Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court should not have rendered summary judgment in favor of defendant, because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether an easement by necessity over defendant's property should be granted for the installation of commercial utilities. The court explained that, consistent with the broad principle that easements by necessity require only a reasonable necessity, the public policy favoring the effective use of land, the implied conveyance of rights necessary to reasonable enjoyment of property, and the law of other jurisdictions, public policy favors recognition of easements by necessity for utilities over a preexisting deeded right-of-way. The court further explained that when a right-of-way already exists, an expansion of that easement for commercial utilities will be allowed as long as it is reasonably necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant estate and does not unreasonably impair the beneficial enjoyment of the servient estate, and trial courts should balance the intent of the parties regarding use at the time of severance, the relative enjoyment of the properties, and the burdens imposed by the easement in order to determine the overall costs and benefits to the parties. View "Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC" on Justia Law

Certain policy and procedures of the Newtown Police Department did not impose a ministerial duty on the department’s officers to search Stanley Lupienski, an individual suffering from auditory hallucinations and shortness of breath, when they took him into custody pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-503(a).The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Newtown, holding (1) the arrest section of the Department’s policy applies only in the context of criminal arrest and does not apply in the context of civil mental health custody, which is governed by section 17a-503(a); and (2) Lupienski was not subject to mandatory search under the Department’s prisoner transportation section of the policy because the transportation policy does not apply to those under custody pursuant to section 17a-503(a). View "Hull v. Town of Newtown" on Justia Law

In this case arising from four deaths from a house fire the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court concluding that a jury reasonably could find that the municipal defendants were potentially liable pursuant to Connecticut’s municipal liability statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n(b)(8).A mother and her three children lost their lives in a fire in a Bridgeport public housing complex. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 29-305(b), the Bridgeport fire marshal’s office is required to conduct annual inspections of all multifamily residential units within Bridgeport. Plaintiff brought this action against the Bridgeport Fire Department and five Bridgeport city officials alleging that the decedents died as a result of Defendants’ negligent failure to inspect the smoke detection equipment in their unit for compliance with applicable fire safety regulations and codes. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that section 52-557n afforded them immunity. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a jury, considering all of the relevant circumstances, reasonably could find that Defendants demonstrated “a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances,” and therefore, that they were potentially liable under section 52-557n(b)(8). View "Williams v. Housing Authority of City of Bridgeport" on Justia Law

The probate court retains the statutory authority to make findings pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-608n(b) in connection with a petition for special immigrant juvenile status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) when the minor child, who is the subject of the petition, reaches the age of eighteen during the pendency of the petition.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgments of the superior court for juvenile matters dismissing Mother’s and Son’s appeals from the decisions of the probate court. The Appellate Court concluded that section 45a-608n does not provide the probate court with authority to make juvenile status findings after the individual’s eighteenth birthday. The Supreme Court held that, on the contrary, the probate court did not lose its authority to make juvenile status findings pursuant to section 45a-608n(b) when Son turned eighteen years old during the pendency of the petition. View "In re Henrry P. B.-P." on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for breach of the peace and whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment against Defendant of attempted larceny in the sixth degree. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Defendant’s appeal as to the first issue on the ground that certification was improvidently granted; and (2) reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment with respect to its determination that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of attempted larceny in the sixth degree and remanded the case with directions to affirm the judgment of the trial court, holding that the evidence supported Defendant’s conviction of attempted larceny in the sixth degree. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

At issue was whether an insurer was obligated to indemnify a business owner under a personal insurance policy for liability arising form his false imprisonment of his company’s employee at her workplace. The business owner appealed, challenging the appellate court’s determination that such liability fell under the business pursuits exclusion to coverage under his personal umbrella policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) neither the appellate court nor the trial court employed the correct standard for determining whether the business owner’s tortious conduct was an occurrence “arising out of” the business pursuits of the insured; (2) remand was necessary to determine whether the business pursuits exception applied under the correct standard; and (3) Plaintiffs could not prevail on their alternative grounds regarding other exclusions and public policy as a matter of law. View "Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pasiak" on Justia Law

There was sufficient evidence in this case to support Defendant’s conviction of risk of injury to a child because Defendant willfully or unlawfully caused or permitted a three-year-old child to be placed in a situation where the life or limb of the child was endangered.Defendant was found guilty by a jury of risk of injury to a child for endangering his child’s “life or limb” pursuant to Conn. Stat. 53-21(a)(1). The Appellate Court upheld the jury’s verdict on the ground that it was supported by sufficient evidence that Defendant had created “a risk of harm to the mental health of the child” - a separate theory of liability under section 53-21(a)(1). On appeal, both parties agreed that the Appellee Court incorrectly affirmed Defendant’s conviction on the basis of an uncharged theory of liability. The Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed, holding (1) Defendant created a situation that endangered the life or limb of his child, and he had the requisite general intent; and (2) therefore, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of risk of injury to a child. View "State v. James E." on Justia Law

The trial court correctly determined that pretrial disposition conferences, when they are conducted in chambers and off the record, do not constitute “court proceedings the accused has the right to attend” within the meaning of amendment 29(b)(5) of the Connecticut Constitution.Plaintiff in error brought this writ of error claiming that the trial court improperly precluded him from attending plea negotiations and other discussions during in-chambers, pretrial disposition conferences in the criminal prosecution of Kyle Damato-Kushel. Plaintiff in error, the alleged victim, argued that the trial court’s ruling barring his attendance at the pretrial disposition conferences involving the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel violated his rights under article first, section eight of the Connecticut Constitution, as amended by articles seventeen and twenty-nine of the amendments. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that neither the victim nor his authorized representative has a right to attend such conferences. View "State v. Damato-Kushel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s complaint and Defendant’s counterclaim for damages and declaratory judgment. This case stemmed from a purchase agreement entered into by the parties in which Plaintiff was to provide various equipment and services to Defendant for a telecommunications switch room. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court incorrectly concluded that Plaintiff breached the purchase agreement by filing a petition for bankruptcy protection under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code; and (2) the trial court erred in determining that Defendant was within its rights to terminate the purchase agreement upon Plaintiff’s initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. View "CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc." on Justia Law

The right to bail under Conn. Const. art. I, section 8 is extinguished upon a finding of guilt, accepted by the court, and does not continue until the defendant has been sentenced for that offense.Defendant was released pretrial on a $1 million bond. The trial court increased the bond to $1.5 million following the jury’s verdict finding Defendant guilty of murder and other offenses, pending sentences. Six weeks later, the court revoked Defendant’s bail on the ground that it lacked authority to release him under Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-63f. Defendant petitioned for review, arguing that, to the extent that section 54-63f bars the release of persons who have been convicted of homicide offenses pending sentencing, it is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the petition fro review but denied Defendant’s request for relief, holding (1) in the period preceding 1965, when the constitutional provision for bail was amended, there was no constitutional right to bail between conviction and sentence; and (2) the 1965 amendment did not expand the temporal scope of this right. View "State v. Patel" on Justia Law