Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

As a result of Defendants’ negligence, Margaret Mueller was mistakenly diagnosed with the incorrect type of cancer. Mueller and her domestic partner of twenty-one years, Charlotte Stacy, brought this medical malpractice action against Defendants, seeking damages for Mueller’s personal injuries and Stacey’s loss of consortium. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to strike Stacey’s claims on the ground that Stacey and Mueller were not in a civil union or married before or during the dates of the negligent acts. The Appellate Court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs failed to state a legally sufficient claim for loss of consortium because they had not alleged that they would have married or entered into a civil union before the dates of Defendants’ negligent acts if they had not been barred from doing so under state law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment on grounds distinct from those of the trial court instead of remanding the case to provide Stacey with an opportunity to amend her complaint; and (2) if, on remand, Stacey amends her complaint to allege that she and Mueller would have been married when the underlying tort occurred if they had not been barred from doing so under state law, the trial court must deny Defendants’ motion to strike Stacey’s loss of consortium claims. Remanded. View "Mueller v. Tepler " on Justia Law

Catherine Whelan was appointed as the attorney for the minor children of the parties in a dissolution action and continued to represent the children during postjudgment proceedings. Whelan filed a motion seeking payment of outstanding fees and an allowance to participate in an appeal, which the trial court granted. Whelan then sought to recover the fees she owed to Arnold Rutkin, who represented her in the previous proceeding. The trial court granted the motion in part. Thereafter, Whelan filed a motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees for alleged litigation abuses, which the trial court denied. Whelan sought to appeal on behalf of the minor children, without success. These two appeals and writ of error followed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Whelan’s motion for permission to appeal on the minor children’s behalf after properly concluding that an appeal was not in the children’s best interests; (2) the trial court erred in awarding Rutkin’s fees; and (3) the trial court failed to apply the proper standard to Whelan’s claim of litigation misconduct. View "Perry v. Perry" on Justia Law

A mortgagee (Plaintiff) obtained a judgment of strict foreclosure against the mortgagor of certain property. More than thirty days after the time in which to redeem the subject property had expired, Plaintiff filed a motion for a deficiency judgment seeking to collect money damages from the guarantors of the mortgage note. The guarantors objected to the request for a hearing in damages, arguing that Plaintiff was barred from obtaining any additional remedy from the guarantors under Conn. Gen. Stat. 49-1, under which the foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to further action against persons liable for the payment of the mortgage debt, note or obligation who are, or may be, made parties to the foreclosure. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment in favor of the guarantors, holding that section 49-1 had no effect on Plaintiff’s ability to recover the remaining unpaid debt from the guarantors because the guarantors were not parties to the foreclosure claim, as the guarantors’ liability arose separately under their guarantee. View "JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Winthrop Props., LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of various criminal offenses in connection with the shooting of Johnnie Jones. On appeal, Defendant argued that the victim’s conduct in identifying Defendant as the perpetrator was unduly suggestive in violation of his due process rights. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the due process clauses of the Connecticut constitution provide protection against allegedly unduly suggestive eyewitness identification procedures undertaken by a private actor, even in the absence of any improper state action. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) any eyewitness identifications that are not tainted by any unduly suggestive state action do not implicate due process principles unless the identification was so unreliable that its admission deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial; and (2) because Defendant’s claim in this case that the victim’s identification of him as the perpetrator should be suppressed on the ground that it was unduly suggestive did not implicate the state constitution, and because Defendant did not raise the claim at trial, it was not reviewable. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2003, multiple residents of Greenwood Health Center, a nursing home, died or were injured when another resident set fire to the facility. Thirteen negligence actions seeking damages for wrongful death or serious bodily injury were filed against Greenwood, the lessee of the property housing Greenwood, the owner and lessor of the property, and the operator of Greenwood. Lexington Insurance Company (Plaintiff) brought this declaratory judgment action against the lessor of the Greenwood property, which was the insured party under a policy issued by Plaintiff, the other Greenwood entities, and the victims’ personal representatives. Following the filing of cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined the amount of coverage available under the policy and rendered judgment accordingly. Plaintiff appealed the judgment of the trial court determining available coverage, and four of the individual defendants cross appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court improperly interpreted the endorsement relating to the aggregate policy limit, thereby providing more coverage for the individual defendants’ claims than that to which they were entitled; and (2) the trial court improperly applied the self-insured retention endorsement to reduce the available coverage. Remanded. View "Lexington Ins. Co. v. Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly allowed the victim’s attorney to testify about an immunity agreement the attorney had negotiated with the State on behalf of the victim. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that, even if the trial court erred in permitting the victim’s attorney to testify, the admission of the testimony was harmless, and therefore, Defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was entitled to a new trial.View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to sell narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent and interfering with an officer. The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the appellate court abused its discretion by refusing to adopt the buyer-seller exception applied by federal courts in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy to sell narcotics. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the considerations embodied in the buyer-seller exception are already reflected in the laws of the state; and (2) the evidence demonstrated more than a mere buyer-seller relationship with Defendant’s coconspirator on a single occasion, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. View "State v. Allan" on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant was convicted of several offenses. Defendant also pleaded guilty to being a persistent dangerous felony offender and to being a persistent serious felony offender. Judge Espinosa sentenced Defendant to an enhanced sentence. In 2008, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that he was constitutionally entitled to have a jury determine whether extended incarceration would be in the public interest. The trial court dismissed the motion. Defendant subsequently filed a second motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that Judge Espinosa had failed to make the required finding that an enhanced sentence would best serve the public interest. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the alternative ground that Judge Espinosa made the necessary finding that imposing an enhanced sentence on Defendant would best serve the public interest. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Fairchild Heights Residents Association, Inc. (Association), filed suit against Defendant, Fairchild Heights, Inc., for negligence and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court found in favor of Defendant on all counts. The Association appealed, arguing that the appellate court erred in concluding that it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before requesting declaratory relief and that it did not have standing to bring an action under CUTPA. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the Association had standing to assert a CUPTA claim, as (1) there was no administrative remedy the association could have exhausted to obtain the relief it sought before bringing its CUTPA claim; and (2) the Association did not require the participation of all its individual members to allege ascertainable loss for the purpose of obtaining injunctive and other equitable relief under CUTPA. Remanded for a new trial on Plaintiff’s CUTPA claim. View "Fairchild Heights Residents Ass’n, Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc." on Justia Law

Under the apparent authority doctrine recognized by the United States Supreme Court, a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not have such authority. The trial court in this case denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after law enforcement’s warrantless entry of Defendant’s apartment based on the apparent authority doctrine. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. On appeal, Defendant contended that although the apparent authority doctrine is recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement under the federal constitution, it is inconsistent with Conn. Const. art. I, 7. The Appellate Court concluded that application of the doctrine does not offend the right of Connecticut citizens to be free from unreasonable searches under article first, section 7. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court’s opinion was a proper statement of the applicable law on this issue. View "State v. Buie" on Justia Law