Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jose Polanco was convicted of sale of narcotics in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a-277(a) and sale of narcotics within 1500 feet of a school in violation of Ohio Gen. Stat. 21a-278a(b). The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years in prison suspended after four years for violating Section 21a-277(a) and three years for violating Section 21a-278a(b), for a total effective sentence of thirteen years imprisonment, execution suspended after seven years, with three years of probation. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that the trial court illegally sentenced him by (1) suspending the execution of his sentence for violating Section 21a-277(a) without imposing a period of probation; (2) imposing a period of probation without suspending any portion of the term of imprisonment for violating Section 21a-278a(b); and (3) adding the mandatory three year term of imprisonment for violating Section 21a-277(a) to his ten year total sentence for violating Section 21a-277(a). The second trial court denied Defendant's motion to correct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court imposed a valid sentence on Defendant and that the second trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Defendant's motion. View "State v. Polanco" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eric Ham was charged with six crimes, including murder. Shortly before trial, the state offered Ham a plea bargain. Ham's counsel informed Ham that, if he accepted the plea offer, he would be eligible for parole after serving eighty-five percent of his sentence. When counsel advised Ham, his advice was consistent with the parole board's interpretation of the law. Ham rejected the offer. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all six charges, and the court sentenced Ham to a total effective term of fifty years imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Subsequently, in Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, the Supreme Court clarified the law at issue, making it clear that if Ham had accepted the plea offer, he would have been eligible for parole after serving fifty percent of his sentence, rather than eighty-five percent. Ham subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel and arguing that but for counsel's error in advising him about the law, he would have accepted the plea offer. The habeas court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that counsel's performance was not deficient. View "Ham v. Comm'r of Correction" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, defendant Wallace Brabham was convicted of burglary in the third degree and attempt to commit larceny in the first degree. Before sentencing, Defendant posted bond and fled to England. As a result, Defendant failed to appear for sentencing. Defendant was rearrested and returned to Connecticut. Defendant once again posted bond and fled to England and again did not appear for sentencing. Defendant was rearrested and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Defendant appealed. The state contended that the entire appeal should be dismissed under the common-law fugitive felon disentitlement doctrine, which allows an appellate court to dismiss the appeal of a party who flees subsequent to the felony conviction from which he appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Defendant's claims were barred by the rule of fugitive disentitlement. View "State v. Brabham" on Justia Law

Brady Dougan and Tomoko Dougan entered into a stipulation for judgment dissolving their marriage that contained a provision ordering Brady to pay interest if he failed to make payments to Tomoko. Both of the parties entered into the agreement with knowledge of its terms, and the trial court found the stipulation for judgment to be fair and reasonable. When Brady later failed to render a complete payment to defendant, Tomoko moved for enforcement of the stipulation and requested that the trial court order the plaintiff to pay her interest in accordance with the terms of the judgment. The trial court held that the provision for interest was invalid and unenforceable as against public policy. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. On Brady's appeal to the Supreme Court, Tomoko was granted special permission to raise the alternate ground that the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed because the doctrine of judicial estoppel supports the enforcement of the interest provision. The Court agreed with Tomoko and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, finding the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Brady from claiming the provision was unenforceable. View "Dougan v. Dougan" on Justia Law

Defendant Calvin Long was committed to the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board following a finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease of assault in the second degree. The state later petitioned to continue the defendant's commitment under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-593(c), which the defendant challenged on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court held that the legislature had a legitimate basis for providing review procedures for the continued commitment of insanity acquittees different from those afforded to civilly committed inmates. Following remand, the trial court granted the state's petition. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly construed the Supreme Court's decision in the previous appeal to preclude his current equal protection challenge and that a higher level of scrutiny of the statutory scheme should apply to this claim than the Court had applied to his claim in the previous appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that its decision in the previous appeal precluded the defendant's present claims. View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

The commissioner of children and families filed neglect petitions with respect to Joseph W. and Daniel W., and the trial court found the children were neglected. At the termination proceeding, the trial court found the father was not a custodial parent and therefore could not contest the issue of neglect. The court then terminated the parental rights of the father and mother with respect to both children. The parents appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly found the father was not a custodial parent. The appellate court reversed, holding that the terminations were premised on improper adjudications of neglect. The Supreme Court then granted the commissioner's petition for certification to appeal. At issue was whether a noncustodial parent is entitled to contest a neglect petition. The Supreme Court held that the father was entitled to contest the neglect adjudication regardless of whether he was a custodial parent and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court on this alternate ground. View "In re Joseph W." on Justia Law

In 2000, the manager of the Goodspeed Airport cut down trees and woody vegetation on property owned by a land trust. A total of six actions were filed as a result of the clear-cutting. In addition to instituting two of three consolidated actions, the airport brought two federal actions, and the district court found in favor of the land trust in both actions. In state court three other actions were consolidated. The trial court concluded that (1) the airport parties' claims for substantive and procedural due process were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and (2) the airport parties' claims claims for first amendment retaliation and abuse of process were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that either the issues were actually litigated in the federal actions and thus are barred by collateral estoppel, or the claims could have been raised in the federal actions and thus are barred by res judicata. View "Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child arising out of defendant's sexual abuse of his wife's son. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The court held that the trial court reasonably determined that the results of the Abel Assessment of Sexual Interest test administered to defendant were not sufficiently reliable for admission into evidence and, in light of the circumstances, defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the test. Because the evidence that defense counsel proffered provided no basis on which the jury reasonably could have concluded either that the son had visited pornographic websites on his own or that he had viewed images of conduct similar to the conduct attributed to defendant, the trial court properly excluded the evidence. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state's attorney to adduce testimony from an expert on the reporting of sexual abuse by child victims where defense counsel opened the door to redirect examination. The court further held that the comments the state attorney made were based on the evidence and were neither inflammatory nor inaccurate and therefore, defendant's claim of prosecutorial impropriety must fail. Finally, the state conceded that the sentence that the trial court imposed did not comply with General Statutes 53a-70(b)(3) because it included a period of probation rather than a period of special parole. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for resentencing and the judgment was affirmed in all other aspects. View "State v. Victor O." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child where his convictions stemmed from his sexual assault of his step-granddaughter over a two year period. Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction and raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's confrontation rights by precluding him from questioning the physician that had examined the victim hypothetically about the likelihood of injury. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the undisclosed portion of department of children and families records contained in the court file either irrelevant or cumulative of the disclosed portions and declining to provide it to defendant. The court further held that, to the extent there was any impropriety in the prosecutor's remark, it was not sufficiently prejudicial as to require reversal of the conviction. The court finally held that the trial court's jury instructions did not prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "State v. David N.J." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the board of education of the town of Watertown ("board"), the town of Watertown ("town"), and two teachers employed by the board, claiming that, as a result of defendants' negligence, one plaintiff severely injured her foot at a school dance sponsored by the board. At issue was whether the trial court improperly granted defendants' motion to strike the claims on the grounds that negligence claims against the town and board were barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity and did not come within the scope of the statutory waiver of government immunity set forth in General Statutes 52-557n; that the claims against the two teachers were barred because section 52-557n did not create a cause of action against individual municipal employees; and that, in the absence of a common law negligence claim against the teachers, there was no basis for an indemnification claim pursuant to General Statutes 7-465. The court held that the trial court properly granted defendants' motion to strike count one as to the town and the board because they were immune from suit pursuant to 52-557n(a)(2)(B) and properly determined that section 52-557n did not authorize suit against individual government employees. The court also held that the trial court improperly granted the motion to strike the first count of the complaint as to the two teachers and the entire second count seeking payment from the town and the board pursuant to section 7-465 on the ground that plaintiffs had not alleged common law negligence against the teachers. The court further held that the trial court's ruling could be affirmed on the alternate ground that the teachers were immune from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.