Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of robbery in the first degree as an accessory and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. The jury further found that a firearm had been used in the commission of the robbery. Although only Defendant’s accomplice was armed during the commission of the robbery, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an enhanced sentence pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-202k, which provides for a mandatory prison term when a person uses, or is armed with and threatens to use, a firearm in the commission of a felony. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court should either overrule its holding in State v. Davis that section 53-202k applies to unarmed accomplices or limit the applicability of section 53-202k to unarmed accomplices who intend that a firearm be used in the commission of the underlying offense. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) there are several reasons to decline Defendant’s invitation to overrule or otherwise limit Davis; and (2) in light of Davis, the state was not required to also prove that Defendant intended that a firearm would be used during the robbery. View "State v. Flemke" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-48(a). Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that, to find Defendant guilty of the conspiracy charge, it must find that he had specifically intended that the planned robbery would involve the display or threatened use of what was represented to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. The Appellate Court agreed with Defendant and reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, to be convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree, a defendant must specifically intend that there would be the display or threatened use of what was represented as a deadly weapon or dangerous object during the robbery or immediate flight therefrom. View "State v. Pond" on Justia Law

Defendant financed his purchase of a used car with a retail installment loan from Plaintiff. Defendant defaulted on the loan, so Plaintiff repossessed the car and sold it. Plaintiff then brought this action against Defendant seeking a deficiency judgment, interest, and attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages and costs and attorney’s fees. The court also awarded prejudgment interest under Conn. Gen. Stat. 37-1 at the contract rate of 9.14 percent and discretionary postjudgment interest under Conn. Gen. Stat. 37-3a at an annual rate of two percent. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly awarded discretionary postjudgment interest pursuant to section 37-3a. The Appellate Court affirmed, determining that the entry of judgment terminated the accrual of postmaturity interest on the loan, leaving any award of postjudgment interest to the trial court’s discretionary powers under Conn. Gen. Stat. 37-3a(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court improperly concluded that postmaturity interest terminates upon the entry of judgment in the absence of a specific agreement for postjudgment interest; and (2) because the parties’ loan contract did not disclaim postmaturity interest Plaintiff was entitled to postmaturity interest under section 37-1(b). View "Sikorsky Fin. Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts" on Justia Law

The underlying case here was a child protection case concerning the minor children of Mother and Father, who were parties to a pending marital dissolution proceeding. Father filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the children were unconstitutionally in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families. While the allegations in the habeas petition concerned matters that should have been kept confidential, the petition was temporarily made available to the public because Father filed it electronically as a civil matter rather than as a confidential juvenile matter. When reporters at a Newspaper learned about it, they contacted Mother, who requested an injunction seeking to prohibit the Newspaper from publishing information about the case. The trial court issued an injunction that prohibited the Newspaper from publishing the contents of the habeas petition. The Newspaper appealed. Thereafter, the trial court, sua sponte, vacated the injunction, concluding that it was no longer warranted because of subsequent factual developments in the case. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal on the grounds of mootness, holding that the trial court’s vacatur order rendered the Newspaper’s appeal moot, and none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. View "In re Emma F." on Justia Law

Getty Properties Corp. leased certain properties to Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. by way of a master lease. Getty Marketing sublet the properties to Green Valley Oil, LLC. Thereafter, Green Valley entered into an individual sub-sublease with each Defendant, the owners of retail gasoline stations. Getty Properties subsequently terminated the master lease. Getty Marketing then filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court rejected the master lease and ordered that Getty Marketing relinquish possession of the properties to Getty Properties. Getty Properties and NECG Holdings Corp. served Defendants with notices to quit, but Defendants refused to vacate the properties. Plaintiffs subsequently commenced summary process actions against Defendants. The trial court rendered judgment of immediate possession for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiffs’ notices to quit were valid; (2) admitting into evidence the lease between Getty Properties and Getty Marketing, as well as the sublease between Getty Marketing and Green Valley; (3) interpreting the various pleadings in Getty Marketing’s bankruptcy case as terminating the lease and the sublease; (4) finding that Plaintiffs proved a prima facie case for summary process; and (5) failing to dismiss the summary process action as premature. View "Getty Props. Corp. v. ATKR, LLC" on Justia Law

When the marriage of Kathleen and Robert Parisi was dissolved, the trial court incorporated into the judgment of dissolution a separation agreement the parties had previously entered into. Kathleen later filed a motion for contempt, order and clarification, seeking to compel Robert to satisfy, in a particular manner, a financial obligation set forth in the separation agreement. The trial court (1) refused to hold Robert in contempt, citing the lack of evidence of Robert’s noncompliance; and (2) denied Kathleen’s requests to issue an order of compliance or to clarify the agreement, concluding that the agreement was clear and concise. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the trial court (1) properly declined to hold Robert in contempt because the separation agreement was ambiguous; and (2) improperly held that the agreement was clear and concise. Remanded for clarification of the agreement and an accompanying order of compliance. View "Parisi v. Parisi" on Justia Law

This negligence action arose when a ten-year-old boy dragged a piece of concrete up to his family’s third floor apartment and dropped it to the ground below. The boy had removed from the backyard of the apartment building that the residents shared. The concrete struck seven-year-old Adriana Ruiz on the head, causing very serious brain injuries. Adriana’s parent and Adriana filed this negligence action against Victory Properties, LLC, the owner of the apartment building, alleging that Defendant was negligent in failing to remove the loose concrete and other debris from the backyard of the apartment building and that this negligence was a cause of Adriana’s injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Adriana’s injuries were not foreseeable. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury determination of their claim that Defendant bore at least some responsibility for Adriana’s injuries. View "Ruiz v. Victory Props., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, the trial court ordered the dissolution of the marriage of Cary Brody and Felicia Brody and awarded Felicia a $2.5 million lump sum alimony payment. Thereafter, the court issued a postjudgment order finding Cary in contempt for failing to turn over certain property to a third party bailee. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) properly based its alimony award on a finding that Cary committed adultery; (2) properly based its alimony award on conduct that was subject to a prior written stipulation between the parties; and (3) improperly concluded that a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof governs indirect civil contempt proceedings. Rather, findings of indirect civil contempt must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Remanded for a new hearing with respect to the trial court’s postjudgment order. View "Brody v. Brody" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were a private company that owned property in the town of Rocky Hill and a company overseeing the development of a nursing home on that property. Defendants contracted with the state to provide nursing home services to state prisoners and others in state custody. The town filed an action against Defendants claiming noncompliance with its zoning regulations. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding (1) Defendants were an “arm of the state” entitled to sovereign immunity; and (2) even if Defendants were not shielded by sovereign immunity as an arm of the state, the town’s zoning authority over the project was preempted by Conn. Gen. Stat. 17b-372a, which permits certain state officials to contract for the establishment of nursing home facilities for state prisoners and individuals receiving services from the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants were not immune from suit as an arm of the state; and (2) by enacting section 17b-372a, the legislature did not intend to preempt the application of local zoning laws to facilities established on private land under the authority of that provision. View "Town of Rocky Hill v. SecureCare Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the administratrix of the estate of Georgette Dufresne, settled actions against two motorists whose negligence Plaintiff alleged caused Dufresne’s death. Plaintiff brought this action against Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Dufresne’s underinsured motorist carrier, alleging that she was entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits under Dufresne’s policy. Allstate moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff was not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits because she had received payments from her settlements in an amount that exceeded Dufresne’s policy limit. The trial court agreed with Allstate and rendered judgment in its favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “an underinsured motorist carrier is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when all alleged tortfeasors settle the insured’s claims against them for the injuries giving rise to the underinsured motorist claim in an aggregate sum in excess of the policy limits.” View "Guarino v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law