Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Physician diagnosed and treated Patient for various liver and kidney ailments but failed to warn her of the latent driving impairment associated with her condition. After leaving Physician's office, Patient blacked out while operating her motor vehicle and struck Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an action against Physician and his employer (collectively, Defendants) for professional negligence. The trial court found in favor of Defendants, finding that Physician owed no duty to Plaintiff to warn Patient of the driving risks associated with her medical conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, and in so doing, declined to extend a health care provider's duty through judicial modification, holding that the trial court properly found that Physician owed no duty to Plaintiff to advise or warn Patient of the latent driving impairment associated with her medical condition. View "Jarmie v. Troncale" on Justia Law

The named plaintiff, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son, brought this action against defendant city (Defendant), claiming that her son incurred injuries when a fellow student pushed him into a broken locker. Defendant filed its its answer and a special defense claiming municipal immunity. Plaintiffs denied the special defense but failed to plead that any exception to the defendant's immunity applied to them. The court instructed the jury on principles of negligence but made no reference to the special defense. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiffs. The trial court then granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict and the motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of governmental immunity and rendered judgment for Defendant. The appellate court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs failed to plead the identifiable victim, imminent harm exception to municipal immunity in their reply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiffs did not have adequate notice of this alternative basis or sufficient opportunity to address it, the appellate court improperly decided the case on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to plead the imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity. View "Haynes v. City of Middletown" on Justia Law

Daniel King, the substitute defendant and administrator of the estate of David Berzins (administrator), appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, Mary Berzins. The administrator appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on Ramin v. Ramin to grant the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and attorney's fees. Ramin held that a court has discretion to award attorney's fees to party who incurs those fees due to the other party's egregious litigation misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's award of attorney's fees did not fall within the scope of Ramin, as the phrase "egregious litigation misconduct" was limited to discovery misconduct; and (2) the court did not act within its inherent authority in awarding attorney's fees for filing frivolous and duplicative postjudgment motions because it failed to make a finding that the administrator had acted in bad faith as defined in Maris v. McGrath. View "Berzins v. Berzins" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of reckless driving. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to the reckless driving conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the street on which Defendant was driving was a public highway, as required under Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-222(a). The Supreme Court (1) reversed in part the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the evidence was sufficient to permit a finding that Defendant was operating his motor vehicle on a public highway; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This certified appeal arose from the termination of the parental rights of the respondent Mother to her two minor children. The appellate court affirmed the judgments of the trial court rendered in favor of Petitioner, the commissioner of children and families. On appeal, Mother asserted that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof on the issue of personal rehabilitation to Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the appellate court correctly concluded that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to Respondent. View "In re Jason R." on Justia Law

At issue in this certified appeal was whether a landlord may be held liable, under a common-law theory of premises liability, for injuries sustained by a tenant after being bitten by a dog owned by a fellow tenant and kept on premises owned by the common landlord, when the landlord knew of the dog's dangerous propensities but did not have direct care of, or control over, the dog. Defendant, the town of Wallingford housing authority, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court following its decision granting Defendant's motion to strike a complaint brought by Plaintiff, seeking to recover damages for such injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a landlord's common-law duty to alleviate known dangers includes dangers posed by vicious dogs. View "Giacalone v. Town of Wallingford Housing Auth." on Justia Law

The named defendant, EAPWJP, LLC (EAP) appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants a prescriptive easement over a pathway crossing property owned by EAP that the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants had used for many years to access a nearby beach. The pathway traversed protected tidal wetlands and was covered in part by a wooden walkway installed without appropriate permits. The Supreme Court granted certification to appeal to ask whether the appellate court properly concluded that construction and use of a walkway deemed to be a per se public nuisance could establish a prescriptive easement over the underlying tidal wetlands. The Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted, concluding that the issue raised by the certified question went beyond the scope of the record below, and therefore, the issue was not properly preserved. View "Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court's preliminary instruction to the jury regarding posttrial sentencing procedures and the trial court's final instruction to the jury regarding the minor victim's credibility were improper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court (1) properly determined that mentioning sentencing proceedings in the preliminary instructions did not affect the overall fairness and integrity of the proceeding as a whole; and (2) properly determined that the trial court's jury instructions regarding the victim's credibility, read as a whole, did not clearly violate Defendant's constitutional rights or clearly deprive him of a fair trial. View "State v. Makee R." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a motor vehicle accident caused by an underinsured motorist in which Plaintiff, an employee of defendant City (Defendant), sustained injuries while operating a private passenger motor vehicle owned by Defendant and acting within the scope of his employment. Plaintiff sought coverage for his remaining damages from Defendant pursuant to its obligation to provide underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 38a-336(a)(2). Defendant denied Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff's $50,000 recovery exceeded the purported $20,000 coverage limit of Defendant's plan. The trial court rendered in favor of Defendant, determining the limits of Defendant's underinsured motorist coverage in its capacity as a self-insurer to be the statutory minimum of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per occurrence. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit under different reasoning, holding that pursuant to the statutory insurance scheme, a self-insurer is deemed to provide the minimum statutory underinsured motorist coverage of $20,000 per accident and $40,00 per occurrence for the benefit of occupants of its private passenger motor vehicles. View "Garcia v. Bridgeport" on Justia Law

The trial court found Mother in contempt for refusing to allow Father to visit their son in accordance with a previously established visitation schedule. The trial court's contempt order required Mother to place the child in a supervised visitation program with Father and to pay for all expenses associated therewith. The appellate court dismissed Mother's appeal, concluding that the absence of a final judgment deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. Mother contended on appeal that the trial court's contempt order was a final judgment and, thus, immediately appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a civil contempt order requiring the contemnor to incur a cost or take specific action - such as paying for supervised visitation - constitutes an appealable final judgment; and (2) accordingly, the appellate court improperly dismissed Mother's appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "Khan v. Hillyer" on Justia Law