Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue was the extent of an employer’s right to a credit against its obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefits for an injured employee who has recovered damages from a third-party tortfeasor that caused the employee’s injuries.Under an amendment to Conn. Stat. 31-293(a), even if the employer is owed more than is recovered in the third-party action, the employee retains one-third of the proceeds for her sole benefit. In dispute was whether the employer has a right to a setoff against its obligation to pay for post-judgment workers’ compensation benefits until those benefits exceed the one-third portion that the employee received from the proceeds of the third-party action.The Compensation Review Board affirmed the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner that the defendant employer was entitled to a “moratorium,” or the credit afforded the employer against any later arising benefits in the amount of any proceeds the employee received in the third-party action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employee’s one-third portion is not subject to the moratorium because the application of the moratorium to the one-third reduction would conflict with and undermine the purpose of P.A. 11-205, which amended section 31-293(a). Moreover, the legislature intended for the employee alone to retain the benefit of the one-third reduction. View "Callaghan v. Car Parts International, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court improperly reached the merits of Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective of assistance of counsel in his habeas action.The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court denying Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to certain testimony on the basis of double hearsay. On appeal, Respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, argued that Petitioner’s claim was unreviewable because Petitioner raised the argument for the first time on appeal. Petitioner disagreed, claiming that defense counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668.The Supreme Court agreed with Respondent, holding that because Petitioner failed to present any evidence or pursue an argument before the habeas court that his counsel’s failure to object on the basis of double hearsay constituted deficient performance, the Appellate Court improperly reached the merits of Petitioner’s claim. View "Eubanks v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Defendant’s convictions for three counts of murder for the murders of Thomas Gaudet, Holly Flannery, and Kylie Flannery and two counts of capital felony for the coincident murders of Gaudet and Flannery and the murder of nine-year-old Kylie were improperly merged rather than vacated.Defendant was sentenced to death for his second capital felony conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court improperly merged his three murder convictions with the corresponding capital felony convictions as lesser included offenses of those crimes. The Supreme Court dismissed in part Defendant’s appeal and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Defendant’s challenges to the penalty phase of his trial were either moot or unripe; and (2) pursuant to State v. Polanco, 61 A.3d 1084 (Conn. 2013), the trial court should have vacated the three murder convictions rather than merging them into the capital felony convictions. View "State v. Roszkowski" on Justia Law

Because Defendant’s signs on her property were not “advertising signs,” the trial court properly concluded that municipal regulation of the signs was outside the scope of a municipality’s zoning commission’s authority to regulate the height, size, and location of “advertising signs and billboards” under Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-2.Plaintiff, the zoning enforcement officer for the city of Milford, requested permanent injunctions ordering Defendant, a homeowner, to remove the subject signs from her property that were not in compliance with city zoning regulations and precluding her from occupying the property until she obtained certificates that she had made home improvements to her residence.The trial court denied Plaintiff’s request for the permanent injunctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the phrase “advertising signs” under section 8-2 means any form of public announcement intended to aid directly or indirectly in the sale of goods or services, in the promulgation of a doctrine or idea, in securing attendance, or the like; (2) Defendant’s signs were not advertising signs under section 8-2, and therefore, the trial court properly concluded that the City lacked authority to regulate Defendant’s signs; and (3) the facts did not support the “extraordinary equitable remedy” of a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from occupying her premises. View "Kutcha v. Arisian" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s collateral attack on Sowell v. DiCara, 127 A.3d 356 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015), cert. denied, 128 A.3d 953 (Conn. 2015), in this declaratory judgment action was nonjusticiable under Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 985 A.2d 1052 (Conn. 2010).Plaintiff filed a writ error (first writ) claiming that a judge had improperly found clear and convincing evidence that he had violated Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Appellate Court found that Plaintiff had violated Rule 4.2 and dismissed the first writ. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a writ of error in the Supreme Court challenging the Appellate Court’s actions (second writ). The Appellate Court dismissed the second writ. Plaintiff then filed the present action against a law firm and the Appellate Court claiming that the Appellate Court’s construction of Rule 4.2 was a due process violation. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the claims against the Appellate Court were barred by sovereign immunity. On appeal, Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s challenge to the Appellate Court’s interpretation of Rule 4.2 in Sowell was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiff’s collateral attack on Sowell was nonjusticiable under Vavlo. View "Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court determining that Plaintiff, Walgreen Eastern Company, Inc., had established aggrievement under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a by showing that the valuation of Plaintiff’s property by Defendant, the Town of West Hartford, was excessive. The Court further affirmed the trial court’s judgment determining the true and actual value of the subject property and concluding that the Town’s valuation of the subject property was not manifestly excessive under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-119.After the Board of Assessment Appeals (Board) upheld the town assessor’s valuation, Plaintiff appealed to the superior court, which (1) found Plaintiff satisfied its burden of proving aggrievement; and (2) rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its section 12-117a count and in favor of the Town on Plaintiff’s section 12-119 count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the relief awarded by the trial court was sufficient because the court properly determined the true and actual value of Plaintiff’s property; and (2) the trial court properly determined that Plaintiff did not meet its burden to establish a claim under section 12-119. View "Walgreen Eastern Co. v. Town of West Hartford" on Justia Law

The trial court improperly refused to mark for certain records for identification and abused its discretion in declining to review those records in camera.Defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in a spousal relationship and other crimes. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding, inter alia, that the trial court improperly refused to conduct an in camera review of the complainant’s privileged record from Interval House, an organization that provides services to domestic violence victims, and improperly declined to mark those records for identification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to conduct an in camera review of the Interval House records, an error that warranted a new trial. View "State v. Norman P." on Justia Law

Because Defendant was not self-represented during his testimony, the trial court’s decision to allow Defendant to testify in narrative form did not cause him to be self-represented without a proper waiver of his right to counsel.During the trial for the murder of his father and the physical assault of his elderly mother, Defendant demanded to testify that Satan had taken over his body and performed these acts. Based on the Rules of Professional Conduct, defense counsel requested that Defendant be permitted to give that testimony in narrative form. The trial court granted the request, and Defendant testified in that manner. After Defendant was convicted, he appealed, claiming that, pursuant to State v. Francis, 118 A.3d 529 (2015), he was entitled to a new trial because in order to exercise his right to testify, he was compelled to self-represent without a proper waiver of his right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Francis does not control the present case; and (2) under the facts of this case, Defendant was not self-represented during his narrative testimony or at any other point during the trial. View "State v. Jan G." on Justia Law

Defendant’s statement to two water company employees who had entered his property pursuant to an easement to service a fire hydrant was not “fighting words,” and therefore, the First Amendment forbids the imposition of criminal sanctions.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-182(a)(1). The conviction arose from Defendant’s statement to the water company employees that, if they did not leave his property, he would retrieve a gun and shoot them. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that, although inappropriate, Defendant’s words were not likely to provoke an immediate and violent reaction from the water company employees, and therefore, Defendant’s speech did not amount to fighting words. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, consistent with the First Amendment, Defendant’s statements did not constitute fighting words. View "State v. Parnoff" on Justia Law

Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51bb permitted Plaintiff to file a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission alleging that the City of New Haven had violated Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-290a by wrongfully terminating his employment in retaliation for bringing a workers’ compensation claim, notwithstanding that a related issue had previously been decided by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration in an arbitration proceeding brought pursuant to Plaintiff’s collective bargaining agreement.The Compensation Review Board determined that, under section 31-51bb, Plaintiff’s claim brought before the Commission pursuant to section 31-290a was not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 31-51bb permitted Plaintiff to file a claim with the Commission pursuant to section 31-290a under the circumstances of this case. View "Williams v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law