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a timely motion seeking a deficiency judgment against Defendant and Guarantors. The trial court found the fair market value of the mortgaged property to be $5.3 million and rendered a deficiency judgment in the amount of $13,264,318. Defendant and Guarantors appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on the appraisal report submitted by the substitute plaintiff and the testimony of Plaintiff’s appraiser because they expressed an opinion on the value of the leased fee interest in the mortgaged property, and Plaintiff was required to establish the value of the fee simple interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court’s fair market value finding was not erroneous, and Plaintiff satisfied its burden of establishing the value of the mortgaged property. View "J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Applicant applied for zoning variances allowing for the vertical expansion of a nonconforming building. There was no showing, however, that the strict application of the zoning regulations would destroy the property’s value for any of the uses to which it could reasonably be put. The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Fairfield granted the application, concluding that the strict application of the zoning regulations would produce an unusual hardship. The trial court rejected Plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly determined that the strict application of the zoning regulations would produce an undue hardship for Applicant, justifying the variances. Remanded to the Board with direction to deny Applicant’s application for the variances. View "E and F Assocs., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant executed a promissory note in favor of Bank that was secured by a mortgage deed on certain property. The mortgage was subsequently assigned to Plaintiff, which was also the holder of the note. In 2012, Plaintiff declared the note to be in default and sought to foreclose on the property. The trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default against Defendant for failure to appear and ordered a judgment of foreclosure by sale. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure by sale. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-12 in denying her motion to open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure by sale and should have applied the standard articulated in Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-15. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that even if Plaintiff were to prevail on her claim, the trial court ruled that there was no good cause to warrant the opening of the judgment against her, and therefore, Defendant could be afforded no practical relief if the matter were to be remanded to the trial court. View "JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Mendez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed a right-of-way over land owned by John Gorman and land owned by Amy and Robert Kahn. The trial court quieted title and established an easement by deed in favor of Plaintiff over the Gorman property and established an easement by necessity in favor of Plaintiff over the Kahn property. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff failed to prove the location or use of the easement by deed over the Gorman property and the use of the easement by necessity or implication over the Kahn property at the time his property effectively became landlocked. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to the creation of an easement by deed over the Gorman property, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that it was the intent of the parties to the deed to create an easement appurtenant; and (2) affirmed as to the creation of an easement by necessity over the Kahn property but reversed as to creation of easement by implication over the Kahn property, holding that an easement by necessity could not be imposed under the circumstances of this case and that the case must be remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s claim for an easement by implication. View "Deane v. Kahn" on Justia Law

After Defendant, the owner of real property in the Town of Canton, abandoned the subject property, the Town filed a petition seeking the appointment of a receiver of rents. The trial court, finding that Defendant owed the Town taxes, granted the petition and authorized the receiver to collect all rents or use and occupancy payments. The court subsequently modified its order to allow the receiver to evict the tenant and to bring an action against the tenant for all rents due. The tenant moved to remove the receiver, asserting that the receiver had exceeded its authority under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-163a by serving it with a notice to quit and by bring an action to collect back taxes and prior rents. The court denied the motion for removal. The Appellate Court (1) reversed insofar as the trial court granted the receiver’s motion to modify the receivership orders, but (2) affirmed insofar as it denied the tenant’s motion to remove the receiver. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to the reversal of the trial court’s judgment granting the receiver’s motion for modification, holding that section 12-163a does authorize a receiver to use legal process to collect rent due prior to the date of the receiver’s appointment; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Canton v. Cadle Props. of Conn., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a restaurant supply company, leased commercial property from Defendant. The lease provided Plaintiff and the guarantor with the option to purchase the premises during the term of the lease. In a separate provision, the lease required Defendant to perform environmental remediation on the premises. Plaintiff told Defendant that it had elected to exercise the option to purchase the premises but that, before the parties could close on the transaction, Defendant had to fulfill its obligation to complete the environmental remediation. Plaintiff, however, never attempted to tender payment of the purchase price. Plaintiff subsequently filed this action requesting that the trial court order specific performance of the option to purchase provision in the lease. The trial court declined to order specific performance. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exercise the option to purchase in accordance with its terms. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff did tender the purchase price as required, it failed to exercise the option to purchase when the option was available; and (2) the doctrine of frustration of purchase did not apply in this case because Defendant’s lack of environmental remediation did not interfere with the purpose of the lease. View "Howard-Arnold, Inc. v. T.N.T. Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Getty Properties Corp. leased certain properties to Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. by way of a master lease. Getty Marketing sublet the properties to Green Valley Oil, LLC. Thereafter, Green Valley entered into an individual sub-sublease with each Defendant, the owners of retail gasoline stations. Getty Properties subsequently terminated the master lease. Getty Marketing then filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court rejected the master lease and ordered that Getty Marketing relinquish possession of the properties to Getty Properties. Getty Properties and NECG Holdings Corp. served Defendants with notices to quit, but Defendants refused to vacate the properties. Plaintiffs subsequently commenced summary process actions against Defendants. The trial court rendered judgment of immediate possession for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiffs’ notices to quit were valid; (2) admitting into evidence the lease between Getty Properties and Getty Marketing, as well as the sublease between Getty Marketing and Green Valley; (3) interpreting the various pleadings in Getty Marketing’s bankruptcy case as terminating the lease and the sublease; (4) finding that Plaintiffs proved a prima facie case for summary process; and (5) failing to dismiss the summary process action as premature. View "Getty Props. Corp. v. ATKR, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were a private company that owned property in the town of Rocky Hill and a company overseeing the development of a nursing home on that property. Defendants contracted with the state to provide nursing home services to state prisoners and others in state custody. The town filed an action against Defendants claiming noncompliance with its zoning regulations. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding (1) Defendants were an “arm of the state” entitled to sovereign immunity; and (2) even if Defendants were not shielded by sovereign immunity as an arm of the state, the town’s zoning authority over the project was preempted by Conn. Gen. Stat. 17b-372a, which permits certain state officials to contract for the establishment of nursing home facilities for state prisoners and individuals receiving services from the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants were not immune from suit as an arm of the state; and (2) by enacting section 17b-372a, the legislature did not intend to preempt the application of local zoning laws to facilities established on private land under the authority of that provision. View "Town of Rocky Hill v. SecureCare Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant each owned fifty percent of an LLC, which owned commercial real estate (the premises). Plaintiff agreed to sell his interest in the LLC to Defendant. The parties subsequently executed a buyout agreement that provided for a certain purchase price and contained a contingency clause requiring Defendant to pay Plaintiff an addition to the purchase price if specified conditions were met. The parties closed on the sale under the buyout agreement. Defendant then sold the entire premises to a third party. Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant alleging that Defendant breached the buyout agreement by not paying Plaintiff a contingent addition to the purchase price as required by the contingency clause. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. A divided Appellate Court panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) properly determined that the contract at issue was unambiguous; and (2) properly affirmed the trial court’s postjudgment interest award where the trial court declined to award prejudgment interest. View "Salce v. Wolczek" on Justia Law