Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Edward Okeke and Tamara Shockley were unmarried when Shockley gave birth to a son. Shockley affirmed an acknowledgement of paternity form the parties executed after the birth. The last name of the child on the paternity acknowledgement was stated as 'Okeke.' The official birth certificate of the child, however, listed his last name as 'Shockley-Okeke.' Plaintiff filed with the department of public health and amendment of the child's birth certificate. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff's request. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's administrative appeal. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-42(d)(1), the commissioner of public health has the authority to amend a child's birth certificate where the name on the birth certificate differs from that initially agreed upon by the parents on an acknowledgement of paternity form. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner did not have the authority to amend the birth certificate under the facts of this case. View "Okeke v. Comm'r of Pub. Health" on Justia Law

Midland Funding obtained judgments against Plaintiff Susan Ballou in two cases. The small claims court entered installment payment orders pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-356d. Defendant, the Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., which represented Midland in small claims court, did not apply for an order of postjudgment interest in either of the two cases, and the small claims court did not issue an order of postjudgment interest in either case. Defendant thereafter sought a bank execution against Plaintiff for the judgment amounts and directed the state marshal to add postjudgment interest of ten percent to the amount of the judgments. Plaintiff commenced an action in the U.S. district court disputing the amount of the debts. At issue before the court was whether postjudgment interest accrues automatically on any unpaid balance under a judgment for which the court has entered an installment payment order. The Connecticut Supreme Court accepted certification to answer this question and held that section 52-356d(e) does not provide for the automatic accrual of postjudgment interest on all judgments in which an installment payment order has been entered by the court. View "Ballou v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C." on Justia Law

After his bicycle collided with a radar trailer that the Town's police department had placed on the road, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town, alleging, inter alia, a breach of statutory duty pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149 and a claim of nuisance. The trial court granted the Town's motion to strike Plaintiff's nuisance claim under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n, which provides that section 13a-149 is the exclusive remedy against a municipality for injuries caused by a defect in a road or bridge. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint removing all claims except his section 13a-149 claim. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to establish a highway defect claim under section 13a-149. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly affirmed the trial court's judgment striking the nuisance claim against the Town on the basis of its determination that section 13a-149 was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the Town, when it also affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the Town on the basis of its determination that Plaintiff had failed to establish an essential element of a highway defect claim under section 31a-149. View "Himmelstein v. Windsor" on Justia Law

In the involuntary conservatorship action underlying this case, Daniel Gross was placed in the locked ward of Grove Manor Nursing Home. Jonathan Newman was appointed by the probate court to represent Gross in the action, and Kathleen Donovan was appointed as conservator. The superior court granted Gross's petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that the conservatorship was void ab initio. Gross subsequently brought a complaint in U.S. District Court, asserting state and federal civil rights claims. The court dismissed it as to all defendants, finding, in relevant part, that Donovan, Newman, and Grove Manor were entitled to immunity because they were serving the judicial process. On appeal, the U.S. court of appeals submitted certified questions regarding Connecticut law to the Supreme Court. The Court held (1) absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to a conservator appointed by the probate court only when the conservator is executing an order of the probate court or the conservator's actions are ratified by the probate court; (2) absolute quasi-judicial immunity does not extend to attorneys appointed to represent respondents in conservatorship proceedings or conservatees; and (3) the function of nursing homes caring for conservatees does not entitle them to quasi-judicial immunity under any circumstances. View "Gross v. Rell" on Justia Law

Defendants, State Five Industrial Park and Jean Farricielli, appealed from a trial court judgment holding them liable, after invoking both reverse and traditional veil piercing principles, for a $3.8 million judgment rendered against Jean's husband, Joseph Farricielli, and five corporations that he owned and/or controlled, in an environmental enforcement action brought by Plaintiffs, the commissioner of environmental protection, the town of Hamden, and the town's zoning enforcement officer. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the facts that were proven in this case did not warrant reverse veil piercing, and judgment on Plaintiffs' veil piercing claims should be rendered in favor of Defendants. View "Comm'r of Envtl. Prot. v. State Five Indus. Park, Inc." on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant Willie Coleman was convicted of murder in connection with the fatal stabbing of his girlfriend. Defendant appealed, contending that the state offered insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his intent to kill the victim, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that it could infer such intent from the number of wounds he had inflicted on her, and that an improper statement by the prosecutor in closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient in this case to demonstrate intent; (2) Defendant failed to preserve his claim challenging the jury instructions, and Defendant could not prevail under State v. Golding or the plain error doctrine; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor's remark in closing argument did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. sells its products to Connecticut schoolchildren by having schoolteachers submit to Plaintiff book orders the teachers have collected from students. The books are delivered to the teachers, who then distribute the books to the students. In 2006, the commissioner of revenue services imposed a sales and use tax deficiency assessment on Plaintiff for more than $3 million. Plaintiff protested the assessments. The commissioner upheld the assessments, reasoning that Plaintiff had sold its products using "in-state representatives" pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-407(a)(15)(A). The trial court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly determined that the teachers were not Plaintiff's "representatives" within the meaning of section 12-407(A)(15)(a)(iv), as the teachers serve as the exclusive channel through which Plaintiff markets, sells and delivers its products to Connecticut schoolchildren; and (2) the trial court incorrectly determined that the taxes could not be imposed under the commerce clause, as the activities of the Connecticut schoolteachers who participate in Plaintiff's program provide the requisite nexus under the commerce clause to justify imposition of the taxes. View "Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs." on Justia Law

The predecessor insurance companies to Plaintiff, Arrowood Indemnity Company, brought a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. district court claiming they did not have a duty to defend or to indemnify Defendants, the King family, for liability arising out of injuries sustained by a third party while the King's child was driving his parents' ATV on a private road in a private residential community, claiming that the accident had not occurred on an insured location and the Kings' notice of a claim was untimely. The district court rendered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of unresolved state law and concluded (1) with respect to a claim for negligent entrustment under a liability policy that provides coverage for accidents involving ATVs that occur on insured locations, the relevant location is the site of the accident; (2) the private road in this case did not fall under the coverage provision; and (3) social interactions between the insured and the claimant making no reference to an accident do not justify delayed notice, but an insurer must prove prejudice to disclaim its obligation to provide coverage based on untimely notice. View "Arrowood Indem. Co. v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant William Coleman was serving a fifteen-year sentence following his convictions on charges pertaining to his relationship with his ex-wife when he went on a hunger strike. Following a trial, the trial court granted the former commissioner of correction's application for a permanent injunction authorizing the department of correction to restrain and force-feed Defendant to prevent life-threatening dehydration and malnutrition. Defendant was subsequently force-fed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined (1) the state's interests outweighed Defendant's common-law right to bodily integrity; (2) the forcible administration of artificial nutrition and hydration to Defendant did not violate his constitutional right to free speech and privacy; and (3) international law did not prohibit medically necessary force-feeding under such circumstances. View "Comm'r of Corr. v. Coleman" on Justia Law

The substitute Plaintiff, the successor administrator of the estate of Decedent, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, Physician and Medical Center, claiming, inter alia, that Physician had failed adequately to warn Decedent of certain risks associated with the use of birth control pills and the symptoms of those risks. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Defendants and rendered judgment accordingly. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to present the case to the jury and correctly reversed the trial court's ruling granting a directed verdict in favor of Defendants. View "Curran v. Kroll" on Justia Law