Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed directly from the judgment of conviction of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a. On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial court, in fashioning his sentence, improperly considered his trial testimony relative to his drug dealing and thus burdened defendant's right to testify in his own defense. The court held that the question of the trial court's consideration of that testimony was irrelevant because that court clearly relied on other independent sources for the fact of defendant's drug dealing, meaning that it could not possibly have penalized defendant for testifying at trial. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's claim lacked merit and affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court upholding the zoning board of appeals of the city of Stamford's ("board") decision that a dock located on the waters of Stamford Harbor was a neighborhood dock rather than a marina, and therefore, improvements to the dock were not subject to the city's zoning regulations. At issue was whether the trial court properly upheld the board's decision that the Southfield Point Associations' construction of a 196 foot dock and the use of Cook Road Extension for access to and connection with the dock were entirely immune from local zoning regulation merely because they related to water dependent use. The court held that the trial court properly upheld the board's decision and agreed with defendants when the dock and its intersection with Cook Road Extension were located waterward of the mean high water line, where the city normally had no jurisdiction, and when the zoning regulations did not apply to activities that took place on Cook Road Extension.

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and General Statutes 7-465 when defendants terminated plaintiff from his employment as a senior field engineer in defendants' information technology department after it had determined that he was responsible for disruptions in its computer network. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding defendants a portion of defendants' attorney's fees that it incurred in defending against plaintiff's action. The court held that the trial court acted well within its discretion in awarding attorney's fees where plaintiff continued to litigate his claims against defendants after it became clear that those claims were groundless.

Defendant and his wife appeal the trial court's judgment in a breach of contract and lien foreclosure action arising out of a dispute concerning the construction of a single-family home in the town of Greenwich. Defendants challenged all aspects of the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiff except the portion of the judgment awarding plaintiff loss profit. Plaintiff challenged in his cross-appeal that the trial court improperly accepted the attorney trial referee's determination that the mechanic's lien was invalid and therefore improperly awarded defendants damages under General Statutes 49-8(c). The court held that because plaintiff and third party defendant offered no legal support for the attorney trial referee's finding that the wife was liable for breaching the contract between defendant and plaintiff, the portion of the trial court's judgment that was rendered against her could not stand. The court also held that the judgment of foreclosure must be reversed where there was no evidence that plaintiff furnished any materials or provided any services in connection with the contract balance and that the portion of the judgment awarding plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes 52-249 must also be reversed where such an award was authorized only when a valid judgment of foreclosure had been obtained. The court further held that the parties did not intend to impose liability for delays in the permitting and wetlands approval process and that the attorney trial referee improperly found that plaintiff was entitled to damages for the delays attributable to the change orders. The court also held that because plaintiff was not entitled to recover delay damages, it necessarily followed that any mechanic's lien securing those damages was invalid. The court finally held that the case must be remanded to the trial court for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with section 49-8(c).

Defendant, then age sixteen, was arrested and charged with ten offenses and arraigned as a youthful offender under General Statutes 54-76c et seq. Following the arraignment, the state filed a motion to transfer defendant's case to the regular criminal docket. At issue was whether the Appellate Court, sua sponte, properly dismissed for lack of a final judgment the interlocutory appeal of defendant from an order of the trial court transferring his case from the youthful offender docket of the Superior Court to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to sections 54-76c(b)(1). The court held that the trial court's order was not an appealable order under State v. Curcio where it did not conclude the rights of defendant regarding his status as a youth offender. Accordingly, the Appellate Court properly dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Defendant appealed from the decision of the trial court granting the state's motion to transfer defendant's case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket pursuant to General Statutes 54-57c(b)(1). At issue was whether the trial court improperly granted the state's motion to transfer without first holding a hearing on the motion in violation of defendant's right to due process under the federal constitution. The court held that section 54-76c(b) required a hearing on the adult docket prior to the finalization of the transfer of a case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket, that this statutory requirement satisfied due process, and that neither section 54-76c(b)(1) nor due process entitled defendant to a hearing before the court on the youthful offender docket.

On April 19, 2006, Plaintiff Gabrielle Nyenhuis, in the course of her employment as a uniformed police officer of Defendant Metropolitan District Commission (District), had an altercation with a member of the public. The following day, in response to a citizen complaint filed against her, the District placed Plaintiff on administrative duty. An internal investigation was launched, and in June, the West Hartford Police Department arrested Plaintiff and charged her with third degree assault. She would later be acquitted on the charge. The District reinstated Plaintiff to active duty. In November, 2007, Plaintiff initiated two complaints against the District pursuant to its grievance procedure, seeking accrued vacation and lost overtime stemming from the time she was placed on administrative duty until her reinstatement. While the grievances were pending, Plaintiff filed suit in the circuit court seeking indemnification for, among other things, the same vacation time and lost overtime. The court awarded Plaintiff damages and the District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtâs award of damages, but disagreed with the courtâs method of calculating them. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a rehearing on the issue of damages.

Plaintiff Randall Motzer worked for Defendants Edward Haberli and E. Haberli Electric, LLC as an electricianâs apprentice. In June, 2004, he was working on a job site to help install electrical wiring through the ground floor of an apartment complex. The task required two people to complete. Bryan Papillo, the other worker, drilled holes through the floor above and fed wires to Plaintiff working below. In one instance, Plaintiff put his fingers through the hole to retrieve the wires and heard Papillo yell something just as a drill bit came down on Plaintiffâs finger. Plaintiff had to have part of his finger removed. As a result of this injury, Plaintiff received workersâ compensation benefits. Notwithstanding the benefits, Plaintiff filed a two count complaint against Defendants, alleging among other things, Defendants engaged in âserious and willful misconductâ and that conduct lead to Plaintiffâs injury. Defendants denied responsibility and raised five special defenses. A jury trial on the matter began in March, 2009. At the close of the case, Defendants moved for a directed verdict alleging Plaintiff failed to prove Defendants were the cause of Plaintiffâs injury. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendants. On review, the Supreme Court found that the record was sufficient to support the trial courtâs grant of a directed verdict to Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Bruce Bedrick appeals the trial courtâs decision in favor of his wife Deborah Bedrick. Deborah filed suit seeking dissolution of her marriage in August, 2007. She sought permanent alimony, an equitable distribution of the partiesâ real and personal property, and other relief. Bruce filed a cross-complaint seeking to enforce a postnuptial agreement that the parties executed in December, 1977 but most recently modified in 1989. The agreement provided that in the event of dissolution, neither party would pay alimony. Instead, Deborah would receive a cash settlement. The 1989 amendment listed the cash settlement to be $75,000. The agreement further provided that Deborah would waive her interests in Bruceâs businesses, and not be liable for Bruceâs personal and business loans. The trial court concluded that because there was not much case law addressing the validity of postnuptial agreements in Connecticut to use as a guide, it may not enforce an agreement that was not fair and equitable. The court concluded that the postnuptial agreement was not fair and equitable, and declined to enforce it. Bruce appealed the decision and lost. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that postnuptial agreements are valid and enforceable, and generally must comply with contract principles. The Court also concluded that the terms of such agreements should be both fair and equitable at the time of execution, and not unconscionable at the time of dissolution. The Court found that the terms of the Bedricksâ agreement were unconscionable, and it affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

The Town's building officials refused to issue permits to Plaintiff-Appellant Levine for two dwelling units Plaintiff wanted to build on his property. Plaintiff sued for permission to build but lost at trial and appealed, challenging the Town's authority to change its mind after considerable time and money was spent on development. Plaintiff also argueed that there were problems with the trial court's conclusion on his municipal estoppel claim. The Court found that the town properly enacted its land use ordinance, but the lower court improperly applied the law to Plaintiff's municipal estoppel claim to allow him damages for reliance on Town's initial permission to build. Starting in 2005, Plaintiff sought permission from the Town to develop a parcel of land. In 2006, the Town amended its land use ordinance to prohibit the construction of more than one dwelling on a lot, but did not expressly provide whether the revisions would apply to projects already in development. A February, 2006 meeting of the board of selectmen passed a resolution to allow Plaintiff's project to proceed; a September, 2006 meeting rescinded the February approval, and reserved the right to enforce the Town's land use ordinances against Plaintiff's project. In November, 2006, Plaintiff sought the building permits for work already in progress, and the Town refused to issue them. The Court affirmed the lower court's determination that the Town's board had authority under state law to pass the September, 2006 resolution. However, though the Court agreed with Plaintiff that he had demonstrated significant time and money was spent in developing his land. The Court held that the standard used to decide was too strict under state law, and ordered a new trial to resolve Plaintiff's municipal estoppel claim.