Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the town of Hamden in this tax dispute, holding that the appellate court correctly determined that the word "submit" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-63c(a) unambiguously requires that an assessor receive income and expense forms by June 1.Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-63c(a) requires the owners of certain rental property to "submit" income and expense information to their municipal tax assessor "not later than the first day of June." Plaintiff in this case mailed the relevant information on May 31, 2016, but the assessor did not receive the forms until June 2, 2016. The assessor imposed a ten percent penalty on Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the penalty was improper because its timely mailing was sufficient under the statute. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the word "submit" requires receipt of the income and expense forms no later than June 1; and (2) the ten percent penalty imposed on Plaintiff pursuant to section 12-63(d) was valid. View "Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Town of Hamden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming Defendant's conviction of three counts of custodial interference in the second degree, holding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-98(a)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant and that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued that section 53a-98(a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague in its application to her and that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction. The appellate court rejected both claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly concluded that section 53a-98(a)(3) was not unconstitutionally vague in its application to her and that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of three counts of custodial interference in the second degree. View "State v. Lori T." on Justia Law

In this companion case to Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, __ A.3d __ (2022), which the Court also decided today, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the habeas court dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Practice Book 23-29 sua sponte and without prior notice, holding that remand was required.Petitioner filed a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting four claims. The habeas court, sua sponte and without prior notice, dismissed the petition pursuant to Practice Book 23-29. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the habeas court did not have the benefit of the Court's decision in Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 A.3d 368 (Conn. 2020), remand was required for the habeas court to first determine whether any grounds exist for it to decline to issue the writ pursuant to Practice Book 23-24. View "Boria v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court dismissing Petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the superior court dismissing Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Practice Book section 23-29 requires the habeas court to provide prior notice of the court’s intention to dismiss, on its own motion, a petition that it deems legally deficient and an opportunity to be heard on the papers by filing a written response.Acting on its own motion and without prior notice, the habeas court dismissed Petitioner's habeas petition as repetitious under section 23-29(3). The appellate court dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a dismissal under section 23-29, which occurs after the writ has issued and the action has commenced, requires some procedural safeguards, including prior notice and an opportunity to submit a written response, but not a full hearing; and (2) on remand, if the writ is issued, and the habeas court again dismisses Petitioner's habeas petition on its own motion pursuant to section 23-29, it must provider Petitioner with prior notice and an opportunity to submit a brief or written response to the proposed basis for dismissal. View "Brown v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count each of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) under the circumstances of the case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted a dual inculpatory statement under section 8-6(4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence; (2) the statement at issue was non-testimonial, and its admission at trial did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; (3) certain statements made by the prosecutor did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation under the state Constitution; and (4) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his second claim of impropriety. View "State v. Graham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court finding that Defendant had discriminated against Plaintiff during the course of her employment by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability, in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-60(b)(1), and had unlawfully retaliated against her, holding that the trial court did not err.In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court concluded that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence written settlement communications, in violation of Conn. Code Evid. 4-8 and that the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the written communications into evidence; and (2) the other evidentiary errors identified by the appellate court were harmless. View "Kovachich v. Dep't of Mental Health & Addiction Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of home invasion, burglary, and other crimes, holding that there was no error on the part of the trial court and that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's convictions.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his written statement to the police after finding that Defendant's statement was voluntary and reliable; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the entirety of the cooperation agreement between the state and Defendant's accomplice regarding portions of the accomplice's obligation to testify truthfully; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, home invasion predicated on attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, home invasion predicated on burglary in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit home invasion. View "State v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment the trial court convicting Defendant of murder, holding that a specific unanimity instruction was not required in this case.In affirming Defendant's conviction, the appellate court read this Court's precedents to mean that, although a jury must unanimously reject a self-defense claim before it may find a defendant guilty, there is no requirement that jurors agree on which specific factor of Connecticut's four-factor test for self-defense the state has disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a specific unanimity instruction was not required in this case; and (2) there was no reasonable possibility that Defendant's conviction resulted from the jurors' misunderstanding of the self-defense instruction, which the trial court reiterated several times and in various ways. View "State v. Mekoshvili" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court concluding that Defendant's allegedly defamatory statements about Plaintiff made during a hearing before the Greenwich Planning and Zoning Commission were entitled to statutory immunity, holding that the appellate court erred.Plaintiff brought this defamation action seeking to recover damages for injuries he claims to have sustained as a result of Defendant's alleged defamatory statements. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because the statements Defendant made about Plaintiff at the commission's hearing were entitled to absolute immunity because the hearing constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a hearing on a special permit application before a town's planning and zoning commission is not quasi-judicial in nature; and (2) therefore, the appellate court erroneously determined that Defendant's statements were entitled to absolute immunity. View "Priore v. Haig" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of murder and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the death of his wife, holding that the prosecutor improperly commented on Defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent following his arrest and advisement of rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes of conviction and that the prosecutor improperly commented on his post-Miranda silence. The Supreme Court reversed his convictions, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; but (2) the prosecutor's remarks impermissibly used Defendant's post-Miranda silence against him, in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), rendering the trial "fundamentally unfair," and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Patrick M." on Justia Law