Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant in this case issued health care insurance policies to provide coverage for medical services and entered into contracts with practitioners of the healing arts to provide those services. Plaintiffs, three individual podiatrists and the Connecticut Podiatric Medical Association, brought an action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant's practice of reimbursing individual podiatrists at a lower rate than medical doctors for the same service constituted unfair discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CUIPA, by prohibiting unfair discrimination, bars the denial of reimbursement on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts, but does not preclude setting different reimbursement rates on the basis of the particular license held by a practitioner of the healing arts. View "Conn. Podiatric Med. Ass'n v. Health Net of Conn., Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, American Diamond Exchange, brought an action against Defendant, Jurgita Karobikaite, and her husband, Scott Alpert, after Alpert, who was working as an estate buyer for Plaintiff, diverted Plaintiff's customers so that he could personally purchase their jewelry. Defendant shared in the profits. A judgment of default was entered against Alpert. The court found Defendant liable for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy and civil conspiracy and awarded Plaintiff $118,000 in damages. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court as to damages and remanded for a recalculation of damages based on the existing record. On remand, the trial court awarded $103,355 in damages to Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which its lost profits could be determined with reasonable certainty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence by failing to raise it in her direct appeal or because the appellate court decided the claim against her in the first appeal; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support an award of damages. View "Am. Diamond Exch., Inc. v. Alpert" on Justia Law

This was the second of two appeals arising from a property dispute between Plaintiffs, members of a local parish of the Episcopal church and the church, and Defendants, several present or former officers or vestry members of the parish. Plaintiffs brought an action against Defendants, alleging breach of trust for the wrongful failure to relinquish to Plaintiffs all of the real and personal property of the parish following a decision by a majority of the voting members of the parish, including Defendants, to withdraw from the diocese and to affiliate the parish with an ecclesiastical society that was not part of the Episcopal church. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court properly (1) granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and declared that the disputed property was held in trust for the Episcopal church, and that Defendants had no right or authority to occupy, use or possess the property; (2) ordered Defendants to relinquish possession, custody and control of the property to the Plaintiffs; and (3) permitted Plaintiffs to move for an order of accounting. View "Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Conn. v. Gauss" on Justia Law

This was the first of two appeals arising from a property dispute between members of a local parish of the Episcopal church and several present or former officers or vestry members of the parish. An unincorporated voluntary association attempted unsuccessfully to intervene in the action to protect its alleged ownership interest in the property. The association appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied its motion to intervene and its request for an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion because (1) the issues raised by the association were fully and fairly raised by the present pleadings, and (2) the association did not seek to intervene to assert a claim against Defendants. In addition, the Court held that there was a presumption of adequate representation because the record demonstrated that the identities of the association members and Defendants were overlapping and that they had the same ultimate objective. View "Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Conn. v. Gauss" on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals arose from the collision of two city fire trucks. As a result of the collision, firefighter John Keane died, and firefighter William Mahoney suffered serious injuries. Monica Keane brought an action against Defendants, the firefighters who drove the trucks, alleging negligence in their operation of the fire trucks and that their negligence caused John Keane's death. In the second case, William and Erin Mahoney filed a complaint against Defendants, two firefighters and the city, alleging that the firefighters were negligent and that their negligence caused William Mahoney to sustain injuries. In both cases, the trial court granted the motions of Defendants to strike all counts of the complaint, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-308 barred firefighters who are eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits from bringing negligence actions against other firefighters for their injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court, holding that section 7-308 does not violate equal protection and, therefore, the trial court properly granted Defendants' motions to strike on the ground that the actions were barred by the immunity provision in section 7-308. View "Keane v. Fischetti" on Justia Law

Plaintiff HVC Inc. was a trustee of the Honda Lease Trust. During the audit period at issue, several car dealerships entered into thousands of leases with customers (lessees) pursuant to lease plan agreements between the dealerships, the trust, and the servicer of the trust. Under the leases, the lessees were responsible for submitting the vehicle registration renewal application and renewal fees to the department of motor vehicles on behalf of the trust. Upon receipt of the renewal application and fee, the department sent the vehicle registration card to the trust, and the trust forwarded the vehicle registration card to the appropriate lessee. After conducting a sales and use tax audit for the audit period from April 1, 2001 through October 31, 2004, Defendant Pamela Law, the then commissioner of revenue services, issued a deficiency assessment against Plaintiff, concluding that the renewal fees constituted taxable gross receipts of the trust and, therefore, were subject to the sales tax. The trial court rendered summary judgment partially in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the renewal fees paid by the lessess qualified as Plaintiff's gross receipts subject to sales tax under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-408(1). View "HVT, Inc. v. Law" on Justia Law

This case centered on the scope of an implied easement located on a lawn that lay between a beachfront development and Long Island Sound. Plaintiffs owned waterfront lots in the development and Defendants owned rear lots. The trial court concluded that the implied easement over the lawn in favor of Defendants conferred only a right-of-way to access the shoreline. Defendants appealed, and an intervening plaintiff cross appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed with respect to the Defendants' appeals, and (2) reversed with respect to the cross appeal, holding that the trial court improperly ordered, in a supplemental memorandum of decision, that the right-of-way could also be used for the purpose of accessing areas other than the shoreline as the record disclosed no support for this finding. View "McBurney v. Paquin" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant John Papandrea was convicted of nine counts of larceny in the first degree. The appellate court affirmed. At trial, the state claimed that Defendant stole corporate funds from his employer in order to purchase artwork. Defendant conceded that he took the funds but asserted in his defense that he lacked the wrongful intent necessary for first degree larceny. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate court properly concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence of Defendant's intent to commit larceny. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that Defendant had the necessary intent to commit larceny. View "State v. Papandrea" on Justia Law

For several years, Plaintiff Housatonic Railroad Company purchased diesel fuel from a petroleum distributor that was used exclusively by Plaintiff as part of its interstate freight rail business. The distributor remitted the petroleum tax to Defendant, the commissioner of revenue services. The distributor separately billed Plaintiff for the amount of tax it paid to the department of revenue services, and Plaintiff paid that amount directly to the distributor. Plaintiff then submitted requests to the department for a refund of the money paid for the petroleum tax by the distributor to the department. The commissioner denied Plaintiff's request. Plaintiff appealed. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the state was immune from suit because Plaintiff could not establish an exception to sovereign immunity under any of three separate statutory provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of the statutory provisions on which Plaintiff relied permits a rail carrier to bring an action against the state for a refund of taxes paid by a petroleum distributor. View "Housatonic R.R. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs." on Justia Law

Petitioners, George Gould and Ronald Taylor, were arrested and charged with, inter alia, murder, felony murder, and robbery in the first degree. The jury acquitted Petitioners of the murder charge but convicted them on all of the other counts. Subsequently, Petitioners filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. The habeas court granted the petitions and vacated the convictions, concluding that petitioners had established their entitlement to relief on the basis of actual innocence because two of the state's witnesses had recanted their testimony. Respondent, the commissioner of correction, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the habeas court's judgments, holding that, under the test set forth in Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, actual innocence requires affirmative evidence that Petitioners did not commit the crimes of which they were convicted, not simply the discrediting of evidence on which the conviction rested. Remanded for a new trial under the proper standard. View "Gould v. Comm'r of Correction" on Justia Law