Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the habeas court erred when it determined that trial counsel for Petitioner rendered deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to sixty-years' imprisonment. Petitioner later brought his habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The habeas court determined that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to recommend that Petitioner accept the court's pretrial offer of a forty-five-year sentence of incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, counsel's representation of Petitioner did not amount to ineffective representation. View "Maia v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the Town of Bloomfield, the Bloomfield Police Department, and one of its police officers, in this personal injury action, holding that the defense of discretionary act immunity provided by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n(a)(2)(B) does not apply to claims arising from the manner in which an emergency vehicle is operated under the privileges provided by Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-283.Plaintiff and her children sustained personal injuries when police officer Jonathan Sykes collided with the driver's side of Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff brought this action claiming negligence, negligent supervision, and respondent superior. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the claims were barred by discretionary act immunity under section 52-557n(a)(2)(B). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the discretionary act immunity provided by § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) does not apply to the manner in which an emergency vehicle is operated by virtue of the codified, common-law duty to drive with "due regard" pursuant to section 14-283(d). View "Adesokan v. Bloomfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court upholding the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for remittitur in this wrongful termination action, holding that the appellate court did not err in affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for remittitur.Plaintiff brought this action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy stemming from his termination from employment as a truck driver after he raised complaints to Defendant regarding the safety of Defendant's vehicles. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff and awarded him damages for lost wages. Thereafter, Defendant filed several postverdict motions, including his motion for remittitur seeking to reduce the damages award to zero dollars. The trial court denied the motions. Plaintiff appealed, and Defendant cross-appealed, claiming that the trial abused its discretion in failing to set aside the jury's award. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the damages award. View "Roach v. Transwaste, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning the state's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP), Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-265cc through 8-265kk, which is designed to assist homeowners in avoiding foreclosure, the Supreme Court concluded that the EMAP notice requirement in section 8-265ee(a) is not jurisdictional in nature and that section 8-265ee(a) requires that a mortgagee provide an EMAP notice for each foreclosure action initiated.At issue on certified appeal were two questions relating to the requirement set forth in section 8-265ee(a) that mortgagees provide notice to homeowners to inform them of the resources available under EMAP. The Supreme Court concluded (1) an EMAP notice sent before the commencement of a prior foreclosure action by the predecessor mortgagee is not jurisdictional; and (2) an EMAP notice sent before the commencement of a prior foreclosure action by the predecessor mortgagee was not valid for a subsequent action initiated by the successor mortgagee. View "KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court dismissing Petitioner's appeal, holding that unpreserved claims challenging the habeas court's handling of the habeas proceeding are reviewable under the plain error doctrine and State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 832 (Conn. 1989), if the petition can demonstrate that the unpreserved claims meet the criteria set forth in Simms v. Warden, 646 A.2d 126 (Conn. 1994)(Simms II).Petitioner was convicted of robbery in the first degree and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Petitioner later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction. The habeas court dismissed the petition after a hearing, concluding that there was no good cause to proceed because Petitioner filed outside of the applicable time limits. The appellate court dismissed Petitioner's appeal, concluding that the certification requirement in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-470(g) barred appellate review of unpreserved claims in uncertified appeals under Golding and the plain error doctrine. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and remanded for further considerations, holding that plain error and Golding review is available to challenge the habeas court's handling of the habeas proceeding despite denying a petition for certification to appeal if the appellant can demonstrate that the unpreserved claims meet the criteria set forth under Simms II. View "Banks v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the superior court dismissing for lack of jurisdiction High Watch Recovery Center, Inc.'s administrative appeal challenging the decision of the Department of Public Health approving a certificate of need application submitted by Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC, holding that the appellate court erred.Birch Hill submitted a certificate of need application to the Office of Health Care Access requesting public approval to establish a substance abuse treatment facility in Kent. The Department and Birch Hill entered into an agreed settlement constituting a final order wherein the Department approved Birch Hill's application subject to certain conditions. High Watch, which operated a nonprofit substance abuse treatment facility, intervened and appealed the final order. The superior court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the Department's decision was not a final decision in a contested case and that High Watch was not aggrieved by the decision. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court did not err in determining that High Watch's petition requesting intervenor status in the public hearing on Birch Hill's certificate of need application was not a legal sufficient request for a public hearing for the purposes of Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-639a(e). View "High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dep't of Public Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court granting Mother's motion to reinstate her guardianship rights with respect to Child, holding that the trial court correctly applied the proper best interest balancing test.After a hearing on Mother's motion for reinstatement of her guardianship rights, the trial court issued an oral decision stating that parents are entitled to a presumption that reinstatement of guardianship rights is in the child's best interests. Father appealed, arguing that this presumption does not apply in cases between two parents. The appellate court agreed but nevertheless affirmed because it discerned no indication that the trial court had actually applied the presumption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly concluded that the trial court (1) did not apply a presumption in favor of Petitioner when it determined that reinstatement of her guardianship was in the best interests of Child; and (2) did not err in determining that reinstatement of guardianship was in the best interests of Child. View "In re Paulo T." on Justia Law

In this case regarding the "homestead act," Public Acts 1993, No. 93-301, 2 (P.A. 93-301), and involving a certified question in a bankruptcy appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that Public Acts 2021, No. 21-161, 1 (P.A. 21-161) applies in all bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after the effective date of the act to debts that accrued prior to that date.When the legislature enacted the act in 1993 a debtor could protect up to $75,000 of the value of a primary residence from attachment in postjudgment proceedings or bankruptcy, but the act included the following carve-out: the homestead exemption could not be claimed for debts accrued prior to the effective date. In 2021, the legislature amended the act by, among other things, increasing the exemption to $250,000. This time, however, the legislature did not include a special carve-out for a debtor's preexisting debts. At issue was whether the Supreme Court should read such a carve-out into P.A. 21-161. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative and that P.A. 21-161, 1 was not retractive as applied to the debtor's bankruptcy petition in this case. View "In re Cole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that there was not substantial record evidence to support the determination of the presiding human rights referee's determination of intentional discrimination in this action challenging an employment termination decision, holding that the appellate court erred.The referee determined that the Hartford Police Department had discriminated against Hoa Phan, a probationary police officer on the basis of his Vietnamese and Asian ancestry by terminating his employment. The trial court affirmed. The appellate court reversed, ruling that the trial court erred in finding that substantial evidence supported the referee's finding of intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the referee correctly determined that Phan had established his prima facie case; and (2) the appellate court's alternative holding that substantial evidence did not support the referee's finding of intentional discrimination was erroneous. View "Hartford Police Dep't v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights as to his minor child (Child), holding that the trial court did not violate Father's right to adequate notice when it terminated Father's parental rights after the close of the evidence pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17-112(j)(3)(B)(ii).At the close of the evidence in this case the Commissioner of Children and Families moved to amend the petition to allege a different ground for the termination of Father's rights. The trial court granted the motion pursuant to Practice Book section 34a-1(d). Thereafter, the Commissioner of Children and Families filed an amended summary of the facts in support of its petition claiming that grounds existed for termination of Father's parental rights pursuant to section 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(ii). At the conclusion of trial, the trial court granted the petition to terminate Father's parental rights on ground (B)(ii). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not violate Father's constitutional due process right to adequate notice by allowing the Commissioner to amend the petition after the close of the evidence and terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to ground (B)(ii). View "In re Gabriel S." on Justia Law