Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Juvenile entered a plea of guilty to robbery in the second degree. The superior court found Juvenile to be delinquent and ordered him to be committed to the custody of the department of children and families (department) in an out-of-state facility. The department subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the matter, arguing that the court's orders exceeded the court's placement authority pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-140. The court denied the motion to intervene. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order, concluding that section 46b-140 does not give the superior court the authority to place a juvenile in an out-of-state facility. While this appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, the trial court modified Juvenile's probation to permit him to return to Connecticut from his placement out-of-state. The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal as moot and not capable of repetition, yet evading review, as the legislature's most recent amendment to section 46b-140 firmly establishes that the statute does not authorize the superior court to order the direct placement of a child committed to the department in an out-of-state residential facility. View "In re Jeffrey M." on Justia Law

The vehicle Plaintiff was driving collided with a parked fire truck that was responding to an accident, and Plaintiff sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action against the Town and others, alleging that the Town was negligent in that the fire truck and lane closures were inadequately marked and the positioning of the fire truck constituted a nuisance. The trial court granted the Town's motion to strike the negligence counts of the basis of governmental immunity. The court also granted the Town's motion to strike Plaintiffs' nuisance counts on the basis of Himmelstein v. Windsor and entered judgment in favor of the Town. The appellate court reversed in part, concluding that its decision in Himmelstein did not bar Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. The appellate court drew a distinction between the present case and Himmelstein, noting that the nuisance claim in Himmelstein was barred by the exclusivity provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' nuisance claims here were clearly distinguishable from those asserted in Himmelstein, as in the instant case, Plaintiffs' nuisance counts did not fall within the scope of section 13a-149. View "Kumah v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant's father was a resident at Plaintiff's nursing care facility until his death. After Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff the outstanding bill from her father's assets, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, claiming breach of contract and fraud. The trial court held in favor of Defendant, concluding that Defendant did not have a power of attorney for her father and did not have access to his checking account or to any of his other financial resources. The court also awarded attorney's fees to Defendant under Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-150bb for successfully defending against a commercial party's action based on a contract. The appellate court reversed in part, concluding that Defendant was not entitled to attorney's fees under section 42-150bb because she was not the personal representative of her father. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that, in order to be a "personal representative" entitled to fees under section 42-150bb, Defendant would have to be a legal representative of the party to the contract. Remanded. View "Aaron Manor, Inc. v. Irving" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of larceny in the second degree by embezzlement from a person who is sixty years of age or older. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the ownership of funds in a jointly held account is a factual issue for the jury to resolve. Defendant argued that the instruction was improper because a joint holder of an account, as a matter of law, jointly owns the funds in the account and, consequently, cannot be charged with stealing those funds. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court's jury instruction was legally correct, where the ownership of a joint account, as between its coholders, is not controlled by statute, but, rather, is a question of fact dependent on the intent of the joint account holders and all of the circumstances surrounding the joint account's creation and maintenance. View "State v. Lavigne" on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into a written contract under which Plaintiff, a contractor, agreed to install a fence around real property owned by Defendant. Defendant paid a deposit of half of the amount due upon execution of the contract but refused to pay the balance owed on the contract upon substantial completion of the fence. Plaintiff sued Defendant. In his answer, Defendant alleged he was not liable under the contract because Plaintiff failed to comply with the Home Improvement Act by failing to indicate a starting and completion date in the contract. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that the contract did not comply with the Act but that Defendant invoked the Act in bad faith. The appellate court reversed the award of attorney's fees, costs, and interest, but otherwise directed judgment in favor of Plaintiff for the balance due under the bad faith doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff the balance due. View "Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent. Defendant entered the plea after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his recreational vehicle, which was parked on the property of Edward Jevarjian, and of Jevarjian's home and garage. The plea was conditioned on Defendant's right to appeal from the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that the contested search was not unlawfully premature; and (2) the appellate court properly determined that Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of Jevarjian's home and garage. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent. Defendant's plea was conditioned on his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his home and of a recreational vehicle not belonging to him, which was parked on Defendant's property at the time of the search. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction, determining that Defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the recreational vehicle. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the appellate court properly determined that the judge issuing the search warrant made a scrivener's error as to the time of execution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the issue of whether Defendant had standing to contest the search of the recreational vehicle was not before the Court, the resolution of the certified issue could yield no practical relief, and therefore, Defendant's appeal was moot. View "State v. Jevarjian" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the findings and order of the trial court, which committed Defendant to the custody of the commissioner of mental health and addiction services and required Defendant to submit to periodic competency examinations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined (1) Conn. Pub. Acts 98-88, 2, which amended Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-56d(m) by authorizing a court to order periodic competency examinations in certain circumstances, applied retroactively; (2) the trial court properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over Defendant when it conceded that Defendant had no notice of the proceeding that resulted in an arrest warrant for failure to appear; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering periodic competency examinations when there was not a substantial probability that Defendant would regain competence. View "State v. Custodio" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence on the ground that the sentence was imposed without the assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Conn. Const. art I, 8. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial court improperly concluded, in connection with accepting his nolo contendere pleas to numerous offenses and sentencing him to fifty-four months of imprisonment, that he had waived his right to counsel and was not indigent and therefore did not qualify for the services of a public defender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly determined that Defendant's decision to waive counsel was competently made, and knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (2) the trial court's conclusion that Defendant failed to carry his burden of proving his eligibility for public defender services was not clearly erroneous. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, convicting him of one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-21(a)(1) and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of section 53-21-(a)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted into evidence a video recording and transcript of a forensic interview of the victim as a prior inconsistent statement under the rule set forth in State v. Whelan, and Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because the victim appeared a testified at trial, where she could have been subjected to cross-examination; and (2) the record was inadequate for review of Defendant's unpreserved double jeopardy claims. View "State v. Cameron M." on Justia Law