Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to her two minor children and awarded permanent guardianship to the children's paternal great-aunt and her husband. Mother appealed, claiming that the trial court's application of Conn. Gen. Stat. 71a-112 violated her rights under the substantive due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions because the trial court was required to determine that termination was the least restrictive permanency plan to protect the children's best interests, and the standard was not met in this case. Specifically, Mother argued that termination was not required when permanent guardianship was sufficient to protect the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the standard was met in this case where the trial court necessarily found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was the least restrictive alternative to protect the children's best interests. View "In re Brayden E.-H." on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Children and Families filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to her son and daughter. The trial court granted the petitions pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-112. Mother sought review, contending that the trial court's application of section 17a-112 to her was unconstitutional. Respondent failed to preserve her claim at trial and therefore sought to prevail under State v. Golding. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Mother's claim failed under the first prong of Golding for lack of an adequate record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that Mother's unpreserved constitutional claim was unreviewable due to an inadequate record. View "In re Azareon Y." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder and related firearms offenses. The appellate court affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing, which the lower court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Petition filed a second petition for DNA testing. The lower court dismissed the petition on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed on an alternative ground, holding that the petition failed on the merits, as the reasonable probability standard, which requires access to DNA testing only if exculpatory results discovered by DNA testing would undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, was not met in this case. View "State v. Dupigney" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from his employment for allegedly engaging in sexual harassment. Employee's union filed a grievance against Employer, and the parties submitted the controversy to arbitration. The arbitrator reduced the dismissal to a one year suspension without pay, finding the dismissal was without just cause. Employer filed an application to vacate the arbitral award, claiming that enforcement of the award violated public policy. The trial court granted the application and vacated the arbitrator's award on public policy grounds. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the award violated the public policy against workplace sexual harassment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace required nothing less than Employee's termination. View "State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence of his refusal to answer questions from the police. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Defendant opened the door to evidence of his refusal to answer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in determining that defense counsel opened the door to the admission of the evidence at issue. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree and related crimes. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in precluding him from cross-examining the complainant about whether she had lied to the police on an unrelated matter in violation of his right to examine a witness' character for untruthfulness, his right to confrontation, and his right to present a defense. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined the trial court reasonably concluded that inquiry into the collateral matter should not be permitted. View "State v. Annulli" on Justia Law

Upon their divorce, Father and Mother agreed to a parenting plan governing the care and custody of their minor child. Father subsequently sought increased visitation and parenting time. The matter was referred to the Family Relations Office (family relations), which scheduled a child custody evaluation with the parties. When family relations declined Father's request to complete the evaluation with the assistance of counsel, Father filed a motion to order family relations to allow him to proceed with the assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Father appealed, contending that the family relations policy of barring counsel from its child custody evaluations violates procedural due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that family relation's existing procedures were constitutionally sufficient. View "Barros v. Barros" on Justia Law

A construction company (Constructor) retained Defendant to arrange insurance for a new housing development. Defendant procured insurance from two insurance companies (Peerless and Hartford). Peerless denied coverage for a house destroyed by fire that was built on a lot not listed in Peerless's policy. Haynes claimed against Defendant for its negligent omission of the lot. Defendant gave notice of the loss to Plaintiff, from whom Defendant had purchased errors and omissions coverage. Defendant and Plaintiff settled with Constructor for $354,000. Constructor assigned its rights against Peerless and Hartford to Plaintiff and Defendant collectively. Defendant and Plaintiff then proceeded against the insurers for the $354,000. After the parties settled, $208,000 was deposited in an escrow account. Plaintiff sought a declaration that it was entitled to all of the escrow funds. Defendant counterclaimed for a declaration that, under Connecticut's make whole doctrine, it was entitled to recover the $150,000 deductible it contributed to the $354,000. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. The Supreme Court accepted certification from the appellate court and answered its questions by holding (1) the make whole doctrine is the default rule under Connecticut law; and (2) the make whole doctrine does not apply to insurance policy deductibles. View "Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. TD Banknorth Ins. Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee, who worked as a driver for Plaintiff, had his commercial driver's license suspended for one year after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Although Employee's misconduct did not occur in the course of his employment, Plaintiff discharged him because he could no longer perform his work duties. The Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board) sustained an award of unemployment benefits to Employee. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly held that Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-236(a)(14), which disallows unemployment benefits to a discharged employee who has been disqualified under law from performing the work for which he was hired as a result of a drug or alcohol testing program, did not apply to a commercial driver like Employee who, while off duty, loses his license for driving under the influence and is therefore unable to work. View "Tuxis Ohr's Fuel, Inc. v. Adm'r, Unemployment Comp. Act" on Justia Law

The family court magistrate ordered Defendant to pay $1440 in weekly child support based on Defendant's eighty-six percent proportionate share of the parties' combined net weekly income of $14,154. In determining the appropriate method for assessing child support, the magistrate noted that the guidelines schedule stops at $4000 of combined weekly net income. The magistrate then calculated Defendant's child support on the same percentage basis as that assigned to a combined net weekly income of $4000. Defendant appealed, claiming that the magistrate's order contravened the principle that as income level rises, the proportion of income dedicated to child related spending decreases. The trial court affirmed the magistrate's decision with one modification to the arrearage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that the magistrate properly ordered Defendant to pay child support in an amount equivalent to his proportionate share of 11.83 percent of the parties' combined net weekly income, the same percentage under the schedule for a combined net weekly income of $4000. View "Dowling v. Szymczak" on Justia Law