Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this dispute over who had the authority to lease shellfishing beds on behalf of the Town of Branford, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town, holding that summary judgment was improper.Plaintiffs had been granted the right of first refusal by Branford's Shellfish Commission to lease certain shellfishing grounds located in the Town, but the Commission leased the grounds to Plaintiffs' competitor. Plaintiff brought this action alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel and that it enjoyed a right of first refusal. The Town moved for summary judgment, arguing that the right of first refusal was no a valid or enforceable contract because the Commission lacked authority to enter into it. The trial court agreed, holding that only the Town's Board of Selectmen had authority to lease the shellfishing beds on behalf of the Town. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. View "Shoreline Shellfish, LLC v. Branford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's conviction of assault in the third degree, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-61, holding that the Appellate Court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Appellate court (1) correctly concluded that Defendant had failed to preserve his claim that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by omitting a defense of personal property instruction with respect to the charge of assault; and (2) correctly concluded that Defendant waived that unpreserved claim of instructional error. View "State v. Ramon A. G." on Justia Law

In this public interest appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court sanctioning Defendants after finding that Defendants had violated numerous discovery orders and engaged in harassing and intimidating behavior directed at Plaintiffs' counsel, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiffs, a first responder and family members of those killed in the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, brought these actions against Alex Jones and his affiliate corporate entities claiming that statements made on Jones' radio show were tortious. At issue were orders of the trial court sanctioning Defendants by revoking their opportunity to pursue the special motions to dismiss provided by the anti-SLAPP statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-196a. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Defendants for discovery violations and for Jones' conduct; and (2) Defendants were afforded adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond before the trial court imposed sanctions. View "Lafferty v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's denial of Mother's motion for reinstatement of guardianship rights to a parent under Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-611, holding that the trial court improperly denied Mother's motion for reinstatement of guardianship with respect to her minor son.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) under section 45a-611, once a parent demonstrates that the factors that resulted in the removal of the parent as guardian have been satisfactorily resolved, the parent is entitled to a presumption that reinstatement of his or her guardianship rights is in the best interests of the child; and (2) the party opposing reinstatement must rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) because it was unclear whether the trial court applied this presumption and because the court did not determine whether Mother had rebutted the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court erred in denying Mother's motion for reinstatement of guardianship. View "In re Zakai F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's conviction of one count of assault of a disabled person in the third degree and one count of disorderly conduct, holding that any error in the proceedings below was harmless.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the Appellate Court correctly concluded that Defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel during the pretrial stage of the proceedings, and the trial court's canvass was sufficient; and (2) even assuming arguendo that had Defendant not waived the claim that he was denied the right to counsel at arraignment and during plea negotiations and that the trial court erred in failing to canvass him, any error was harmless. View "State v. Joseph A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's conviction of two counts of assault in the first degree as a principal and two counts of assault in the first degree as an accessory, holding that the Appellate Court erred insofar as it affirmed Defendant's assault conviction as to Kenneth Tucker.Defendant's convictions were based on a joint physical assault involving two perpetrators, Defendant and his brother, and two victims, Kenneth Tucker and Luis Rodriguez. On appeal, Defendant argued that his conviction of four assault violated his right to be free from double jeopardy under the federal constitution because he committed only one assault per victim, for a total of two assaults. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment insofar as it affirmed Defendant's conviction as to Tucker, holding (1) the imposition of multiple punishments on Defendant for Tucker's assault violated the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (2) Defendant's criminal acts involving Rodriguez constituted two distinct courses of conduct for double jeopardy purposes. View "State v. Ruiz-Pacheco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the conclusion of the trial court that Plaintiff, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., had not strictly complied with the notice provisions of an asset purchase agreement (APA) and the court's judgment in favor of Defendant, Chemtura Corporation, holding that the trial court improperly required strict compliance with the APA's notice provisions.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court incorrectly concluded that New York law requires strict compliance with a notice provision in a commercial contract. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that New York law distinguishes between public contracts and private commercial contracts and does not require strict compliance in commercial contracts if the contracting party receives actual notice and suffers from prejudice. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the trial court erred in requiring strict compliance with the APA's notice provision and in failing to make any other factual findings regarding Plaintiff's breach of contract claims. View "E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Chemtura Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the habeas court denying Petitioner's second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner's federal due process rights were violated when the State knowingly failed to correct the false testimony of two prosecution witnesses when defense counsel was aware of the falsity of the testimony.A jury found Petitioner and his codefendants guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. In his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus Petitioner alleged that his prior habeas counsel provided ineffective assistance in that he failed to raise the claim that the State had violated Petitioner's right to due process by failing to correct the allegedly false testimony of two witnesses at trial. The habeas court denied the petition, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in light of the facts of this case, the fact that counsel was aware of the falsity of the testimony was insufficient to protect Petitioner's due process rights. View "Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

In this case stemming from a fatal automobile accident arising from a high-speed police pursuit, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of a town and its municipal officers, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that Defendants were shielded by governmental and qualified immunity from liability for the decision to pursue the fleeing motorist.The decedent, a passenger in the vehicle that was pursued by police officers, was killed when the vehicle struck an embankment and turned over onto its roof. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the police officers were negligent in pursuing the vehicle and that the town was liable for the negligent acts of its agents and employees. The trial court concluded that the officers' alleged actions involved the exercise of discretion and that an exception to discretionary act immunity did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-283(d) imposes a discretionary duty on police officers to give due regard to the safety of all persons and property when determining whether to engage a pursuit; and (2) the trial court did not err in concluding that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity did not apply in the present case. View "Borelli v. Renaldi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Father's motion to dismiss a petition to adjudicate a newborn child neglected on the basis of "predictive neglect" when the parents relocated to another state before the child's birth, holding that the Connecticut trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.After the Commissioner of Children and Families filed a petition seeking to terminate Respondents' parental rights, Respondents drove to Florida and signed a one-year lease for an apartment. Two days after the child's birth, the Florida Department of Children and Families took custody of the child. The Connecticut trial court then filed a petition seeking to adjudicate the child neglected. The motion was denied on the ground that the child was not in Connecticut. Thereafter, the Florida department filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Connecticut trial court, which the magistrate granted. Thereafter, Father filed a motion to dismiss the pending neglect petition on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Connecticut trial court denied Father's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a Connecticut trial court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition because any neglect of the child would never occur in Connecticut. View "In re Teagan K.-O." on Justia Law