Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed to the superior court from the decision of the planning and zoning commission of the town of Clinton (Defendant), granting, subject to certain conditions, its applications for a special permit and for coastal site plan review. Plaintiff caused Defendant to be served with a complaint, but the complaint was not accompanied by a citation or a summons. The trial court dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of personal jurisdiction because the service of process did not conform to the requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-8(f)(2). Plaintiff appealed, claiming that, although the service of process was defective, it should have been allowed to add the citation and serve the corrected process pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-72. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's failure to attach a summons or citations to the complaint was a substantive defect in the service of process and, thus, was not the type of technical defect that was amendable pursuant to section 52-72. View "New England Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

The zoning board of appeals of the town of Madison (board) approved a variance to replace Plaintiffs' house on the footprint of the prior structure. After Plaintiffs built a new house on the property, Plaintiffs submitted an application for a certificate of zoning compliance seeking approval to convert their present balcony into a large, uncovered deck. The proposed deck would fully comply with the zoning regulations but arguably would not comply with the previously approved variance. The zoning officer denied the application, and the board upheld the decision. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the board could not deny Plaintiffs' application because the footprint limitation was not expressly described in the certificate of variance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) conditions attached to the granting of a variance are not to be construed solely on the basis of the language in the certificate of variance; and (2) the board properly denied Plaintiffs' application for a certificate of zoning compliance. Remanded. View "Anatra v. Town of Madison Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff interred her husband's remains in the backyard of her property. The town's zoning compliance officer issued a cease and desist order for violation of the town's zoning regulation. Plaintiff appealed to the town zoning board of appeals, seeking a variance. Subsequently, the compliance officer withdrew the order to allow Plaintiff to remedy the violation. Plaintiff then notified the board she was withdrawing her objection to the order. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced an action in the trial requesting a judgment declaring she had the right to use her property for the interment of her and her husband's remains. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint because Plaintiff had failed her exhaust her administrative remedies by not appealing to the board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's failure to pursue her appeal and, thereby, to exhaust her administrative remedies left the trial court without jurisdiction over her action for a declaratory judgment; and (2) because Plaintiff was actually challenging the proper interpretation of the town zoning regulations, which was a function of the board, Plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Piquet v. Chester" on Justia Law

Defendants, State Five Industrial Park and Jean Farricielli, appealed from a trial court judgment holding them liable, after invoking both reverse and traditional veil piercing principles, for a $3.8 million judgment rendered against Jean's husband, Joseph Farricielli, and five corporations that he owned and/or controlled, in an environmental enforcement action brought by Plaintiffs, the commissioner of environmental protection, the town of Hamden, and the town's zoning enforcement officer. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the facts that were proven in this case did not warrant reverse veil piercing, and judgment on Plaintiffs' veil piercing claims should be rendered in favor of Defendants. View "Comm'r of Envtl. Prot. v. State Five Indus. Park, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the town of Bozrah and the town's zoning enforcement officer, brought an action seeking a temporary and permanent injunction to enjoin Defendants, owners and residents of certain property, from refusing to consent to an inspection of their property for zoning violations. The trial court granted a temporary injunction preventing Defendants from refusing to allow the inspection, concluding that pursuant to Camara v. Municipal Court, the reasonable governmental interest in stabilizing property values and promoting the general welfare justified an inspection in the present action. Defendants appealed, claiming that the trial court's order violated their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a zoning official may inspect a single property pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-12 if the official first obtains an injunction issued upon probable cause by a judicial officer; and (2) because the trial court failed to make a preliminary determination of probable cause to believe that a zoning violation existed on the property, its order permitting a search of Defendants' property violated the Fourth Amendment. Remanded. View "Bozrah v. Chmurynski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a development company, brought an action against Defendants, several entities including the City, alleging Defendants had violated the Connecticut Antitrust Act by engaging in an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's amended complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to allege an antitrust injury. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants took bribes and kickbacks in exchange for steering public contracts did not state a cognizable antitrust claim, and therefore, the appellate court and trial court properly granted Defendants' motions to strike Plaintiff's amended complaint. View "Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim" on Justia Law

Defendant landowner applied for a zoning change to designate its parcel as a business and commercial zone and for a special exception permit for approval of the site plan of its shopping center project. The Town's Planning and Zoning Commission denied the zone change application and denied as moot Defendant's application for a special exception permit. Defendants appealed, and the trial court judge, Judge Owens, approved Defendant's application for a zone change. During the pendency of Defendant's zone change appeal and upon receipt of Judge Owens's decision, the Commission approved the special exception permit but took no official action regarding the zone change application. Plaintiffs, several individuals, appealed, arguing that the commission acted improperly when it approved Defendant's special exception permit. The superior court sustained the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly revisited the prior judgment of Judge Owens and too narrowly construed the effect of Owens's decision as well as the actions taken by the Commission in reviewing and approving Defendant's application for the special exception permit. Remanded. View "Zimnoch v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n " on Justia Law

This case centered on the scope of an implied easement located on a lawn that lay between a beachfront development and Long Island Sound. Plaintiffs owned waterfront lots in the development and Defendants owned rear lots. The trial court concluded that the implied easement over the lawn in favor of Defendants conferred only a right-of-way to access the shoreline. Defendants appealed, and an intervening plaintiff cross appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed with respect to the Defendants' appeals, and (2) reversed with respect to the cross appeal, holding that the trial court improperly ordered, in a supplemental memorandum of decision, that the right-of-way could also be used for the purpose of accessing areas other than the shoreline as the record disclosed no support for this finding. View "McBurney v. Paquin" on Justia Law

The present matter arose from three related tax appeals involving Plaintiff Goodspeed Airport's property that consisted of a commercial utility airport and forty-three acres of open fields. The superior court denied relief on Plaintiff's claim seeking reclassification and assessment of certain of its real property as open space and disposed of all three appeals. The appellate court concluded that (1) 13.08 acres of Plaintiff's property were ineligible for open space classification; and (2) Plaintiff, notwithstanding the ongoing improper classification of its property by Defendant, the town of East Haddam, was not entitled to judicial relief from the improper assessment of its forty-three acres. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that the trial court properly determined that the 13.08 acres were ineligible for open space classification and that Plaintiff was not aggrieved pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a on the basis of Defendant's ongoing overassessment of the forty-three acres. Remanded. View "Goodspeed Airport, L.L.C. v. East Haddam" on Justia Law

Letitia Kilby filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming unlawful housing discrimination by Defendants, the town housing authority and a property management company. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred. The trial court then granted Defendants' request to file a civil action in the trial court. Kilby moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that although the statute at issue, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-83(d)(2), did not expressly grant Kilby a right of intervention, it impliedly granted Kilby a right of intervention. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal, but while the case was pending, the legislature enacted Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, which amended the text of section 46a-83 to allow a complainant to intervene as of right in a housing discrimination action brought by the commission on behalf of the complainant. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the significance of Defendants' appeal was substantially undermined by Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, and, thus, certification was improvidently granted. View "Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Litchfield Housing Auth." on Justia Law