Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over the adoption of certain amendments to Fenwick’s zoning regulations by the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick (the Commission). The plaintiffs, who owned real property in Fenwick, appealed the Commission's decision, arguing that the Commission had unlawfully adopted the amendments by failing to publish notice of its decision in a newspaper with a substantial circulation in Fenwick, as required by statute. The Commission moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was untimely. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Commission's failure to publish the amendment in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick rendered it ineffective as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Commission properly published notice of its decision in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick. The court adopted an availability-centered test for determining whether a newspaper has a substantial or general circulation in a municipality. The court considered factors such as the type of news covered by the publication, its general availability in the municipality, the frequency of distribution, the existence of any cost barriers to access, and whether residents are aware of its use for the publication of legal notices. Applying this test, the court found that the Press was a newspaper of substantial circulation in Fenwick. Consequently, the plaintiffs' zoning appeal, which was filed more than fifteen days after the date that notice of the Commission's decision was published, was required to be dismissed. View "9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Public Health (DPH), Juanita Estrada, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the DPH retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure. Estrada's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals appointed as municipal directors of health. She approved an appointment without verifying the individual's credentials, which were later found to be false. After notifying her supervisor, the individual was removed from the position. Estrada then repeated the error with another appointment and received a letter of reprimand. She subsequently received another reprimand, multiple unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was demoted. Estrada filed grievances challenging these actions but did not raise a whistleblower retaliation claim. All grievances were denied. She then filed a whistleblower retaliation claim with the commission.The trial court concluded that the commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower complaint, that Estrada had not made a protected whistleblower disclosure, and that she had failed to establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the alleged retaliation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the merits in favor of the department. The commission appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.The Supreme Court held that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower retaliation claim. The court also held that an employee is entitled to whistleblower protection under the statute for reporting his or her own error. However, the court concluded that Estrada had failed to prove that the department’s adverse personnel actions were caused by Estrada’s reporting of her errors rather than the errors themselves. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Connecticut and the Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO. The plaintiff, the state, sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating a union member to his employment as the director of student conduct at a state university. The defendant union sought to confirm the award. The grievant’s employment had been terminated in connection with a domestic dispute involving his wife. The university conducted its own investigation and subsequently informed the grievant that his employment was being terminated as a result of his off-duty conduct. The union contested the grievant’s discharge, and an arbitration hearing was held. The arbitrator concluded that the university did not have just cause to terminate the grievant’s employment and ordered his reinstatement.The state contended that the award violated public policy. The trial court rendered judgment granting the state’s application to vacate the award and denying the union’s motion to confirm the award, from which the union appealed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state failed to demonstrate that enforcement of the arbitration award reinstating the grievant to his position of director of student conduct violated public policy. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the union’s motion to confirm the award and to deny the state’s application to vacate the award. View "State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank AG, sought to recover damages from the defendants, Alexander Vik and his daughter, Caroline Vik, for their alleged interference with a business expectancy. The plaintiff was attempting to collect an approximately $243 million foreign judgment from a company, Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (SHI), which the plaintiff claimed was controlled by Alexander. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had attempted to interfere with a Norwegian court’s order requiring the sale of SHI’s shares in a Norwegian software company, Confirmit, to partially satisfy the foreign judgment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the litigation privilege because they were based on communications made and actions taken in prior judicial proceedings. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded with direction to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded with direction to affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court held that the defendants could not prevail on their claim that the plaintiff’s appeal was rendered moot by virtue of the court’s decision in a previous case. The court also held that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants were barred by the litigation privilege. The court concluded that many of the tactics Alexander allegedly used to disrupt, delay, and otherwise interfere with the sale of Confirmit, including stacking Confirmit’s board of directors with family members and associates, submitting a disingenuous bid to acquire Confirmit, coordinating with his father to have the plaintiff’s execution lien deregistered, and forging and backdating the document purporting to grant Caroline a right of first refusal, occurred outside of the context of any judicial proceeding and, therefore, were not covered by the litigation privilege. View "Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik" on Justia Law

In this case, two candidates for state legislative offices in the 2014 general election, Joe Markley and Rob Sampson, were fined by the State Elections Enforcement Commission for violating state statutes and regulations governing campaign financing. The candidates' campaign committees had received public funding grants and published communications that criticized the then-governor, who was running for reelection. The commission found that the candidates had violated the applicable statutes and regulations by using their campaign funds to pay for communications that criticized the governor while promoting their opposition to his policies.The candidates appealed to the trial court, arguing that the statutes and regulations violated their First Amendment rights by restricting their ability to speak about other, non-opposing candidates. The trial court upheld the commission's decision, agreeing that the candidates had violated the statutes and regulations and concluding that the restrictions did not infringe on the candidates' First Amendment rights.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the candidates argued that the commission's enforcement of the statutes and regulations violated their First Amendment rights. The court held that the commission's enforcement of the statutes and regulations imposed an unconstitutional condition in violation of the First Amendment. The court found that the commission's enforcement of the statutes and regulations penalized the candidates for mentioning the governor's name in a manner that was not the functional equivalent of speech squarely directed at his reelection campaign. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to sustain the candidates' administrative appeal. View "Markley v. State Elections Enforcement Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Northland Investment Corporation (N Co.), a landlord of multiunit residential buildings, and the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). N Co. sought a declaratory ruling from PURA that it could use ratio utility billing (RUB) to recoup utility costs from tenants in buildings without individual meters. Under RUB, N Co. would bill tenants for their proportionate share of utility usage, calculated based on factors like unit square footage and number of occupants. PURA concluded that RUB violated the statute because it prohibited charging a tenant for utilities they did not exclusively use. However, PURA suggested N Co. could use the "building in" methodology, incorporating estimated utility costs into fixed rent.PURA's decision was appealed to the trial court, which remanded the case back to PURA for further consideration of whether its decision on RUB conflicted with its conclusion on the "building in" approach. PURA reaffirmed its prior ruling, and N Co. appealed again to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal. N Co. then appealed from the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the trial court's decision, agreeing with PURA's determination that the statute prohibits N Co.'s proposed use of RUB to recoup building-wide utility costs by billing tenants for their estimated proportionate share of the total cost. The court concluded that the "building in" approach was acceptable as it allowed for consistent and predictable payments each month and placed the risk of higher-than-anticipated utility usage on the landlord. View "Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a bank and a homeowner over a foreclosure action. The bank sought to foreclose on a mortgage after the homeowner defaulted on a promissory note secured by the mortgage. The mortgage agreement included a provision authorizing the bank to purchase force placed insurance coverage for the property if the homeowner failed to maintain adequate coverage. The homeowner alleged that the bank was involved in an undisclosed kickback scheme with an insurance provider, which led to him being charged more than the cost of purchasing the force placed coverage, contrary to the provisions of the mortgage agreement and certain representations the bank had made to him. The bank filed a motion to strike the special defenses and the counterclaim, which the trial court granted in part. The trial court subsequently granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment as to liability and rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which the homeowner appealed.The Supreme Court of Connecticut denied the bank's motion to dismiss the appeal, concluding that the filed rate doctrine, as applied by the federal courts, did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. The court also found that the trial court improperly struck the homeowner’s special defenses of unclean hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court reasoned that the homeowner's allegations were directly related to the bank's enforcement of the provision of the mortgage agreement authorizing the bank to purchase force placed insurance, and the alleged effect of the bank’s conduct in enforcing that provision, that it wrongfully increased the homeowner’s overall debt, provided a sufficient nexus to the foreclosure action. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "M&T Bank v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over workers' compensation benefits. The plaintiff, an employee of Frank Lill & Son, Inc., claimed to have sustained two separate injuries during his employment. He sent a written notice of claim to his employer and the Workers’ Compensation Commission. The employer, within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff’s notice of claims, mailed a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff’s right to compensation benefits. However, the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period had elapsed. The plaintiff then filed a motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, arguing that the employer had failed to commence payment of the claims or to file a notice of intention to contest the claims within the required timeframe.The administrative law judge granted the plaintiff’s motion, concluding that the employer had failed to meet the requirements of the statute, and therefore, the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries and were precluded from contesting his claims. The Compensation Review Board upheld the administrative law judge’s decision.The case was then brought before the Connecticut Supreme Court. The defendants argued that they had met their statutory obligation by mailing the notice within the statutory period, and that "mailing" should be considered the same as "filing" for the purposes of the statute. However, the court disagreed, stating that the statutory language was clear that the notice of intention to contest must be delivered, not just mailed, to the administrative law judge within the specified timeframe. The court also noted that the use of different terms in the same statute suggested that the legislature intended for the terms to have different meanings. The court affirmed the decision of the Compensation Review Board, ruling that the employer had not met its statutory obligation. View "Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over visitation rights for a minor child, L. The plaintiff, Laurie Hepburn, is the sister of L's deceased mother and had lived with L since her birth in 2010. After the death of L's mother in 2021, L's father, the defendant Chandler Brill, took L to live with him full-time. Hepburn filed a petition for visitation rights, which Brill moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Hepburn lacked standing under the third-party visitation statute because she failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that she had a parent-like relationship with L and that L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation were denied.The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the initial petition, concluding that it did not satisfy the requirements of the third-party visitation statute. The court also dismissed, on its own, the amended petition, concluding that its allegations, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, would not establish the plaintiff’s parent-like relationship with L or establish that L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation were to be denied.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s amended petition for visitation with L. The court found that the plaintiff had adequately alleged both the existence of a parent-like relationship and that the denial of visitation would cause L real and significant harm. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hepburn v. Brill" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mercedes-Benz Financial and 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, and its principal, Aniello Dizenzo. The plaintiff, Mercedes-Benz Financial, alleged that the defendants breached a motor vehicle lease agreement by failing to make payments. After the defendants failed to appear, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment and rendered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants later moved to open and set aside the default judgment, arguing that the vehicle had serious defects, making it dangerous to operate, and that they had returned the vehicle to the dealership. They also claimed that they mistakenly thought the case had been resolved.The trial court denied the defendants' motion to open the judgment, concluding that the motion was untimely and had no basis. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which acknowledged that the trial court incorrectly determined that the motion was untimely but upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that it had not abused its discretion in denying the motion on the ground that it had no basis.The defendants then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to open. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's determination that the motion was untimely was incorrect, and this error likely affected the trial court's decision on the merits of the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the lower court to reverse its judgment and conduct an evidentiary hearing on the defendants' motion to open the judgment. View "Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC" on Justia Law