Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1991, Plaintiff commenced an action to recover on a promissory note. In 1992, Defendant, a guarantor of the note, moved from Connecticut to South Carolina. In 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in Plaintiff's favor. In 2007, Plaintiff commenced an action in Connecticut against Defendant to enforce the judgment. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that Defendant's contact with Connecticut was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of either the long arm statute or due process. In 2009, the Legislature enacted Conn. Stat. 52-598(c), a mechanism whereby a judgment creditor can "revive" an unsatisfied judgment for money damages before the period for enforcement expires. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to revive the 1994 judgment. The trial granted the motion. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that (1) Defendant's challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction on appeal was barred as an improper collateral attack on the original judgment; and (2) section 52-598(c) applies retroactively and provides a proper basis for the trial court's jurisdiction over Defendant for purposes of adjudicating the motion to revive. View "Inv. Assocs. v. Summit Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

The Town of Malborough terminated the employment of Emily Chaponis as town assessor after the board of selectmen did not make a motion to reappoint her to a successive term of office. Chaponis filed a grievance through the Union, of which she was a member, alleging that the Town violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Union by discharging her without just cause. An arbitration panel ordered the Town to reinstate Chaponis to her position, concluding that the Town violated the agreement when it terminated Chaponis' employment without just cause. The trial court denied the Town's application to vacate the arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitrators' award ordering the reinstatement of Chaponis' employment after the statutory expiration of her term of office contravened the mandates of the statutory scheme governing the term of office for municipal officers, and therefore, the award was unenforceable. Remanded. View "Town of Marlborough v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052" on Justia Law

After the Town of Westbrook's board of selectmen unanimously voted not to reappoint Ivan Kuvalanka to a successive term of office as town assessor, Kuvalanka filed a grievance asserting that the Town had violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, of which Kuvalanka was a member. The arbitrators determined that the grievance was not arbitrable under the agreement. The Union filed an application in the trial court to vacate the award. The trial court denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) properly limited the scope of its review when considering the Union's application to vacate the award; and (2) properly determined that the Union did not establish grounds to vacate the award. View "AFSCME, Council 4. Local 1303-325 v. Town of Westbrook" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought two separate actions alleging that Hazel Smart died as a result of a defective catheter used in her dialysis treatment at Greater Waterbury Gambro HealthCare. The trial court consolidated the two actions, which brought claims sounding in negligence, medical malpractice, loss of consortium, and products liability. During pretrial proceedings, the trial court imposed monetary sanctions on Plaintiffs for failure to comply with a discovery order. Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the trial court's discovery order was not an appealable final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly dismissed the appeal, as the trial court's order did not constitute an appealable final judgment. View "Incardona v. Roer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were twelve beer and soft drink manufacturers doing business in Connecticut. In 2009, the Legislature provided that all unclaimed beverage container deposits, which previously had been retained by Plaintiffs, henceforth must be paid to the State. The legislation was signed into law on January 15, 2009 and made applicable for a four-month period prior to its effective date. Plaintiffs brought this action against the Commissioner of Environmental Protection, claiming that application of the provision to the four month period prior to the effective date was an unconstitutional taking because Plaintiffs had a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs did not have a vested property interest in the unclaimed deposits attributable to the four month period in question, and therefore, the provision in the act that all unclaimed deposits accruing during that period must be paid to the State did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of Plaintiffs' property. View "A. Gallo & Co. v. Comm'r of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Decedent admitted herself to Hospital for treatment for major depression and personality disorder. At the time of her admission, Decedent was diagnosed with high suicide ideation and had previously attempted suicide. One week later, Decedent committed suicide at Hospital. Plaintiff, the executor of Decedent's estate, filed a medical malpractice action against Hospital and Decedent's treating psychiatrist. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The appellate court remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court improperly declined to the poll the jury to determine whether any of the jurors had read an article regarding the subject matter of the case published prior to trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the appellate court improperly determined that the trial judge abused his discretion in declining to poll the jury. View "Kervick v. Silver Hill Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a licensed physician and surgeon, was charged with violating the applicable standard of care in his treatment of two children. The Connecticut Medical Examining Board (board) found that Plaintiff had violated the standard of care with respect to his treatment of both children and ordered a reprimand, imposed fines, and placed Plaintiff on probation for two years. The trial court primarily affirmed, as did the appellate court. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied in his disciplinary hearing rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the preponderance of the evidence standard applied at the proceeding because the board is an administrative agency subject to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, under which the preponderance of the evidence is the default standard of proof; and (2) the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof at a physician disciplinary proceeding does not offend a physician's due process rights. View "Jones v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Emilio and Maria D'Ascanio, filed an action for damages incurred as a result of personal injuries sustained by Emilio when he was operating a forklift designed, manufactured, and distributed by Defendants. Plaintiffs claimed that defects in the forklift proximately caused Defendant's injuries. During trial, Plaintiffs' expert witness presented testimony by showing a video of a forklift that was not the same model involved in this case. The trial court struck the testimony the expert had given and precluded him from testifying further. The trial court subsequently denied Plaintiffs' motions for a mistrial and a continuance. The court then granted a directed verdict for Defendants on the basis that Plaintiffs had not presented expert testimony that the forklift was defective. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiffs' conduct did not constitute a pattern of abuse so egregious as to warrant dismissal, the appellate court properly determined the trial court's rulings, considered in their entirety, constituted an abuse of discretion. View "D'Ascanio v. Toyota Indus. Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of eight counts of sexual assault in the first degree and eight counts of risk of injury to a child. The sixteen counts were predicated on four separate incidents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of each of the sixteen counts, as there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant abused the complainant on four separate and distinct occasions; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in withholding certain portions of the records of the Department of Children and Families relating to the complainant; and (3) the prosecutor did not engage in improper argument during closing argument. View "State v. Stephen J. R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned real property on a highway. In 2006, the board of selectmen of the town of Lyme (board) concluded that the highway extended through and across Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff brought an administrative appeal in the superior court. The superior court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) it was entitled to consider the appeal in a trial de novo, and therefore, the motion for summary judgment was procedurally appropriate; and (2) the board exceeded its authority by determining the length of the highway rather than its width. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to a trial de novo; but (2) the board was statutorily authorized to determine the width of the highway as well as its length. Remanded. View "Marchesi v. Bd. of Selectmen of Town of Lyme" on Justia Law