Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The present matter arose from three related tax appeals involving Plaintiff Goodspeed Airport's property that consisted of a commercial utility airport and forty-three acres of open fields. The superior court denied relief on Plaintiff's claim seeking reclassification and assessment of certain of its real property as open space and disposed of all three appeals. The appellate court concluded that (1) 13.08 acres of Plaintiff's property were ineligible for open space classification; and (2) Plaintiff, notwithstanding the ongoing improper classification of its property by Defendant, the town of East Haddam, was not entitled to judicial relief from the improper assessment of its forty-three acres. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that the trial court properly determined that the 13.08 acres were ineligible for open space classification and that Plaintiff was not aggrieved pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a on the basis of Defendant's ongoing overassessment of the forty-three acres. Remanded. View "Goodspeed Airport, L.L.C. v. East Haddam" on Justia Law

In four decisions, Defendant, the freedom of information commission, ordered Plaintiff, a town ethics commission, to make and maintain, for three years, audio recordings of Plaintiff's executive sessions or any other session closed to the public after finding that (1) Plaintiff violated the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act by convening in nonpublic sessions to discuss certain matters and (2) Plaintiff had failed to comply with the commission's orders to amend its minutes to reflect those discussions. The trial court consolidated Plaintiff's appeals and then dismissed them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the commission's orders exceeded its remedial authority under the Freedom of Information Act. Remanded with direction to render judgments in favor of Plaintiff. View "Ethics Comm'n v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were former husband and wife. Following the dissolution of their marriage, Defendant was granted joint custody and visitation rights of the parties' two daughters. Defendant then reported that her eldest daughter had been sexually abused by Plaintiff. As a result of the investigation, Defendant was charged with risk of injury to a child, false reporting of an incident, false statement in the second degree, attempt to commit malicious prosecution, and sexual assault in the fourth degree. Following Defendant's guilty plea, Plaintiff filed a complaint sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly improperly applied the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff's claim was time barred. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that the existence of an original duty must be established before applying the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll the statute of limitations in a nonnegligence cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Watts v. Chittenden" on Justia Law

An employee of Plaintiff, the town of Southbury, was injured in a car accident with Defendants, Patricia and Joseph Gonyea, during the course of employment. Employee applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from Plaintiff. Employee also made a claim against Defendants, which was settled for the Defendants' policy insurance limit. After Plaintiff perfected its statutory lien rights, Employee forwarded to Plaintiff the net proceeds he received from the settlement. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced the present action to recover past and future works' compensation benefits it had paid, or would become obligated to pay, as a result of Employee's injuries. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff had assented to the settlement between Employee and Defendants and, thus, was barred from pursuing this action. The trial court granted Defendants' motion, concluding Plaintiff had assented to the settlement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff assented to the settlement and voluntarily relinquished its rights to recover an outstanding balance through subsequent litigation. View "Town of Southbury v. Gonyea" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count each of possession of narcotics, possession of a controlled substance, interfering with an officer, and tampering with physical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence taken from the motor vehicle that Defendant was operating at the time of his arrest; (2) concluding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction on the possessory charges; (3) admitting Defendant's unredacted medical records into evidence; and (4) instructing the jury as to the State's burden of proof. View "State v. Winfrey" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to sexual assault in the second degree, sexual assault in the third degree, and risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court twice remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. At the hearing for resentencing upon the second remand, Defendant moved to withdraw his prior pleas, and the trial court denied his motion. On appeal, Defendant claimed the trial court should have granted his motion pursuant to Practice Book 39-26 and 39-27(2) as well as due process protections because the Supreme Court previously determined that his plea agreement resulted in an unenforceable illegal sentence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, holding that Defendant's motion was beyond the scope of remand for resentencing and therefore should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "State v. Tabone" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography. As a condition of probation, Defendant was required to not possess or subscribe to any sexually stimulating material deemed inappropriate by probation officer. After finding Defendant violated his probation by visiting dating websites and possessing nude photographs, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the special condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face and unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim of unconstitutional overbreadth failed because because he did not allege a violation of his First Amendment rights; (2) there was no merit to Defendant's vagueness claim, and his as-applied vagueness claim failed under State v. Golding and the plain error doctrine; and (3) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding. View "State v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Defendant was adjudicated a youthful offender for committing the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ninety days' incarceration and a period of probation of two years. As a condition of probation, Defendant was ordered to make restitution to the victims in the amount of $2,000. Defendant appealed, arguing that since there was no evidence or finding that he had personally caused damage, the trial court's order to pay restitution was improper. The appellate court reversed the sentence imposed and remanded with direction to vacate the restitution order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because its order of restitution had a nexus to the crime of which Defendant was convicted and was, therefore, reasonably related to Defendant's rehabilitation. View "State v. Silas S." on Justia Law

Defendant David Sheriff was charged with several drug-related offenses. Flavio Bail Bonds executed a bail bond for Sheriff on each of the cases. After Sheriff failed to appear for the trial of the three cases, Flavio discovered that Sheriff had fled to Jamaica and remained there. The state subsequently declined to initiate extradition proceedings. Flavio filed a petition with the trial court for compromise or to release Flavio from its obligation on the bonds pursuant to Practice Book 38-23, which permits a court to relieve a surety of bond obligations after a showing of good cause. The trial court determined that Flavio had failed to establish good cause, and therefore, denied Flavio's petition. Flavio thereafter filed a writ of error. The Supreme court held that the trial court properly denied the petition and denied the writ, holding (1) the trial court applied the proper standard in making its determination, and (2) the trial court properly concluded that Flavio failed to show good cause under the rule. View "State v. Sheriff" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant was found not guilty of murder, either as a principal or an accessory. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted testimony that Defendant previously had possessed a pistol on an occasion prior to the date of the crimes with which he was charged; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering, in sentencing Defendant, remarks made by the family of the victim in their impact statement and other evidence related to the murder charge, of which Defendant was found not guilty. View "State v. Pena" on Justia Law