Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming Defendant's conviction of murder and related offenses, holding that the appellate court correctly concluded that the trial court's rejection of Defendant's insanity defense was reasonable.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court improperly rejected the opinions of his experts. Specifically, Defendant argued that the State neither presented nor elicited evidence to undermine the consensus of his experts that, as the result of a mental disease, Defendant lacked substantial capacity to control his conduct within the requirements of the law. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in concluding that the trial court's rejection of his expert opinion was not arbitrary. View "State v. Weathers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that the assessor for Defendant, the town of Wilton, improperly imposed late filing penalties on Plaintiffs after taking and subscribing to the oath on the grand list for that assessment year, holding that there was no error.This dispute arose because the assessor signed the grand list without imposing penalties on Plaintiffs and instead delayed imposing penalties until when the assessor issued certificates of change pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-60 for the properties that were the subjects of the penalties. The Board of Assessment Appeals of the Town of Wilton denied Plaintiffs' appeals. The trial court affirmed. The appellate court reversed, holding that tax penalties imposed without statutory authority are invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the penalties imposed were assessments required by law within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-60; and (2) because penalties imposed without statutory authority are invalid, the Town may not collect the penalties at issue in this case. View "Wilton Campus 1691, LLC v. Wilton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court sustaining Plaintiffs' administrative appeal and remanding this case to the Commissioner of Banking for further proceedings as to Plaintiffs' entitlement to tribal sovereign immunity in administrative proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in part.At issue was whether a business entity shared sovereign immunity with Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, a federally-recognized tribe. On appeal, Plaintiffs - Clear Creek Lending, Great Plains Lending, LLC, and John Shotton, chairman of the Tribe - claimed that the trial court improperly allocated the burden of proving entitlement to tribal sovereign immunity to Plaintiffs, improperly required proof of a functioning relationship between the entities and the tribe, and improperly failed to find Shotton immune in further administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the entity claiming arm of the tribe status bears the burden of proving its entitlement to that status; (2) Great Plains was an arm of the tribe and Shotton was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity but not injunctive relief; and (3) there was insufficient evidence that Clear Creek was an arm of the tribe as a matter of law. View "Great Plains Lending, LLC v. Department of Banking" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiffs' administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction from the adverse decision of the State Elections Enforcement Commission determining that Plaintiffs violated certain state election laws and regulations, holding that the administrative appeal was timely filed.In its decision, the Commission found that Plaintiffs, who had received funding for their campaigns through the Citizens' Election Program, had violated laws and regulations related to the Program and imposed civil fines for those violations. Plaintiffs appealed. The superior court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was untimely filed under Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-183(c)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the timeliness of Plaintiffs' appeal was governed by the limitation period of Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-183(c)(3); and (2) Plaintiffs' appeal was timely filed under section 4-183(c)(3). View "Markley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the habeas court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering a new trial on certain charges, holding that the trial court committed an error under State v. Salomon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008), and that the error was not harmless.At issue in this appeal and the companion case decided today, see Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, __ A.3d __ (Conn. 2021), was how the harmlessness of a Salamon error is to be assessed. In Salamon, the Supreme Court held that, when a defendant is charged with kidnapping in conjunction with another underlying crime, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that he cannot be convicted of kidnapping if the restraint imposed on the victim was merely incidental or necessary to the underlying crime. Here, Appellant forcibly moved and restrained his victims after having taken property in their possession. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court granting Appellant's habeas petition and ordering a new trial on the kidnapping charges, holding that this Court had no fair assurance that the Salamon error in this case did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. View "Bell v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court resolved two questions left open by State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008) and its progeny, holding that that standard articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 6019 (1993), which governs federal habeas actions, applies in state habeas proceedings as well.In Salamon, the Supreme Court overruled its longstanding interpretation of Connecticut's kidnapping statutes and held that, when a defendant is charged with kidnapping in conjunction with another underlying crime, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that he cannot be convicted of kidnapping if the restraint imposed on the victim was merely incidental or necessary to the underlying crime. In the instant case, Appellant was found guilty of four counts of kidnapping in the first degree and four counts of robbery. After the Supreme Court decided Salamon, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the instructions given to the jury were not in accordance with Salamon. The habeas court denied the petition. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Brecht standard applied in this case; and (2) the habeas court correctly determined that the trial court's failure to instruct Appellant's jury in accordance with Salamon was harmless. View "Banks v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

In this case coming to the Supreme Court on certification from a federal district court, the Court was asked to decide questions regarding Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572g. The Court answered the questions as follows: (1) "the amount of indebtedness then outstanding in connection with the credit transaction" is the amount of indebtedness outstanding at the time of the buyer's written demand on the seller for purposes of limiting an assignee's liability under section 52-572g; (2) an assignee can avoid liability under the statute only if the promissory note, contract, or other instrument is reassigned back to the seller prior to the buyer making such a demand; and (3) if a retail installment contract includes the Federal Trade Commission "holder rule" language mandated by 16 C.F.R. 433.2, an assignee's liability under that rule is cumulative to its liability under section 52-572g. View "Hernandez v. Apple Auto Wholesalers of Waterbury, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court awarding postjudgment, offer of compromise interest to Plaintiff under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-192a and Practice Book 17-18, holding that the trial court's award of postjudgment, offer of compromise interest was improper.Plaintiff, an employment staffing agency that providers workers for temporary assignments, commenced this action against Defendant to recover a debt by filing a complaint for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and awarded Plaintiff interest. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's award of postjudgment interest under section 52-192a and Practice Book 17-18 was improper. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the award of postjudgment interest under section 52-192a, holding that the award of post judgment, offer of compromise interest was improper under Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car system, Inc., 472 A.2d 316 (Conn. 1984). View "Kelly Services, Inc. v. Senior Network, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the appellate court concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion in awarding Plaintiff $18,000 per month in permanent, nonmodifiable alimony, holding that the award constituted an abuse of discretion.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's orders impermissibly double counted his income by considering it for business valuation purposes and further by awarding alimony on the basis of his income from those businesses. The appellate court agreed and reversed the judgment as to the trial court's financial orders and remanded the case for a new hearing on all financial issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the alimony award was an abuse of discretion; and (2) this Court's rule against double counting does not apply when, as in the instant case, the asset at issue is the value of a business. View "Oudheusden v. Oudheusden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of interfering with an officer, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-167a(a), holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress on the grounds that he was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when a marked police cruiser blocked the egress of his vehicle, which was parked with its engine running and Defendant asleep in the driver's seat. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred because the responding officer was checking on Defendant's well-being pursuant to the officer's community caretaking function and was not engaged in an investigatory stop involving criminal activity. View "State v. Pompei" on Justia Law