Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the owner of a parcel of land in the Town of Colchester, challenged the Town’s assessment of the property for the tax year 2011. The Colchester Board of Assessment Appeals upheld the Town’s original valuation. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Town had used an improper method for valuing the property. The trial court upheld the Town’s original assessment, determining that Plaintiff had not established that it was aggrieved by the Town’s valuation because it found that Plaintiff’s expert was not credible. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard of valuation to the subject property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court’s determination that Plaintiff failed to establish aggrievement was not clearly erroneous, and the trial court properly rejected Plaintiff’s appeal. View "Nutmeg Housing Development Corp. v. Colchester" on Justia Law

In 1989, Connecticut National Mortgage Company brought this action seeking to foreclose a mortgage on a parcel of real property owned by Defendant. The trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure in 1994. That judgment has been opened and modified several times over the years. In 2012, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. was substituted as the plaintiff. On June 8 2015, the trial court entered a new judgment of strict foreclosure extending defendant’s law day to August 4, 2015. On June 18, 2015, the trial court denied Defendanat’s motion to vacate the new judgment. On June 26, 2015, Defendant filed an appeal. On January 13, 2016, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the June 8, 2015 judgment triggered an automatic stay and that the appellate stay prevented title from vesting in the plaintiff by operation of law when Defendant failed to exercise her right of redemption on August 4, 2015. Therefore, the case should not have been dismissed as moot. View "Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

The Indian Spring Land Company (Plaintiff), the owner of an unimproved tract of land, filed an application to construct a gravel access road subject to certain conditions. The Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of the Town of Greenwich (Defendant) granted Plaintiff’s application, subject to certain conditions. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that its road construction activities were “directly related to its farming operations” and were therefore permitted as of right, thus not requiring the approval of a wetlands agency under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-40(a)(1). The trial court concluded that Defendant had the necessary jurisdiction to attach special conditions to Plaintiff’s permit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 22a-40(a)(1); and (2) under the proper interpretation of the statute, Defendant did not have jurisdiction to regulate the construction of Plaintiff’s access road. View "Indian Spring Land Co. v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the homeowner’s association for a common interest community. Defendant owned a condominium unit in the community. Pursuant to a "standard collection policy" adopted by Plaintiff in 2011, Plaintiff brought this action seeking to foreclose a statutory lien for allegedly delinquent common expenses, attorney’s fees, and costs. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to vote to commence a foreclosure action against Defendant’s unit or to adopt a standard foreclosure policy pursuant to the notice and comment requirements of Connecticut’s Common Interest Ownership Act. Plaintiff, in turn, argued that its policy was an "internal business operating procedure" rather than a rule and therefore was not subject to the notice and comment procedures for rules. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff’s standard foreclosure policy was an internal business operating procedure, not a rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the standard foreclosure policy is a rule and that the rule-making requirements are jurisdictional. Remanded with direction to dismiss Plaintiff’s action. View "Neighborhood Ass’n v. Limberger" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a partnership and an LLC, were related entities with common owners. The partnership acquired a commercial office complex and later transferred ownership of the property to the LLC. In 2008, the City of Norwalk’s tax assessor set the fair market value of the partnership at approximately $49 million. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ property tax appeal and reduced the valuation of the LLC’s property by approximately $15 million. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal because the LLC had not appeared in administrative proceedings before the City’s Board of Assessment Appeals and did not initiate the appeal to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the tax appeal was initially brought by a nonaggrieved party, the partnership, the appeal was also maintained by the LLC, an aggrieved party that had properly been added to the trial court proceedings by way of a promptly filed amended complaint. View "Fairfield Merrittview Ltd. P’ship v. City of Norwalk" on Justia Law

The predecessors of Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a right-of-way agreement that created an express easement for the benefit of property owned by Plaintiff over a driveway located on the property owned by Defendants. Plaintiff commenced this action asserting a quiet title claim and a claim seeking an injunction restoring Plaintiff’s rights under the agreement. Defendants raised special defenses, asserting that Plaintiff’s property had been used for purposes other than “professional offices or residential uses” in violation of the terms of the agreement. The trial court entered judgment for Defendants, concluding that the easement was in effect until Plaintiff’s property was used by a mortgage brokerage, a home health-care agency, and an appliance delivery coordination service, which tenancies terminated the agreement. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the term “professional offices,” as used in the agreement, was plain an unambiguous; and (2) using the broader definition of the term “professional” indicates that the agreement did not preclude offices of the type that had been previously operated out of Plaintiff’s property. Remanded. View "NPC Offices, LLC v. Kowaleski" on Justia Law

In 2013, the legislature amended the statutes governing Connecticut’s public land records system to create a two-tiered system in which a nominee of a mortgagee operating a national electronic database to track residential mortgage loans must pay substantially more in recording fees than do other mortgagees. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. (collectively, Plaintiffs), the only entities currently required to pay the increased recording fees, brought this action against Defendants - the governor, attorney general, treasurer, state librarian, and state public records administrator - seeking injunctive relief and a judgment declaring that this two-tiered fee structure violates various provisions of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fees do not violate the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions or the dormant commerce clause of the federal constitution. View "MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. v. Malloy" on Justia Law

In 2009, Wheelabrator Bridgeport, L.P., which operates a waste to energy facility in the city of Bridgeport, appealed from the tax assessment of the City, alleging that the city had overvalued the property on the city’s 2007 and 2008 grand lists. In 2011, Wheelabrator and other plaintiffs filed a second appeal from the city’s tax assessment, alleging that the city had overvalued the property on the 2010 grand list. The two appeals were consolidated for purposes of trial. The trial court dismissed the first appeal for lack of standing and then rendered partial judgment in favor of Wheelabrator in the second appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court improperly dismissed the first appeal; and (2) the trial court improperly valued the property in the second appeal and failed to consider evidence of the city’s wrongful conduct in the second appeal. Remanded for further proceedings in the first appeal and a new trial in the second appeal. View "Wheelabrator Bridgeport, L.P. v. Bridgeport" on Justia Law

The Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Meriden granted a variance to Mark Development, LLC to use a parcel of real property located in a regional development zone as a used car dealership on the grounds that the effect of applying the Meriden Zoning Regulations was so severe as to amount to a practical confiscation. Plaintiffs, the City of Meriden and two of its officers, appealed from the Board’s decision granting the variance. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ appeal in part and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to sustain Plaintiffs’ appeal, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been deprived of all reasonable uses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court correctly found that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been practically confiscated. View "Caruso v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

A nearly century old dispute among neighbors in a housing development along the Long Island Sound over access to the shore has given rise to numerous actions, two of which have reached the Supreme Court over the past decade. At issue in the present consolidated appeals was whether certain prior actions barred, via the doctrine of res judicata, two claims in Plaintiffs’ consolidated quiet title actions. The trial court denied Defendants’ motions for summary as to those claims pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claims were not sufficiently similar to those asserted in the prior actions such that they should have been brought in the same action; and (2) Plaintiffs were not in privity with other lot owners involved in prior actions. View "Wheeler v. Beachcroft" on Justia Law