Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the interest rates applicable to pawnbroker repurchase agreements are governed by the pawnbroker interest rate statute or the usury statute or whether these agreements are regulated at all. Defendant-pawnbroker entered into five separate repurchase transactions with Plaintiff pursuant to which Plaintiff agreed to sell personal property items for Defendant and to hold those items subject to Plaintiff’s right to repurchase them. After a dispute over the fees Defendant charged Plaintiff to secure the right to repurchase those items, Plaintiff brought this action claiming, inter alia, that Defendant’s actions violated the pawnbroker interest rate statute. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the rate limits set forth in the pawnbroker interest rate statute do not apply to repurchase transactions. The district court certified questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the pawnbroker interest rate statute does not govern the rates that pawnbrokers may charge in connection with repurchase agreements; and (2) the interest rates applicable to pawnbroker repurchase agreements are governed by the usury statute. View "Gilmore v. Pawn King, Inc." on Justia Law

After a malpractice action was filed against a physician licensed by the Commissioner of Public Health (Department), the Department and the physician entered into a consent order, designated as a public document, indicating that the physician had agreed to a reprimand on his license and a civil penalty. A newspaper (Newspaper) subsequently made a request to the Department under the Freedom of Information Act (Act) for the records reviewed by a consultant in connection the Department’s investigation into the case, including an exhibit (exhibit A). After the Department failed to produce exhibit A, the Newspaper filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission). The Department argued before the Commission that exhibit A contained Practitioner Data Bank and Healthcare Data Bank records and that federal law provided a basis to withhold those records. The Commission concluded (1) federal regulations barred disclosure of records received from the Healthcare Data Bank, but (2) regulations did not bar disclosure of records received from the Practitioner Data Bank. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that none of the records were not subject to public disclosure under the Act.View "Comm’r of Pub. Health v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Connecticut Siting Council approved a proposed project of the Connecticut Light and Power Company. Plaintiffs appealed the siting counsel’s decision while the power company’s motion for reconsideration of the decision, with regard to the denial of a second project, was still pending. The siting council subsequently granted the motion for reconsideration and approved the second project. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs had not appealed from a final decision of the siting council. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in its judgment.View "Citizens Against Overhead Power Line Constr. v. Conn. Siting Council" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s decedent received medical care and treatment from Defendants and, thereafter, died in August 2007. Plaintiff extended the two-year statute of limitations contained in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-555 until November 2009, at which point Plaintiff sent a summons and complaint to a marshal and requested that Defendants be served. Due to an error on the part of the marshal, the trial court dismissed the claims against Defendants in April 2011 for improper service. In December 2011, Plaintiff commenced the present wrongful death action. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of the two-year statute of limitations, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-592, the accidental failure of suit statute, did not operate to save Plaintiff’s action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly determined that section 52-592 did not save the action. Remanded. View "Dorry v. Garden" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree. During trial, in seeking to imply that the complainant had a motive to testify favorably for the State, Defendant sought to question the complainant on recross-examination about the conditions of her participation in a pretrial diversionary program on a felony charge pending against her in an unrelated case. The trial court concluded that the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence was greater than its probative value. The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the trial court violated Defendant’s right to confrontation by precluding Defendant from eliciting such evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the testimony he sought to obtain and the complainant’s motive to testify favorably for the State to implicate his right to confrontation. View "State v. Benedict" on Justia Law

Walter Hopkins was severely injured as a result of the second of two vehicle collisions. Hopkins was the passenger in an Infiniti, which struck the side of a vehicle driven by Matthew Vincent, a volunteer firefighter. Vincent pursued the Infiniti at high speeds in his vehicle, at which time he relayed information via cell phone regarding the Infiniti and its location to Ellen Vece, a 911 dispatcher employed by the Town of Clinton. The Infiniti eventually crashed into a tree. Hopkins required permanent care as a result of his injuries. An action was filed on Hopkins' behalf against the Town, among others. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, finding (1) the Town was liable under the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity; and (2) Vece’s failure to act was a proximate cause of Hopkins’ injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity did not apply in this case because the circumstances would not have made it apparent to Vece that her failure to instruct Vincent to stop following the Infiniti likely would have subjected Hopkins to imminent harm.View "Edgerton v. Town of Clinton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant alleging, inter alia, fraud and civil theft. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff on eight counts of the complaint and awarded him $342,648 in compensatory damages. The court also found Plaintiff was entitled to “punitive damages in the form of attorney’s fees” on four of the counts. After Defendant filed this appeal, the trial court awarded Plaintiff $23,400 in punitive damages, which represented the amount claimed in attorney’s fees. Thereafter, the Appellate Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal for lack of a final judgment by relying on its decision in Lord v. Mansfield. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed Defendant’s appeal for lack of a final judgment. The Court held that Lord was wrongly decided because it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Paranteau v. DeVita, which adopted the bright line rule that “a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even though the recoverability or amount of attorney’s fees for the litigation remains to be determined.” View "Hylton v. Gunter" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of murder and related crimes for his role in the shooting death of Aaron McCrea. At trial, Defendant sought to introduce witness statements contained in a search warrant affidavit that purportedly implicated other individuals in the shooting. The trial court sustained the State’s objection, concluding that the statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. Defendant was subsequently convicted of all charges. Defendant appealed, arguing that he functionally preserved his claim that the statements in the search warrant affidavit should have been admitted under one of the hearsay exceptions and, in the alternative, his claim should be reviewed pursuant to State v. Golding. The Supreme Court rejected both of Defendant’s arguments, holding (1) Defendant failed to preserve his claim, functionally or otherwise; and (2) the claim was not of a constitutional nature such that review was warranted pursuant to Golding. View "State v. Santana" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case was stillborn. Plaintiffs, as coadministrators of the estate of the decedent, filed this action against Defendants, who provided prenatal care to the decedent’s mother, alleging that Defendants’ negligent failure to diagnose and treat the mother’s gestational diabetes caused the decedent’s stillbirth. At the close of Plaintiffs’ evidence the trial court granted Defendants' motion for a directed verdict, concluding that Plaintiffs had insufficient evidence to establish their claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in precluding two of their expert witnesses - physicians board certified in obstetrics and gynecology - from opining that the mother’s untreated gestational diabetes caused the decedent’s stillbirth. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the expert testimony on the basis that the expert witnesses were not qualified to render an opinion on the cause of the decedent’s stillbirth. Remanded. View "Weaver v. McKnight" on Justia Law

Defendant’s conviction for threatening in the second degree and breach of the peace in the second degree arose out of statements he made to an attorney that represented the Town of Waterford in a zoning dispute with Defendant. On appeal, Defendant argued that his statements were protected by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution because they were not real or true threats. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on both charges, as Defendant’s statements did not rise to the level of a true threat and were therefore entitled to the protection of the First Amendment despite their inflammatory nature. View "State v. Krijger" on Justia Law