Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action alleging negligence on the part of employees or agents of Defendants, Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center and Women’s Health Associates, P.C., during the delivery of her child and at postpartum office visits. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a(c) on the ground that the physician opinion letter submitted by Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of section 52-190a(1) because the letter was not authored by a similar health care provider, as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-184c(c). Specifically, because Plaintiff brought this action principally on the basis of vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of certain certified midwives, Defendants argued that Plaintiff was required to submit an opinion letter authored by a certified nurse-midwife or registered nurse. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiff provided an opinion letter of a physician who is board certified in obstetrics, which is the same specialty practiced by the nurse-midwives, Plaintiff fulfilled the requirements of section 52-184c(c) and 52-190a. Remanded. View "Wilkins v. Conn. Childbirth & Women's Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a subcontract with a general contractor to perform work on a public construction project. The general contractor provided a payment bond with Defendant, a surety on the project. Plaintiff later submitted to the general contractor a request for equitable adjustment to the subcontract to recoup additional costs allegedly incurred as a result of the general contractor’s deficient performance. When the general contractor did not respond to the claims, Plaintiff sent Defendant notice of its claim. Defendant failed either to pay or to deny notice of the claim within ninety days as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-42(a). Plaintiff subsequently sued Defendant in federal district court, alleging that Defendant had waived any substantive defenses, and Plaintiff was therefore entitled to judgment in the full amount of the claim. The district court certified questions of law to the Supreme Court regarding the correct interpretation of section 49-42(a). The Supreme Court answered that a surety’s failure to pay or deny a claim under section 49-42(a) within the ninety day deadline is tantamount to a denial of the claim and does not constitute a waiver of the surety’s right to defend the claim on the merits. View "Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of State of Penn." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant each owned fifty percent of an LLC, which owned commercial real estate (the premises). Plaintiff agreed to sell his interest in the LLC to Defendant. The parties subsequently executed a buyout agreement that provided for a certain purchase price and contained a contingency clause requiring Defendant to pay Plaintiff an addition to the purchase price if specified conditions were met. The parties closed on the sale under the buyout agreement. Defendant then sold the entire premises to a third party. Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant alleging that Defendant breached the buyout agreement by not paying Plaintiff a contingent addition to the purchase price as required by the contingency clause. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. A divided Appellate Court panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) properly determined that the contract at issue was unambiguous; and (2) properly affirmed the trial court’s postjudgment interest award where the trial court declined to award prejudgment interest. View "Salce v. Wolczek" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of intentional manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his conviction violated his constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy because a reasonable possibility existed that he was acquitted of the offense at an earlier trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s conviction did not violate right against double jeopardy; and (2) any error committed by the trial court in construing the term “crime of violence” and in instructing the jury on the elements of the various offenses that fall within the definition of “crime of violence” was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Terwilliger" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and larceny in the first degree. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment. Nearly nine years later, Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his counsel failed to call two witnesses whose testimony would have contradicted that of an important state’s witness regarding Petitioner’s motive to commit the offenses for which he was found guilty. The habeas court denied the petition and, further, denied Petitioner’s request for certification to appeal. The Appellate Court dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that assuming, without deciding, that the habeas court’s denial of certification was an abuse of discretion, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to a new trial. View "Sanchez v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the third degree and larceny in the second degree. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that (1) Public Acts 2009, No. 09-138, 2, which amended the second degree larceny statute to increase the value of property stolen necessary to constitute the offense, was not intended to be an ameliorative act that applied retroactively; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain uncharged misconduct evidence concerning Defendant’s activities in another location. View "State v. Cote" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the third degree and larceny in the second degree. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state to introduce evidence of Defendant’s uncharged misconduct to prove his intent to commit the charged crimes; and (2) Public Acts 2009, No. 09-138, 2, which amended the second degree larceny statute to increase the value of property stolen necessary to constitute the offense, does not apply retroactively. View "State v. Kalil" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when she fell on a patch of snow and ice on a sidewalk. The sidewalk was owned by the town of Enfield and abutted the property of Defendants, private landowners. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that town ordinances requiring landowners whose property abuts public sidewalks to clear those sidewalks of ice and snow does not impose civil liability on the property owners for injuries to third parties. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that, although the ordinances did not transfer civil liability on the property owners, Defendants may be held liable under alternative negligence theories. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s alternative theories of common-law liability based on negligence failed and that liability was not shifted to the landowners in this case. View "Robinson v. Cianfarini" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree. On appeal, Defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of four of Defendant's prior felony convictions to impeach his credibility because the four felonies at issue were more than ten years old and “did not bear directly on his veracity.” The Appellate Court agreed with Defendant but concluded that the impropriety was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly determined that the admission of Defendant’s record of prior convictions constituted harmless error. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of assault of public safety personnel. Defendant appealed, arguing that his rights to equal protection were violated, along with the same rights of a venireperson, C.D., who was excluded from the jury on the basis of C.D.’s answer to a question about race. Defendant further argued that the Supreme Court should exercise its supervisory authority to disallow peremptory challenges based on answers to the question about race in the juror questionnaire. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the constitutional rights of Defendant and C.D. were not violated, as the prosecutor articulated a race neutral, nonpretextual explanation for his peremptory challenge; and (2) the Court declines to invoke its supervisory authority in the present case. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law