Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-55 was not repealed by a sequence of public acts relating to that statute passed by the legislature in 2003, holding that section 14-55 has been repealed, and therefore, the suitability analysis mandated by the statute is no longer required to obtain a certificate of approval of the location for a used car dealership.The Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford granted a certificate of approval of the location for a used car dealership run by Defendants. Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal challenging the judgment, arguing that the board had failed to conduct the suitability analysis mandated by section 14-55. The trial court denied the appeal, concluding that the board was required to consider the suitability factors set forth in 14-55 and that the board had given due consideration to the suitability of Defendants' proposed use. The appellate court reversed, deciding that section 14-55 was not repealed in 2003 but that the board issued no findings as to the suitability factors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 14-55 has been repealed. View "One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

In this action brought under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (CEPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-14 et seq., seeking an injunction requiring a nuclear power plant in Waterford to convert to a closed-cycle cooling system, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court in favor of Defendants, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff sued the Commissioner of Environmental Protection and the owner and operator of the power plant, claiming that a previous permit approval proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by CEPA and that the current operation of the power plant would result in unreasonable pollution. The trial court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the administrative proceeding was inadequate; and (2) this Court declined to review Plaintiff's claim that she established that unreasonable pollution would result from the power plant's operation as permitted. View "Burton v. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the legislature's action in amending Conn. Gen. Stat. 21a-279(a) to reclassify a first offense for possession of narcotics from a class D felony subject to a maximum sentence of imprisonment of seven years to a class A misdemeanor subject to a maximum sentence of one year of incarceration did not apply retroactively to criminal cases pending at the time the amendment became effective.Defendant was arrested and charged with violating section 21a-279(a) prior to the enactment of Spec. Public Acts, Sess. June 2015, No. 15-2, 1, which amended the statute. Defendant was convicted and sentenced after the amendment's enactment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the lower courts erred in determining that Spec. Sess. P.A. 15-2, 1 does not apply retroactively, and therefore, the sentence imposed on him was illegal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of Spec. Sess. P.A. 15-2, 1 clearly and unambiguously prohibits retroactive application; and (2) this Court declines to adopt the amelioration doctrine. View "State v. Bischoff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court denying habeas corpus relief after concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Petitioner from litigating the issue of whether he was prejudiced he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument at his criminal trial, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice.Petitioner, who was convicted of murder, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by, among other things, failing to object to the prosecutor's improper remarks during closing argument. The court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he had suffered prejudice. The appellate court affirmed on the grounds that Petitioner was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply; and (2) Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's performance. View "Ross v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court revoking Defendant's probation and sentencing him to a two-year term of imprisonment, holding that the trial court did not improperly deny Defendant's motion to dismiss the violation of probation charge.On appeal, Defendant argued that the condition of probation upon which the violation of probation charged was predicated violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection as well as the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's claims on appeal failed. View "State v. Imperiale" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of the sexual assault of a twelve-year-old girl and his sentence of thirty-three years, holding that the trial court's enhancement of Defendant's sentence was not fundamentally unfair.On appeal, Defendant argued that, at sentencing, the trial court violated his due process right by penalizing him for refusing to apologize for his criminal misconduct. Specifically, Defendant argued that his sentence contravened his constitutional right against self-incrimination because an apology would necessarily have required him to admit guilt. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that there was no evidentiary support for Defendant's contention that the trial court had increased his sentence because of his unwillingness to apologize to the victims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court did not penalize Defendant for maintaining his innocence at sentencing. View "State v. Angel M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of Defendant, as executor of the estate of Robert Rackliffe, on the ground that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were time barred, holding that the extended limitation period set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-577d did not apply to Plaintiffs' negligence claims for personal injuries brought against the alleged perpetrator of a sexual assault.Seven plaintiffs, each of whom were minors at the time of the alleged assaults, alleged that Rackliffe's conduct constituted both intentional sexual assault and medical negligence. Defendant sought summary judgment as to the counts sounding in negligence, arguing that those counts were time barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-584. The trial court granted summary judgment as to all of the negligence counts. Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their additional claims and appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were governed by the three-year limitation period set forth in section 52-584 and that section 52-577d did not apply to Plaintiffs' claims. View "Doe v. Rackliffe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of burglary in the third degree and other offenses in connection with a break-in, holding that the appellate court improperly addressed an issue of evidentiary sufficiency sua sponte without calling for supplemental briefing, as required by Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 84 A.3d 840 (Conn. 2014).On appeal, the appellate court reversed Defendant's conviction for tampering with physical evidence, concluding that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to have reasonably concluded that Defendant intended to tamper with the evidence at issue. In reaching its decision, the appellate court recognized that the issue was distinct from Defendant's sufficiency argument on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court violated the mandate in Blumberg by raising a different claim of evidentiary sufficiency sua sponte, without calling for supplemental briefing from the parties. View "State v. Stephenson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court revoking Defendant's probation following an incident in which he allegedly robbed and threatened a customer, Lawrence Welch, at a Dunkin' Donuts store, holding that Welch's identification of Defendant was reliable notwithstanding the inherent suggestiveness of the showup procedure.After Defendant was charged with violating a condition of his probation he filed a motion to suppress Welch's identification of him, claiming that the showup procedure violated his due process rights. The trial court denied the motion and found that Defendant had violated his probation. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive due to the exigencies of the ongoing investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Welch's identification of Defendant was reliable. View "State v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court finding that Defendant, East Coast Swappers, LLC, had violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110a et seq., holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to award Plaintiff attorney's fees.The trial court found that Defendant had violated CUTPA and awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages. The court, however, declined to award punitive damages or attorney's fees. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Court should adopt a presumption whereby a plaintiff prevailing in a CUTPA action should ordinarily recover attorney's fees under section 42-110g(d) unless the award would be unjust. The Supreme Court declined to adopt Plaintiff's suggested presumption but nevertheless reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award Plaintiff attorney's fees. View "Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC" on Justia Law