Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was selected by the City of Bridgeport Board of Education to serve as its acting superintendent of schools. Because Defendant was not certified as a school superintendent in Connecticut, Defendant completed an independent study course, and the Commissioner of Education granted a waiver of certification for Defendant pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-157(b). Plaintiffs sought a writ of quo warranto that would remove Defendant from his office as acting superintendent. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that because Defendant did not complete a school leadership program required by section 10-157(b), he was not entitled to a waiver of certification. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a quo warranto action may not be utilized to avoid that administrative process by mounting a collateral attack on an administrative agency's decision to issue a waiver that renders a public officer qualified to hold his position. Remanded.View "Lopez v. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the fourth degree. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing arguments and in connection with defense counsel's cross-examination of key state's witnesses, and the prosecutorial impropriety deprived Defendant of his due process right to a fair trial; and (2) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a video recording and transcript of a forensic interview of the victim under the tender years exception to the hearsay rule without first conducting a hearing. Remanded for a new trial.View "State v. Maguire" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by improperly precluding Defendant from introducing, on relevancy grounds, evidence of prior sexual conduct that was admissible under the rape shield statute, in violation of Defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation; and (2) the trial court’s preclusion of the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as conservator of the person of her daughter, filed a complaint against Defendant, claiming that Defendant committed sexual battery, civil assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying her motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial because an exhibit that was not admitted into evidence at trial was mistakenly given to the jury during its deliberations and had the potential to have a prejudicial impact on the jury. The Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiff and reversed, holding (1) the exhibit was not properly admitted into evidence and, therefore, was not properly before the jury; and (2) the submission of that document to the jury constituted reversible error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Kortner v. Martise" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that, during sentencing, the trial court deprived him of his due process rights by improperly considering that Defendant decided to proceed to trial rather than accept a plea bargain. The Appellate Court declined to review Defendant’s sentencing claim on the grounds that it was unpreserved and that Defendant had not properly made an “affirmative request” for review in his main brief under State v. Golding. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the requirement that a defendant must “affirmatively request” Golding review in his main brief in order to receive appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims is overruled, and therefore, the Appellate Court improperly declined to review Defendant’s constitutional claims on that ground; (2) Defendant failed to establish that the trial court penalized him for exercising his right to a jury trial; but (3) the use of the Court’s supervisory authority was warranted to prevent adverse effects on the public’s perception of the inherent fairness of the criminal justice system that may arise when a trial judge could appear to have considered a defendant’s decision to exercise his right to a trial during sentencing. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Elson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the trial court as to Defendant’s convictions for the crimes of kidnapping in the second degree and burglary in the first degree, holding that certain evidence relating to the potential impeachment of a key prosecution witness should have been admitted at trial, and that the failure to admit the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to those counts; and (2) affirmed the trial court in all other respects, holding that the court did not err in its instructions to the jury and that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct. View "State v. Baltas" on Justia Law

Father's parental rights to his two minor children were terminated based on the trial court's determination that Father failed to rehabilitate. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly terminated his parental rights because court-ordered specific steps were statutorily required as a prerequisite to termination for failure to rehabilitate and the Commissioner of Children and Families did not provide him with such steps. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's conclusion that the prior provision of specific steps is not required in termination proceedings for failure to rehabilitate was legally incorrect; but (2) under the particular circumstances of this case, the failure to provide specific steps was harmless error.View "In re Elvin G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff successfully bid at a combined foreclosure sale of real estate and secured party auction of personal property owned by Debtors. Bank held mortgage and security interests in the real and personal property. Auctioneer conducted the auction. After purchasing the property, Plaintiff discovered he would not receive much of the personal property he believed to be in the sale. Plaintiff and the current owner of the property (Plaintiffs) brought this action against Debtors, Bank, and Auctioneer (collectively, Defendants), claiming that Defendants' failure to inform Plaintiffs there were conflicting claims as to the ownership of the property constituted negligence and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), among other causes of action. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs on four of their counts. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that Defendants had a common-law duty to Plaintiffs to properly identify the personal property that was subject to the secured party sale; and (2) lacked the authority to award nontaxable costs pursuant to CUTPA. View "Ulbrich v. Groth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's newborn son died shortly after Plaintiff gave birth. Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of her son, later brought a medical malpractice action against her obstetrician and nurse midwife and their employer ("Hospital"). Because Hospital was sold to Defendants nine months after the events leading to the present action, Plaintiff also sued Defendants under a theory of successor liability. After reaching a settlement and executing two covenants not to sue, Plaintiff withdrew her claims against Hospital and its employees. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the covenant not to sue Hospital prevented Plaintiff from seeking to recover from Defendants. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court, holding that Plaintiff’s execution of the covenant not to sue Hospital in perpetuity foreclosed, as a matter of law, her right of action against Hospital and against any subsequent purchaser of Hospital’s assets under the mere continuation theory of successor liability. View "Robbins v. Physicians for Women's Health, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he had been punished twice for the same offense and, thus, his convictions violated the proscription against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the two offenses of which Petitioner was charged and convicted were separate and distinct pursuant to the test set forth under Blockburger v. United States because (1) intent to kill is an element of second degree murder but is not an element of the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian; and (2) the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian by child abuse contains elements of proof not required to establish second degree murder.View "State v. Freeman" on Justia Law