Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a property owner in Fairfield, Connecticut, sought approval from the town's zoning commission to build a forty-unit affordable housing development. The application included a request for a text amendment to the zoning regulations and approval of a site plan and certificate of zoning compliance. The proposed building exceeded the height limits of the residence A zone district, where the property is located, which typically allows only single-family dwellings with a maximum height of thirty-two feet.The zoning commission denied the text amendment request, citing inconsistency with the town's plan of conservation and development, among other reasons. However, it conditionally approved the site plan and certificate of zoning compliance, provided the building height was reduced to three stories and forty feet. The commission justified the height restriction by stating that the proposed building's visibility from a nearby historic district would harm the district's integrity, which it deemed a substantial public interest.The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which consolidated the case with an appeal from four intervenors who opposed the development. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the commission had improperly failed to apply the standards of Connecticut's affordable housing statute (§ 8-30g) to the text amendment request. The court also concluded that the commission did not meet its burden of proving that the height restriction was necessary to protect a substantial public interest that outweighed the need for affordable housing.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision regarding the height restriction, agreeing that the commission failed to demonstrate that the restriction was necessary to protect a substantial public interest in historic preservation that outweighed the need for affordable housing. However, the Supreme Court partially reversed the trial court's decision on the text amendment, ruling that § 8-30g applied only to the plaintiff's property and not to the entire residence A zone district. The case was remanded with instructions to grant the text amendment limited to the plaintiff's property. View "131 Beach Road, LLC v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

A nonprofit association of homeowners in Woodbridge appealed a decision by the Connecticut Siting Council, which approved a telecommunications company's application to construct a cell phone tower in the town. The plaintiff intervened in the administrative proceeding, arguing that the proposed tower would unreasonably impact nearby scenic resources and vistas. During the hearings, the council stated that property values were not among the statutory criteria to be considered. The telecommunications company presented evidence that the tower would improve cell coverage, while the plaintiff's consultant argued that alternative locations would provide better coverage with less impact on residential neighborhoods.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal, concluding that the council's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was reasonable. The court noted that the council had considered evidence from residents about the tower's impact on property values and had sufficiently considered alternative locations but found the approved site to be the most appropriate.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the plaintiff had standing to raise the claim about property values. However, the court concluded that a facility's impact on property values is not an enumerated or unenumerated significant adverse effect that the council must consider under the statute. The court also found that the council's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including extensive testimony and documentary evidence about the coverage provided by the proposed and alternative locations. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the council's approval of the tower. View "Woodbridge Newton Neighborhood Environmental Trust v. Connecticut Siting Council" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a manufacturer of resinous flooring systems, sued a former employee, the defendant, for breaching a noncompete agreement, violating the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), and breaching a common-law duty of confidentiality. The defendant, who had signed a noncompete agreement as a condition of continued employment, later established his own floor coating business and used the plaintiff’s proprietary information to develop competing products. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant also assisted competitors in developing their products.In a separate but related case, the trial court found the noncompete agreement unenforceable due to lack of consideration and ruled that the common-law duty of confidentiality claim was preempted by CUTSA. The court also determined that a payment made to the defendant after his resignation was severance pay, not compensation for reaffirming the noncompete agreement. Based on these findings, the trial court in the present case granted summary judgment for the defendant, applying collateral estoppel to preclude further consideration of the issues.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court had incorrectly determined the noncompete agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment on the breach of the noncompete agreement claim and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the agreement was supported by adequate consideration. The court upheld the trial court’s findings that the severance payment was not consideration for reaffirming the noncompete agreement and that the common-law duty of confidentiality claim was preempted by CUTSA. These rulings were binding in the present case. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part, with further proceedings required to determine the enforceability and potential breach of the noncompete agreement. View "Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a developer and manufacturer of resinous flooring systems, sued several individual and corporate defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets, among other claims. The key individual defendant, S, was a former employee who developed a product called Poly-Crete for the plaintiff. After resigning, S started his own business and developed similar products, allegedly using the plaintiff’s trade secrets. The plaintiff claimed that S and other defendants, including companies that tested and used S’s products, misappropriated its trade secrets.The trial court conducted a bench trial in three phases. In the first phase, the court found that the plaintiff’s formulas for Poly-Crete and other products were trade secrets but ruled that the noncompete agreement S signed was unenforceable due to lack of consideration. The court also found that the plaintiff’s common-law confidentiality claim was preempted by the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA).In the second phase, the court found that S and some defendants misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets to create products like ProKrete and ProSpartic. However, it ruled that other defendants, including Indue, Krone, ECI, and Merrifield, did not misappropriate the trade secrets as they did not know or have reason to know about the misappropriation. The court also granted attorney’s fees to Krone and ECI, finding the plaintiff’s claims against them were made in bad faith.In the third phase, the court ordered the defendants who misappropriated the trade secrets to disgorge profits and enjoined them from using the trade secrets. The court also sanctioned the plaintiff for attempted spoliation of evidence by its president, F, who tried to remove incriminating photos from the company’s Facebook page during the trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on most issues but reversed the judgment regarding the enforceability of the noncompete agreement and the standard for determining misappropriation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. View "Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a foreclosure judgment. The plaintiff, Susanne P. Wahba, had a loan secured by a mortgage on her property. The defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., acquired the loan and later counterclaimed to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, but the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and remanded the case for the setting of new law days. On remand, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion to reset the law days, arguing that the judgment of strict foreclosure did not account for the substantial increase in property values that had occurred during the appeal. The trial court concluded that it had no authority to revisit the merits of the strict foreclosure judgment, as it was bound by the Appellate Court’s rescript order requiring the setting of new law days. The plaintiff then filed a second appeal with the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata from entertaining the plaintiff’s request to modify the judgment of strict foreclosure and order a foreclosure by sale. The court also held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court lacked authority to entertain the plaintiff’s request. The court further held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff was required to file a motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure and to present evidence that the value of the subject property had substantially increased since the date of the original judgment before the trial court could exercise that authority. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wahba v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A man convicted of murder sued his former attorney and law firm for legal malpractice and fraud, alleging they failed to properly represent him in a federal civil rights action and a state habeas action. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims related to the habeas action, concluding they were not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction had not been invalidated. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the legal malpractice claim but reversed with respect to the fraud claim.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Court's reliance on a previous case that a criminally convicted plaintiff's failure to obtain appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction prior to commencing a criminal malpractice action renders the action unripe and presents an issue of justiciability that implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the Supreme Court determined that the question was whether a criminally convicted plaintiff who had not obtained appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction has alleged facts sufficient to state a valid cause of action for criminal malpractice. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice should have been the subject of a motion to strike rather than a motion to dismiss. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed with respect to the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooke v. Williams" on Justia Law

The defendant, Tyhitt Bember, was convicted of felony murder, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in connection with the shooting death of a victim. The defendant, armed with a revolver, had instructed a companion to follow the victim in a car. After confronting the victim on foot, the defendant decided to rob him. When the victim resisted, the defendant shot him five times. The state's case rested almost entirely on the testimony of two witnesses who were facing charges for their involvement in another homicide and had entered into cooperation agreements with the state. The defendant had allegedly confessed his involvement in the victim’s murder to one of these witnesses.The defense moved to preclude the state from introducing the cooperation agreements during its direct examination of the witnesses. The trial court granted the motion but ruled that the prosecutor would be permitted to use leading questions to flesh out the terms of the agreements. The defense also moved for a pretrial hearing regarding the reliability of the witnesses’ proposed trial testimony. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the witnesses’ proposed trial testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to question the witnesses during direct examination regarding the specific terms of their cooperation agreements with the state. The defendant also claimed that the prosecutor had impermissibly vouched for the witnesses’ credibility by introducing the truthfulness provisions of their cooperation agreements, eliciting testimony from the witnesses that their attorneys were present in the courtroom, and referencing their prior testimony in other criminal cases on behalf of the state. The defendant further claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion in concluding that the witnesses’ testimony was reliable and admissible.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the defendant had waived his claim regarding the prosecutor's questioning of the witnesses about their cooperation agreements. The court also held that the prosecutor's introduction of the truthfulness provisions of the witnesses' cooperation agreements did not constitute improper vouching. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the witnesses' proposed trial testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial. View "State v. Bember" on Justia Law

A man convicted of sexual assault and risk of injury to a child appealed his conviction, arguing that he was entitled to access the content of handwritten journals authored by the complainant. The complainant had revealed the existence of these journals during the trial, stating that they were created as part of her therapy following the abuse and contained details about her relationship with the defendant and the abuse he had inflicted. The defendant claimed that these journals constituted a "statement" under relevant rules of practice and that his rights were violated as the prosecutors did not personally review the journals for exculpatory information.The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the defendant had waived his claim to the journals and that the prosecutors were not constitutionally required to personally review the journals. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which agreed with the state's alternative argument that the journals were not subject to disclosure because they did not constitute a statement that was adopted or approved by the complainant. The court also concluded that the Brady review of the journals by a nonlawyer member of the state’s attorney’s office was constitutionally adequate. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "State v. C." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the adoption of certain amendments to Fenwick’s zoning regulations by the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick (the Commission). The plaintiffs, who owned real property in Fenwick, appealed the Commission's decision, arguing that the Commission had unlawfully adopted the amendments by failing to publish notice of its decision in a newspaper with a substantial circulation in Fenwick, as required by statute. The Commission moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was untimely. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Commission's failure to publish the amendment in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick rendered it ineffective as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Commission properly published notice of its decision in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick. The court adopted an availability-centered test for determining whether a newspaper has a substantial or general circulation in a municipality. The court considered factors such as the type of news covered by the publication, its general availability in the municipality, the frequency of distribution, the existence of any cost barriers to access, and whether residents are aware of its use for the publication of legal notices. Applying this test, the court found that the Press was a newspaper of substantial circulation in Fenwick. Consequently, the plaintiffs' zoning appeal, which was filed more than fifteen days after the date that notice of the Commission's decision was published, was required to be dismissed. View "9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Public Health (DPH), Juanita Estrada, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the DPH retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure. Estrada's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals appointed as municipal directors of health. She approved an appointment without verifying the individual's credentials, which were later found to be false. After notifying her supervisor, the individual was removed from the position. Estrada then repeated the error with another appointment and received a letter of reprimand. She subsequently received another reprimand, multiple unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was demoted. Estrada filed grievances challenging these actions but did not raise a whistleblower retaliation claim. All grievances were denied. She then filed a whistleblower retaliation claim with the commission.The trial court concluded that the commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower complaint, that Estrada had not made a protected whistleblower disclosure, and that she had failed to establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the alleged retaliation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the merits in favor of the department. The commission appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.The Supreme Court held that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower retaliation claim. The court also held that an employee is entitled to whistleblower protection under the statute for reporting his or her own error. However, the court concluded that Estrada had failed to prove that the department’s adverse personnel actions were caused by Estrada’s reporting of her errors rather than the errors themselves. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada" on Justia Law