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The probate court retains the statutory authority to make findings pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-608n(b) in connection with a petition for special immigrant juvenile status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) when the minor child, who is the subject of the petition, reaches the age of eighteen during the pendency of the petition. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgments of the superior court for juvenile matters dismissing Mother’s and Son’s appeals from the decisions of the probate court. The Appellate Court concluded that section 45a-608n does not provide the probate court with authority to make juvenile status findings after the individual’s eighteenth birthday. The Supreme Court held that, on the contrary, the probate court did not lose its authority to make juvenile status findings pursuant to section 45a-608n(b) when Son turned eighteen years old during the pendency of the petition. View "In re Henrry P. B.-P." on Justia Law

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At issue was whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for breach of the peace and whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment against Defendant of attempted larceny in the sixth degree. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Defendant’s appeal as to the first issue on the ground that certification was improvidently granted; and (2) reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment with respect to its determination that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of attempted larceny in the sixth degree and remanded the case with directions to affirm the judgment of the trial court, holding that the evidence supported Defendant’s conviction of attempted larceny in the sixth degree. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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At issue was whether an insurer was obligated to indemnify a business owner under a personal insurance policy for liability arising form his false imprisonment of his company’s employee at her workplace. The business owner appealed, challenging the appellate court’s determination that such liability fell under the business pursuits exclusion to coverage under his personal umbrella policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) neither the appellate court nor the trial court employed the correct standard for determining whether the business owner’s tortious conduct was an occurrence “arising out of” the business pursuits of the insured; (2) remand was necessary to determine whether the business pursuits exception applied under the correct standard; and (3) Plaintiffs could not prevail on their alternative grounds regarding other exclusions and public policy as a matter of law. View "Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pasiak" on Justia Law

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There was sufficient evidence in this case to support Defendant’s conviction of risk of injury to a child because Defendant willfully or unlawfully caused or permitted a three-year-old child to be placed in a situation where the life or limb of the child was endangered. Defendant was found guilty by a jury of risk of injury to a child for endangering his child’s “life or limb” pursuant to Conn. Stat. 53-21(a)(1). The Appellate Court upheld the jury’s verdict on the ground that it was supported by sufficient evidence that Defendant had created “a risk of harm to the mental health of the child” - a separate theory of liability under section 53-21(a)(1). On appeal, both parties agreed that the Appellee Court incorrectly affirmed Defendant’s conviction on the basis of an uncharged theory of liability. The Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed, holding (1) Defendant created a situation that endangered the life or limb of his child, and he had the requisite general intent; and (2) therefore, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of risk of injury to a child. View "State v. James E." on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The trial court correctly determined that pretrial disposition conferences, when they are conducted in chambers and off the record, do not constitute “court proceedings the accused has the right to attend” within the meaning of amendment 29(b)(5) of the Connecticut Constitution. Plaintiff in error brought this writ of error claiming that the trial court improperly precluded him from attending plea negotiations and other discussions during in-chambers, pretrial disposition conferences in the criminal prosecution of Kyle Damato-Kushel. Plaintiff in error, the alleged victim, argued that the trial court’s ruling barring his attendance at the pretrial disposition conferences involving the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel violated his rights under article first, section eight of the Connecticut Constitution, as amended by articles seventeen and twenty-nine of the amendments. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that neither the victim nor his authorized representative has a right to attend such conferences. View "State v. Damato-Kushel" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s complaint and Defendant’s counterclaim for damages and declaratory judgment. This case stemmed from a purchase agreement entered into by the parties in which Plaintiff was to provide various equipment and services to Defendant for a telecommunications switch room. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court incorrectly concluded that Plaintiff breached the purchase agreement by filing a petition for bankruptcy protection under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code; and (2) the trial court erred in determining that Defendant was within its rights to terminate the purchase agreement upon Plaintiff’s initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. View "CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Bankruptcy, Contracts

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The right to bail under Conn. Const. art. I, section 8 is extinguished upon a finding of guilt, accepted by the court, and does not continue until the defendant has been sentenced for that offense. Defendant was released pretrial on a $1 million bond. The trial court increased the bond to $1.5 million following the jury’s verdict finding Defendant guilty of murder and other offenses, pending sentences. Six weeks later, the court revoked Defendant’s bail on the ground that it lacked authority to release him under Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-63f. Defendant petitioned for review, arguing that, to the extent that section 54-63f bars the release of persons who have been convicted of homicide offenses pending sentencing, it is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the petition fro review but denied Defendant’s request for relief, holding (1) in the period preceding 1965, when the constitutional provision for bail was amended, there was no constitutional right to bail between conviction and sentence; and (2) the 1965 amendment did not expand the temporal scope of this right. View "State v. Patel" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court for Plaintiff in this action brought pursuant to Connecticut’s Product Liability Act under strict liability and negligence theories, holding that Plaintiff failed to prove both that the product at issue was unreasonably dangerous and that it was a legal cause of the decedent’s fatal lung disease. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the decedent was exposed to asbestos-containing products while working for Defendant and that Defendant’s actions in selling such asbestos-containing products constituted violations of the Act. After Plaintiff rested her case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion as well as Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict following the jury’s verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the product at issue was dangerous or that it was a legal cause of the decedent’s mesothelioma, and therefore, the trial court improperly denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. View "Bagley v. Adel Wiggins Group" on Justia Law

Posted in: Products Liability

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment for the Town of Hebron on this complaint brought by Plaintiffs seeking damages for a temporary taking, temporary nuisance, and tortious interference with Plaintiffs’ business expectancies. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they arose out of the same operative facts as Plaintiffs’ earlier-filed claim for injunctive relief against the Town. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to identify a sufficiently compelling reason to exempt their claims from the preclusive effect of res judicata. View "Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration but denied relief in this case addressing the mandatory vaccination of a child. In 2017, the Supreme Court held that Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-10(c) did not authorize the Commissioner of Children and Families to vaccinate a child placed in her temporary custody over the objection of that child’s parents. In this motion for reconsideration, the Commissioner advanced, for the first time, arguments concerning the effect of Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-93 and 17a-98. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that it is not proper to use a motion for reconsideration simply as a means for giving the losing party a second chance to try a new argument. View "In Re Elianah T.-T." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law