Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The named defendant, EAPWJP, LLC (EAP) appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants a prescriptive easement over a pathway crossing property owned by EAP that the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants had used for many years to access a nearby beach. The pathway traversed protected tidal wetlands and was covered in part by a wooden walkway installed without appropriate permits. The Supreme Court granted certification to appeal to ask whether the appellate court properly concluded that construction and use of a walkway deemed to be a per se public nuisance could establish a prescriptive easement over the underlying tidal wetlands. The Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted, concluding that the issue raised by the certified question went beyond the scope of the record below, and therefore, the issue was not properly preserved. View "Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff interred her husband's remains in the backyard of her property. The town's zoning compliance officer issued a cease and desist order for violation of the town's zoning regulation. Plaintiff appealed to the town zoning board of appeals, seeking a variance. Subsequently, the compliance officer withdrew the order to allow Plaintiff to remedy the violation. Plaintiff then notified the board she was withdrawing her objection to the order. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced an action in the trial requesting a judgment declaring she had the right to use her property for the interment of her and her husband's remains. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint because Plaintiff had failed her exhaust her administrative remedies by not appealing to the board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's failure to pursue her appeal and, thereby, to exhaust her administrative remedies left the trial court without jurisdiction over her action for a declaratory judgment; and (2) because Plaintiff was actually challenging the proper interpretation of the town zoning regulations, which was a function of the board, Plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Piquet v. Chester" on Justia Law

This appeal raised several issues regarding the scope of the jurisdiction of the department of environmental protection to regulate activity "in the tidal, coastal or navigable waters of the state waterward of the high tide line" under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-359. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment denying his administrative appeal contesting the department's order directing Plaintiff to remove a seawall that he had constructed on his property along Long Island Sound without having obtained a permit in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-361. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that substantial evidence showed at least part of Plaintiff's seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, properly concluded that section 22a-359 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiff's seawall, and properly denied Plaintiff's discovery request with respect to his claim of unconstitutional vagueness; but (2) in the absence of a finding by the department that the entire seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, the trial court improperly determined that the department had jurisdiction under section 22a-361 to order removal of the entire seawall. View "Shanahan v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was Conn. Gen. Stat. 21-80a, which protects residents of mobile manufactured home parks by limiting the availability of summary process actions. Under the statute, if a resident proves that he or she engaged in one or more of the protected activities enumerated in the statute within the six months preceding the park owner's eviction proceeding, the owner may not maintain a summary process action against that resident unless the owner can show that one of the exceptions specified in the statute applies. Defendants, residents of a mobile manufactured home park owned by Plaintiff, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's judgment of possession in favor of Plaintiff, claiming that judgment of possession should be granted in their favor because Plaintiff's summary process action was barred under section 21-80a. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) defendants were in material noncompliance with the lease and were using the dwelling unit or the premises for a purpose which was in violation of the rental agreement; and (2) thus, the appellate court's ultimate conclusion that Defendants' violation was encompassed by 21-80a was proper. View "Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal" on Justia Law

The parcel of land that was the subject of this appeal was once owned by a school. An adjacent property, now owned by Defendants, Eric and Wendy Federer, was previously owned by Wendy's father. In 1990, the school sold its property to a limited liability corporation subject to a set of restrictive covenants that did not expressly reference any third parties. The present action arose when Plaintiff, the current owner of the property, sought permits to develop the school property in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the restrictive covenants. Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish the unenforceability of the restrictive covenants as to Defendants. Defendants counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to Plaintiff's property and to enforce the restrictive covenants. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the covenants at issue in this case were not void as a matter of law; and (2) questions of material fact existed as to whether Defendants were entitled to enforce them. Remanded. View "Wykeham Rise, LLC v. Federer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Harry Kraiza filed an application with the planning and zoning commission of the town of Hartland seeking approval of a proposed subdivision on his property. The commission denied Plaintiff's application, finding it was in violation of the subdivision regulations because the proposed dead-end street that provided the only access to the subdivided lots on Plaintiff's property constituted an extension of an existing loop road on adjacent property and the combined length of the two road exceeded the permissible length for a permanent dead-end street. The superior court and appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the commission incorrectly interpreted the Hartland zoning and subdivision regulations in this case, and the appellate court incorrectly determined that the commission properly denied Plaintiff's application to subdivide his property. Remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining Plaintiff's appeal. View "Kraiza v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the town of Bozrah and the town's zoning enforcement officer, brought an action seeking a temporary and permanent injunction to enjoin Defendants, owners and residents of certain property, from refusing to consent to an inspection of their property for zoning violations. The trial court granted a temporary injunction preventing Defendants from refusing to allow the inspection, concluding that pursuant to Camara v. Municipal Court, the reasonable governmental interest in stabilizing property values and promoting the general welfare justified an inspection in the present action. Defendants appealed, claiming that the trial court's order violated their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a zoning official may inspect a single property pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-12 if the official first obtains an injunction issued upon probable cause by a judicial officer; and (2) because the trial court failed to make a preliminary determination of probable cause to believe that a zoning violation existed on the property, its order permitting a search of Defendants' property violated the Fourth Amendment. Remanded. View "Bozrah v. Chmurynski" on Justia Law

Defendant Anna Miller executed a promissory note to a finance company and conveyed by way of a mortgage her interest in real property to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. Defendant's mortgage was thereafter assigned to Plaintiff, RMS Residential Properties (RMS), which became the holder of the note prior to the commencement of this foreclosure action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. On appeal, Defendant contended that RMS lacked standing to commence the foreclosure action because there was no statutory authority that conferred standing on a mere holder of a note to foreclose a mortgage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-17 raises a rebuttable presumption that a holder of a note is the owner of the debt, the statute may confer standing to foreclose a mortgage on a holder of a note. View "RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a development company, brought an action against Defendants, several entities including the City, alleging Defendants had violated the Connecticut Antitrust Act by engaging in an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's amended complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to allege an antitrust injury. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants took bribes and kickbacks in exchange for steering public contracts did not state a cognizable antitrust claim, and therefore, the appellate court and trial court properly granted Defendants' motions to strike Plaintiff's amended complaint. View "Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim" on Justia Law

Defendant landowner applied for a zoning change to designate its parcel as a business and commercial zone and for a special exception permit for approval of the site plan of its shopping center project. The Town's Planning and Zoning Commission denied the zone change application and denied as moot Defendant's application for a special exception permit. Defendants appealed, and the trial court judge, Judge Owens, approved Defendant's application for a zone change. During the pendency of Defendant's zone change appeal and upon receipt of Judge Owens's decision, the Commission approved the special exception permit but took no official action regarding the zone change application. Plaintiffs, several individuals, appealed, arguing that the commission acted improperly when it approved Defendant's special exception permit. The superior court sustained the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly revisited the prior judgment of Judge Owens and too narrowly construed the effect of Owens's decision as well as the actions taken by the Commission in reviewing and approving Defendant's application for the special exception permit. Remanded. View "Zimnoch v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n " on Justia Law