Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request an increase in bond on two prior charges so that Petitioner could be credited for presentence confinement credit on those charges. The habeas court granted relief, concluding that Petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel for a matter pertaining to presentence confinement. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of its conclusion in Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, decided this same day, holding (1) the habeas court properly determined that Petitioner was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at the plea hearing and sentencing; and (2) the failure of Petitioner's counsel to request an increase in the bond on his first arrest constituted deficient performance and such performance prejudiced Petitioner by exposing him to an additional seventeen days in jail for which he received no credit. View "Huertas v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner was arrested three times for three different offenses and later pleaded guilty to violation of a protective order and threatening in the second degree. Petitioner subsequently filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing to request that the court credit Petitioner with seventy-three days of presentence confinement credit for one of his first two arrests. The habeas court found that Petitioner met his burden of proving that counsel's performance was deficient and ordered the Commissioner of Correction to credit Petitioner with seventy-three days of presentence confinement credit. The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel at his arraignment; and (2) Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly ruled that (1) the Sixth Amendment confers a right to the effective assistance of counsel in matters pertaining to credit for presentence confinement; and (2) Petitioner showed deficient performance and prejudice within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington. View "Gonzalez v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner entered guilty pleas, pursuant to the Alford doctrine, to three counts of burglary and one count of larceny and admitted a violation of probation. Petitioner subsequently filed a revised amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court granted the petition in part, concluding (1) counsel did not act in a constitutionally defective manner in her representation of Petitioner; but (2) counsel had an actual conflict of interest. The appellate court reversed, ruling (1) the habeas court misapplied the Rules of Professional Conduct in determining that counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest; and (2) the court improperly determined that a breach of the Rules alone was sufficient to establish a violation of the right to ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the trial court's curtailment defense counsel's cross-examination of a jailhouse informant regarding the maximum sentence the informant faced on pending felony charges at the time he incriminated Defendant was harmless; (2) any error in the trial court's decision to allow testimony from the informant that his parole officer supported his application for a sentence modification was harmless; (3) the trial court properly admitted into evidence testimony regarding Defendant's gang membership; and (4) the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial impropriety during his cross-examination of Defendant's expert witness and during closing argument, but the improprieties did not deny Defendant of a fair trial. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs installed a gabion seawall on their property to mitigate the effects of erosion. Plaintiffs did not seek approval from the town or the department of environmental protection (department) before constructing the seawall. The town subsequently issued a cease and desist order to Plaintiffs, and the department issued a notice of violation to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs submitted a permit application to the department attempting to obtain permission to retain the seawall. The department denied the application and ordered Plaintiffs to remove the seawall. Plaintiffs challenged the removal order. A department hearing officer determined that the department properly exercised jurisdiction and that the department had the authority to order the wall to be removed. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the department properly asserted jurisdiction over the seawall; (2) the department properly asserted jurisdiction under the Coastal Management Act; (3) substantial evidence supported the department's findings and conclusions; and (4) the hearing officer's decision to order the removal of the entire seawall was not an abuse of discretion. View "Sams v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Decedent commenced an action (first action) against Defendants, a hospital and two individuals, alleging that Defendants were negligent in failing to treat him for a lesion in his lung. Decedent died of cancer while the first action was pending. The trial court granted Defendants' motions to strike for failure to comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a. Six weeks later, Plaintiff, Decedent's surviving spouse, commenced the present action alleging the same causes of action alleged against Defendants in the first action and seeking damages for wrongful death and loss of consortium. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The appellate court reversed based on res judicata, concluding that the first action was decided on its merits because a motion to strike is a judgment on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court incorrectly concluded the trial court should have granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata; but (2) the present action was time barred and was not saved by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-592, the accidental failure of suit statute. View "Santorso v. Bristol Hosp." on Justia Law

Defendant contracted with Plaintiffs to purchase their oil recycling business. The parties carried out the purchase using three contracts. All but one of these contracts, the equipment contract, contained provisions entitling Defendant to attorney's fees in the event Plaintiffs breached the agreements. Plaintiffs later commenced this action seeking damages for Defendant's alleged breach of the contracts and for unjust enrichment. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. The jury found in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim but awarded damages only with respect to Plaintiffs' breach of the equipment contract. The trial court denied Defendant's motion for attorney's fees. The appellate court reversed with respect to attorney's fees. On remand, the trial court denied Defendant's motion for attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court improperly applied the law of the case doctrine under these circumstances and improperly rejected Defendant's motion for attorney's fees without reaching the merits of that claim; and (2) when certain claims provide for a party's recovery of contractual attorney's fees but others do not, a party is nevertheless entitled to reasonable attorneys fees if an apportionment is impracticable because the claims arise from a common factual nucleus and are intertwined. Remanded. View "Total Recycling Servs. of Conn., Inc. v. Conn. Oil Recycling Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained a variance from the zoning board of appeals (board) to construct a single-family house on their lakefront property. Plaintiffs then applied for and received a zoning permit and building permit from the town of Lebanon (town) to construct the house. After construction was completed, Plaintiffs constructed a deck. Plaintiffs did not receive the required building permits for the deck, nor did they notify the town of the deck's construction. Several years later, the zoning enforcement officer discovered the deck violated the town's zoning regulations and issued a notice of violation and cease and desist order to Plaintiffs requiring them to abate the setback violation. The board denied Plaintiffs' appeal. The superior court reversed, concluding that the deck at issue was a "building" as that term is used in Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-13a(a) and, therefore, Defendants' enforcement action was untimely under the three year statute of limitations set forth in section 8-13a(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deck was not a "building" under the statute. Remanded. View "Tine v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Lebanon" on Justia Law

After a court trial, Defendant was convicted in two separate cases of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, five counts of risk of injury to a child, and one count of promoting a minor in an obscene performance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) correctly found sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction for promoting a minor; (2) did not plainly err by admitting into evidence expert opinion evidence as to the fact that Defendant had physically, psychologically, and sexually abused the victim; and (3) did not err in permitting the state to present certain evidence of uncharged misconduct. View "State v. George A." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifty-five years for felony murder, twenty years for first degree robbery, and five years for carrying a pistol without a permit, each to run concurrently. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that felony murder was an unclassified felony subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty-five years. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's sentence was proper because felony murder is not an unclassified felony but, rather, a felony classified as murder and, as such, is punishable by a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years to life. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law