Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff property owner sent a letter to a zoning enforcement officer for the Town of Darien, asserting that permits obtained by her adjoining neighbor had been illegally issued. Plaintiff received no response to that letter. Plaintiff filed an application to appeal. The town zoning board of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s application for lack of a timely appeal and lack of a “decision” from which an appeal could lie. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the board, concluding that substantial evidence supported the board’s determination that the town zoning enforcement officer did not make a decision that could be appealed. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the zoning enforcement officer rendered a decision that could be appealed either because (1) he actually made a determination regarding the merit of the violations alleged in her letter that he declined to communicate, or (2) because town zoning regulations obligated him to respond to or act upon the illegality alleged in Plaintiff's letter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the zoning enforcement officer’s action or inaction with respect to Plaintiff’s letter did not give rise to an independent “decision” from which an appeal to the board would lie.View "Reardon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of four counts of sexual assault in the first degree and four counts of risk of injury to a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) permitting the state to use a video recording of a forensic interview of the child victim for substantive purposes, and (2) giving a certain jury instruction. The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court reasonably concluded the video recording of the child victim’s interview was admissible, and (2) Defendant implicitly waived his right to raise his second claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video recording into evidence; and (2) assuming, without deciding, that Defendant’s claim of instructional impropriety was not implicitly waived, the instruction did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "State v. Carrion" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress pretrial and in-court identifications of Defendant; (2) the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion to have the jury view the scene of the crime; (3) the state met its burden of disproving Defendant’s justification of self-defense; and (4) the trial court did not commit plain error in its charge to the jury on Defendant’s claim of self-defense when it defined an “initial aggressor” as a person who appeared to threaten the imminent use of physical force. View "State v. Revels" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a father and his son (minor plaintiff), filed a personal injury action when a horse, which was kept at a facility owned by Defendants, bit the minor plaintiff. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants had actual or constructive notice that the horse had mischievous propensities. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly concluded as a matter of law that the keeper of a domestic animal has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries that are foreseeable because the animal belongs to a class of animals that has a propensity to cause such injuries regardless of whether the animal had previously caused an injury; and (2) the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the minor plaintiff's injury was foreseeable because horses have a natural propensity to bite. Remanded.View "Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained Defendant, a law firm, to represent Plaintiff in an action against other parties. After Plaintiff settled the underlying suit, Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant breached its duty of undivided loyalty and failed to follow Plaintiff’s instructions in the underlying lawsuit. The trial court characterized the allegations against Defendant as sounding in legal malpractice and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims. At issue on appeal was whether Plaintiff’s cause of action was one for malpractice, to which a three-year statute of limitation applied, or contract, to which a six-year statute of limitations applied. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly characterized Plaintiff’s claim as sounding in legal malpractice.View "Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought compensation for injuries he sustained while employed with his employer. The employer’s insurer at the time Plaintiff filed his claim entered into a voluntary agreement on the claim and subsequently sought apportionment against Employer’s prior insurers, including Republic-Franklin Insurance Company. Republic-Franklin did not agree to its apportionment liability until just before the close of evidence. Thereafter, the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner ordered Republic-Franklin to pay interest pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-299b. The Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding that the Commissioner’s order of interest was proper because (1) the Commissioner satisfied the statutory prerequisites of section 31-299b; and (2) Republic-Franklin failed to preserve its claim that the Commissioner’s order of interest was not made within a reasonable period of time as required by section 31-299b. View "Ferraro v. Ridgefield European Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

BNE Energy, Inc. submitted two petitions for declaratory rulings seeking the Connecticut Siting Council’s approval for the construction and operation of three electric generating wind turbines on two separate properties in the town of Colebrook. Plaintiffs intervened in the proceedings. The Council approved the petitions with conditions, and Plaintiffs appealed. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that the Council (1) had jurisdiction over BNE’s petitions; (2) was authorized to attach conditions to its approval of the petitions; (3) was authorized to approve the petitions even though it had not determined that the proposed projects comply with state noise law; (4) properly approved of shorter hub heights for one of the projects; and (5) did not deprive Plaintiffs of their right to fundamental fairness during the hearings on the petitions. View "FairwindCT, Inc. v. Conn. Siting Council" on Justia Law

In connection with his charge of interfering with an officer, Defendant applied for, and was accepted into, an accelerated rehabilitation program. After the expiration of his probationary period in the program, Defendant moved to dismiss the charge of interfering with an officer. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Defendant failed to satisfactorily complete the program because he was convicted of several unrelated crimes while participating in the program. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court did not have the discretion to consider the convictions because the conduct underlying the convictions took place before he was admitted into the program. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purpose of the accelerated rehabilitation statute is to grant onetime offenders an opportunity to maintain a clean criminal record, and therefore, a conviction obtained while participating in the program is contrary to the purpose of the statute and requires a finding of unsatisfactory completion. View "State v. Kevalis" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the interest rates applicable to pawnbroker repurchase agreements are governed by the pawnbroker interest rate statute or the usury statute or whether these agreements are regulated at all. Defendant-pawnbroker entered into five separate repurchase transactions with Plaintiff pursuant to which Plaintiff agreed to sell personal property items for Defendant and to hold those items subject to Plaintiff’s right to repurchase them. After a dispute over the fees Defendant charged Plaintiff to secure the right to repurchase those items, Plaintiff brought this action claiming, inter alia, that Defendant’s actions violated the pawnbroker interest rate statute. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the rate limits set forth in the pawnbroker interest rate statute do not apply to repurchase transactions. The district court certified questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the pawnbroker interest rate statute does not govern the rates that pawnbrokers may charge in connection with repurchase agreements; and (2) the interest rates applicable to pawnbroker repurchase agreements are governed by the usury statute. View "Gilmore v. Pawn King, Inc." on Justia Law

After a malpractice action was filed against a physician licensed by the Commissioner of Public Health (Department), the Department and the physician entered into a consent order, designated as a public document, indicating that the physician had agreed to a reprimand on his license and a civil penalty. A newspaper (Newspaper) subsequently made a request to the Department under the Freedom of Information Act (Act) for the records reviewed by a consultant in connection the Department’s investigation into the case, including an exhibit (exhibit A). After the Department failed to produce exhibit A, the Newspaper filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission). The Department argued before the Commission that exhibit A contained Practitioner Data Bank and Healthcare Data Bank records and that federal law provided a basis to withhold those records. The Commission concluded (1) federal regulations barred disclosure of records received from the Healthcare Data Bank, but (2) regulations did not bar disclosure of records received from the Practitioner Data Bank. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that none of the records were not subject to public disclosure under the Act.View "Comm’r of Pub. Health v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law