Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, while in the course of employment as a uniformed police officer of the City's police department, was involved in a shooting and was later criminally charged in connection with the shooting. The City suspended Plaintiff without pay pending the outcome of the criminal matter. After being acquitted of all charges, Plaintiff brought an action against the City seeking reimbursement for legal fees, lost wages and lost employment benefits. The trial court awarded Plaintiff $562,277, which included Plaintiff's attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's finding of a contract between Plaintiff and his lawyer in which Plaintiff incurred legal fees beyond the retainer was not clearly erroneous; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages to Plaintiff for attorney's fees, and the award was not excessive; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to damages for economic loss during his entire suspension, and the trial court's award of damages for economic loss in this case was proper. View "Murtha v. City of Hartford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants, the driver of a vehicle and the vehicle's owner, for negligence after the driver of the vehicle struck Plaintiff's vehicle, causing injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff submitted an offer of compromise to Defendants, proposing to settle the case. Defendants did not accept the offer during the statutory period under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-192a. Later, the trial court granted Defendants' motion to strike the offer of compromise as a sanction for a discovery violation. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and the trial court then denied Plaintiff's posttrial motion for offer of compromise interest. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding the trial court's striking of the offer of compromise was within the scope of its judicial authority, but doing so in this case was an abuse of discretion because nothing in the record warranted the sanction in the absence of a finding of bad faith or significant prejudice. Remanded with direction to grant Plaintiff's motion for offer of compromise interest. View "Yeager v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife (Wife) sued Defendant for negligence and loss of consortium after Defendant's vehicle struck Plaintiff's vehicle and injured Wife. Wife subsequently withdrew her claims pursuant to a settlement agreement she entered into with Defendant, and Plaintiff withdrew his negligence claim. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's remaining claim, concluding that Plaintiff's loss of consortium claim was barred by the settlement of Wife's negligence claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to legally binding precedent, because a consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action, the consortium claim is barred when the suit brought by the injured spouse has been terminated by settlement; and (2) strong policy reasons support the application of this rule to claims such as Plaintiff's. View "Voris v. Molinaro" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Gibson was convicted, after a jury trial, of failure to appear in the first degree. The appellate court reversed the conviction on the ground that improper statements by the prosecutor during closing argument had deprived Defendant of his constitutional due process right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial prosecutor's two uses of the words 'I think' while marshaling the evidence during closing argument did not constitute an improper expression of personal opinion and therefore did not amount to prosecutorial impropriety. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of conviction on the charge of failure to appear. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

After a vehicle Defendant Tricia Coccomo was driving collided with another vehicle, killing all three occupants, Defendant was convicted of three counts each of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle and misconduct with a motor vehicle, and one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. The appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Defendant had transferred certain real property that she owned for less than fair value as proof of consciousness of guilt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence that Defendant had transferred, after the collision, certain property for less than its fair value to her mother to prove consciousness of guilt; and (2) the trial court did not commit plain error in admitting the results of a blood alcohol test that, according to the Defendant, was performed on someone else's blood. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Coccomo" on Justia Law

After Employee received numerous elevated blood pressure readings and was prescribed hypertension medication, Employee filed a notice of claim for hypertension benefits. The workers' compensation commissioner (1) found that a physician informed Employee more than one year prior to filing his claim that he had hypertension, and (2) concluded that, because Employee's claim was filed more than one year after that date, his claim was untimely under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-294c(a). The compensation review board affirmed. While Employee's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, in which it held that the one year limitation period set forth in section 31-294c(a) for claims for hypertension benefits does not commence until an employee is informed by a medical professional that he or she has been diagnosed with hypertension. At issue on appeal was whether the time limitation period was triggered only after Employee's physician prescribed medication for his condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Employee was, in fact, diagnosed with hypertension more than one year before he filed his claim, the board properly upheld the commissioner's dismissal of Employee's claim for benefits. View "Roohr v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

After Employee was diagnosed with hypertension, Employee filed a notice of claim for hypertension benefits under Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c(a). The workers' compensation commissioner dismissed Employee's claim as untimely under the one year limitation period of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-294c(a), finding that Employee had notice of his hypertension more than one year before he filed his claim for benefits. The compensation review board affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether advice from a medical professional to Employee that he had an elevated blood pressure triggered the one year limitation period. While Employee's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ciarlelli v. Hamden, which held that the one year limitation period set forth in section 31-294c(a) for claims brought pursuant to section 7-433c does not commence until an employee is informed by a medical professional that he or she has been diagnosed with hypertension. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the board applied an incorrect legal standard in upholding the commissioner's dismissal of Employee's claim. View "Brymer v. Clinton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that certain medical malpractice claims that they had asserted in an action against a medical association were covered under an insurance policy issued to the facility by Insurer. Due to Insurer's insolvency during the pendency of the action, Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association assumed liability for Insurer's obligations to the extent that claims were covered under the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Act. The Association filed a counterclaim, contending that the claims against the medical association were not covered because they were subject to a policy provision that excluded them from corporate coverage liability. The trial rendered rendered judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the policy exclusion was inapplicable to the medical association's coverage for claims brought against it predicated solely on liability that it may have occurred through the acts of one of its nurse practitioners. View "Johnson v. Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Defendant landowner applied for a zoning change to designate its parcel as a business and commercial zone and for a special exception permit for approval of the site plan of its shopping center project. The Town's Planning and Zoning Commission denied the zone change application and denied as moot Defendant's application for a special exception permit. Defendants appealed, and the trial court judge, Judge Owens, approved Defendant's application for a zone change. During the pendency of Defendant's zone change appeal and upon receipt of Judge Owens's decision, the Commission approved the special exception permit but took no official action regarding the zone change application. Plaintiffs, several individuals, appealed, arguing that the commission acted improperly when it approved Defendant's special exception permit. The superior court sustained the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly revisited the prior judgment of Judge Owens and too narrowly construed the effect of Owens's decision as well as the actions taken by the Commission in reviewing and approving Defendant's application for the special exception permit. Remanded. View "Zimnoch v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n " on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were two sisters who held interests in a vacant lot as tenants in common. Plaintiff brought a quiet title action, claiming full ownership of the lot through adverse possession. The trial court quieted title to the real property in favor of Plaintiff, holding that Plaintiff had disseized Defendant of her interest in the property. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court improperly determined that Plaintiff had (1) overcome the presumption that possession by a tenant in common is not adverse to another cotenant, and (2) proven by clear and convincing evidence the elements of an adverse possession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly rendered judgment for Plaintiff on her adverse possession claim because there was not unequivocal evidence that Plaintiff expressly notified or conveyed a clear and unmistakable intent to disseize Defendant of her interest in the lot. View "O'Connor v. Larocque" on Justia Law