Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he had been punished twice for the same offense and, thus, his convictions violated the proscription against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the two offenses of which Petitioner was charged and convicted were separate and distinct pursuant to the test set forth under Blockburger v. United States because (1) intent to kill is an element of second degree murder but is not an element of the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian; and (2) the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian by child abuse contains elements of proof not required to establish second degree murder.View "State v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a series of agreements pursuant to which (1) Defendant agreed to transfer the management and, at the option of Plaintiff, the ownership of two automobile repair shops to Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff had the option to purchase the realty on which the shops were located on the condition that Plaintiff was in compliance with the terms of the agreements. When Plaintiff sought to exercise the options, Defendant refused to convey the properties, asserting that Plaintiff had not strictly complied with the agreements’ terms. The trial court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the options because it had substantially complied with the terms of the agreements. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding (1) the agreements were subject to a strict compliance standard, rather than a substantial compliance standard; and (2) Plaintiff had not strictly complied with the agreements' terms. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) properly applied a standard of substantial rather than strict compliance with the terms of the parties’ agreements in resolving Plaintiffs’ claim; and (2) properly determined that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the options because it had substantially complied with the terms of the parties’ agreements. View "Pack 2000, Inc. v. Cushman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree and harassment in the second degree for allegedly threatening a coworker during a telephone call. The appellate court reversed, concluding (1) the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that it could find Defendant guilty of the breach of the peace charge only if it found Defendant's offending speech was a real or true threat not entitled to protection under the First Amendment; and (2) where the telephone harassment statute bars conduct only, the evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant of the harassment charge because the the case was predicated entirely on Defendant's speech. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instructions on the breach of the peace charge were inadequate to ensure Defendant was not convicted on the basis of constitutionally protected speech; and (2) the telephone harassment statute applied to speech as well as conduct, but because Defendant did not have fair notice that she could be subjected to punishment for the verbal content of the telephone call, the harassment charge must be dismissed. View "State v. Moulton" on Justia Law

After Dolly Romprey was involved in an accident, Romprey and her husband (Plaintiffs) sought to recover from their insurer (Defendant) under the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of their automobile insurance policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs' action was time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations, and the tolling provision did not apply in this case because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the threshold requirement that their claim involved an underinsured vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether Plaintiffs had met the statutory tolling provisions of the relevant statute; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in requiring Plaintiffs to submit evidence that they had met the requirements of the statutory tolling provision. Remanded.View "Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Complainants, an attorney and the Office of the Chief Public Defender, submitted a request for a declaratory ruling to the Connecticut Medical Examining Board asking whether physician participation in the execution of condemned inmates using lethal injection was permitted. Complainants then sent a letter regarding their request for a declaratory ruling. The Board convened an executive session to obtain legal advice about issues raised in the letter. Complainants then filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging that Plaintiffs, the Board and its chairperson, violated the Freedom of Information Act by convening in executive session during the meeting for "purposes not permitted" under the Act. The Commission determined the executive session was impermissible under the Act. The trial court upheld the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the letter did not constitute notice of a pending claim as defined by Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-200, and therefore, the Board was not permitted to convene in executive session under the Act. View "Chairperson, Conn. Med. Examining Bd. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This action was the culmination of a long-standing disagreement between two attorneys. The present appeal centered on the judgment of the appellate court concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 51-183c required the judge trial referee to recuse himself from presiding over a hearing regarding the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court improperly considered the merits of Defendant’s claims regarding the recusal of the judge because this issue was moot; and (2) because the appellate court remanded the case for a new hearing without addressing Defendant’s other claims, the case must be remanded for consideration of those claims. View "Gagne v. Vaccaro" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that statements he made to the court during a pretrial hearing and at sentencing indicating dissatisfaction with the performance of his appointed counsel resulted in a clear and unequivocal request invoking the right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment. The appellate court affirmed Defendant's conviction, concluding that Defendant's statements to the court did not develop into a clear and unequivocal request for self-representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not violate Defendant's right to self-representation during the criminal proceedings.View "State v. Pires" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere to several felony offenses. The appellate court affirmed. Petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner's appellate counsel, who also served as his trial counsel, failed to file a petition for certification with the Supreme Court challenging the propriety of the appellate court's judgment. The habeas court granted the petition in part and ordered that Petitioner's right to file a petition for certification to appeal to the Supreme Court be restored. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Petitioner failed to introduce evidence that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficiency. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner's habeas action was not justiciable because it was not ripe for adjudication. Remanded with direction to dismiss the habeas petition.View "Janulawicz v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

Defendant pled nolo contendere to possession of narcotics with intent to sell to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school, and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress with respect to the narcotics and handgun found in a plastic bag inside the trunk of his vehicle. Specifically, Defendant argued that the search of bags inside the trunk of his vehicle could not be conducted within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Connecticut constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state constitution does not prohibit the warrantless search of a closed container located in the trunk of a vehicle conducted during an otherwise constitutional warrantless search of a vehicle. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who worked for Defendant as a plumber, brought this action seeking payment of overtime wages for, among other things, his daily commute between his home and the job sites. The trial court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to overtime compensation for his travel time between home and work because the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) preempted the relevant Connecticut laws and regulations governing overtime and travel time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 31-60-10 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, as applied to the facts of this case, confers lesser benefits on employees than those afforded under the FLSA, federal preemption applies, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for his commuting time. View "Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc." on Justia Law