Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal requiring the Supreme Court to determine the priority of tax liens levied on real property by the Georgetown Special Taxing District the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court subordinating liens acquired by Defendant to the Georgetown Fire District, holding that the fire district's tax liens were subordinate to those of Defendant, which, in turn, were subordinate to those of the town.Plaintiffs - the town of Redding, the Redding Water Pollution Control Commission, and Georgetown Fire District - brought this action to foreclose municipal liens against Defendant RJ Tax Lien Investments, LLC, who had been assigned real estate tax liens originally levied by the taxing district. The trial court granted the motions for partial summary judgment with respect to priority filed by the town and the fire district and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the town and the fire district. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court incorrectly concluded that Defendant's liens were subordinate to those of the fire district. View "Redding v. Georgetown Land Development Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs' medical monitoring claims stemming from a workplace asbestos exposure at Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation's cogeneration project in Stratford, holding that the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment.The named plaintiff brought a class action complaint against Sikorsky and Carrier Corporation, alleging negligence, battery, recklessness, and strict liability for violations of the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. and seeking remedies for asbestos exposure while working at the Sikorsky cogeneration project. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the court declined to recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring under Connecticut law that would allow recovery for an increased risk of future injury rather than a present injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if this Court were to recognize a medical monitoring claim in the absence of any physical manifestation of injury under Connecticut law, Plaintiffs nevertheless failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to certain elements of the claim. View "Dougan v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the trial court incorrectly determined that Defendant was relieved of its duty to defend in the underlying property dispute.Plaintiff contracted with New Beginnings Residential Renovations, LLC to renovate Plaintiff's house. The house received extensive physical damage during the renovation, and Plaintiff brought an action against New Beginnings for property damage. New Beginnings tendered defense of the case to Defendant pursuant to a commercial general liability insurance policy. Defendant declined to defend under two of the policy's "business risk" exclusions. Plaintiff was awarded a default judgment against New Beginnings. Plaintiff then brought this action against Defendant under the direct action statute seeking recovery for the judgment against New Beginnings. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the policy exclusions precluded coverage. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the exclusions did not relieve Defendant of its duty to defend. View "Nash Street, LLC v. Main Street America Assurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment determining Defendant's method of calculating a supplemental sewerage benefit assessment levied against certain of Plaintiff's real property, holding that the trial court incorrectly determined that Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-249 required Defendant to use the same method to calculate the supplemental assessment as was used to calculate the initial assessment.At issue was whether Defendant had authority to levy a supplemental assessment against Plaintiff's property and, if so, whether it used the correct methodology in calculating that assessment. A predecessor of Defendant levied a sewerage benefit assessment against the owners of the property. Later, the building was demolished and a new commercial office building was constructed in its place. No supplemental assessment was levied as a result of the construction. Plaintiff later purchased the property and converted it into a residential condominium community. Defendant then levied a supplemental assessment on the property. The trial court concluded that Defendant's supplemental assessment calculation violated section 7-249 because it should have been calculated on the basis of street frontage, as was the initial assessment. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant had authority to levy the supplemental assessment; and (2) the trial court erred in determining that Defendant incorrectly calculated the supplemental assessment. View "777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of tampering with a witness, holding that the the Appellate Court correctly determined that the jury reasonably concluded that Defendant was guilty of violating Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-151(a).On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to permit a jury reasonably to infer that, when she sent text messages to her boyfriend, Jason Majewski, Defendant had the specific intent to interfere with a witness' testimony at an official proceeding. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the jury reasonably could have found that Defendant tampered with a witness. View "State v. Lamantia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court concluding that Defendant's conviction of breach of the peace in the second degree must be reversed because the First Amendment barred his prosecution for the statements at issue, holding that Defendant's remarks were unprotected fighting words, and therefore, his conviction did not violate the First Amendment.At issue were Defendant's "vulgar and racially charged" remarks that included utterances of the words "fucking niggers" directed at an African-American parking enforcement official following Defendant's receipt of a parking ticket. As a result of this conduct, Defendant was convicted of breach of the peace in the second degree. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that Defendant's speech was constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that Defendant's language did not constitute fighting words. View "State v. Liebenguth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting the state's motion to dismiss this tort action, holding that a state's waiver of sovereign immunity in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-556 for claims arising from a state employee's negligent operation of a state-owned and -insured motor vehicle extends to litigants who are state employees.Plaintiff, a state employee, was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state and operated by another state employee, William Texidor, when another vehicle operated by Tyreke Brooks struck their vehicle. Brooks' vehicle was uninsured. Plaintiff, who applied for and received workers' compensation benefits, brought this action agains the state and Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company alleging that Texidor's operation of the vehicle was negligent. The state filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of sovereign immunity. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 52-556; (2) Plaintiff's action against the state was barred by Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-284(a); and (3) therefore, the form of judgment was improper, and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the state. View "Feliciano v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Compensation Review Board affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission awarding Plaintiff permanent partial disability benefits of twenty-three percent based on the function of his transplanted heart, holding that the Board correctly treated the transplanted heart as an organ rather than a prosthetic device.At issue was whether Plaintiff, who underwent a heart transplant, was entitled to a specific indemnity award for permanent partial disability under the Workers' Compensation Act for the total loss of Plaintiff's native heart or whether the award should be based, instead, on the rated function of Plaintiff's transplanted heart. Plaintiff was awarded benefits based on the function of his transplanted heart. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that his transplanted heart was akin to a prosthetic device, and therefore, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-308(b) required compensation for the 100 percent loss of his native heart. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the transplant meant that Plaintiff had not suffered a complete loss of his heart within the meaning of section 31-308(b). View "Vitti v. Milford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court insofar as it upheld the trial court's order directing Defendants to reimburse Plaintiff for property taxes and insurance premiums, holding that the ordered relief was inconsistent with the remedial scheme available to a mortgagee in a strict foreclosure.At issue was whether a trial court may order a mortgagor to reimburse a mortgagee for the mortgagee's advancements of property taxes and insurance premiums during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment of strict foreclosure. The trial court ordered Defendants to reimburse Plaintiff for such property tax and insurance premium payments, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in directing Defendants to make monetary payments to Plaintiff outside of a deficiency judgment; and (2) the Appellate Court's judgment is affirmed in all other respects. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. Essaghof" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the Compensation Review Board finding that the City of Bridgeport was liable for the payment of Plaintiff's workers compensation benefits as his principal employer, holding that the City was in the "trade or business" of maintaining and repairing municipal buildings and facilities.The City hired Contractor do repair work on the roof of the City's transfer facility, and Contractor hired Subcontractor. Plaintiff, an employee of Subcontractor, was injured in the course and scope of his employment and sought workers' compensation benefits from the City, Contractor, and Subcontractor. The Workers' Compensation Commissioner concluded that, because Howie's Roofing was uninsured, the Second Injury Fund was required to pay Plaintiff benefits under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-355. The Fund contested liability, arguing that the City was required to pay the benefits owed to Plaintiff as his principal employer. The Commissioner determined that the City was Plaintiff's principal employer and ordered the City to pay workers' compensation benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that roof repair was a part or process in the City's trade or business under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-291. View "Barker v. All Roofs by Dominic" on Justia Law