Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of murder and other crimes. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at Petitioner’s underlying criminal trial and on direct appeal. The petition was denied. Petitioner then filed a second habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of habeas counsel in the first habeas proceeding. The habeas court denied the petition. Petitioner later filed a third habeas petition alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of habeas counsel in the second habeas proceeding. The habeas court dismissed these counts, concluding that Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim because the statutory right of indigent habeas petitions to counsel under Conn. Gen. Stat. 51-296(a) is limited to “effective representation by…first habeas counsel.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that common law authorizes a third habeas petition as a proper vehicle to vindicate the right to competent assigned counsel in a second habeas proceeding. Remanded. View "Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Kettle Brook Realty, LLC, owned real property in the Town of East Windsor that that was assessed for purposes of the October 1, 2012 grand list. The Board of Assessment Appeals denied Plaintiff’s request for a reduction in the property’s assessed value. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that its property had been overvalued. The Town filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not serve the appeal papers within the two-month period allotted by Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a. The superior court granted the Town’s motion. The Appellate Court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that, under the plain language of section 12-117a, its appeal was timely commenced upon the filing of its appeal documents in the superior court even though the appeal was not served on the Town until a date beyond the expiration of the two-month appeal period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to serve its appeal on the Town within the two-month limitation period, the trial court properly dismissed the appeal as untimely. View "Kettle Brook Realty, LLC v. Town of East Windsor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Chestnut Point Realty, LLC, owned real property in the Town of East Windsor that that was assessed for purposes of the October 1, 2012 grand list. The Board of Assessment Appeals denied Plaintiff’s request for a reduction in the property’s assessed value. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the property had been overvalued. The Town filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not serve the appeal papers within the two-month period allotted by Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a. The superior court granted the Town's motion. The Appellate Court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that, under the plain language of section 12-117a, its appeal was timely commenced upon the filing of its appeal documents in the superior court even though the appeal was not served on the Town until a date beyond the expiration of the two-month appeal period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to serve its appeal on the Town within the two-month limitation period, the trial court properly dismissed the appeal as untimely. View "Chestnut Point Realty, LLC v. Town of East Windsor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, three counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree and one count of risk of injury to a child. The convictions stemmed from allegations that Defendant sexually assaulted his girlfriend’s daughter. During the trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of a prior allegation of sexual abuse made by the victim against her father’s then wife. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the prior allegation and subsequent investigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, as there were independent bases for the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence at issue that Defendant failed to challenge on appeal. View "State v. Lester" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 2002, Petitioner was found guilty of the 1975 murder of his neighbor. Nearly eight years after his conviction and after Petitioner’s prior unsuccessful challenges to his conviction, Petitioner filed this habeas petition, claiming that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in several respects. The habeas court granted the petition, concluding that counsel was ineffective on three grounds. The Commissioner of Correction appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court and remanded with direction to render judgment denying the petition, holding (1) the habeas court erred in concluding that Petitioner’s representation was ineffective for the three reasons previously identified; and (2) none of Petitioner’s alternative grounds for relief entitled Petitioner to habeas relief. View "Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

In this, the second of two diversity actions, federal courts certified questions for the Supreme Court’s advice regarding whether specific theories advanced in actions under Connecticut’s Product Liability Act alleging that a cigarette’s design had increased consumers’ risk of cancer were precluded by the Court’s adoption of comment (i) to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In the first of these actions, the Supreme Court advised that the strict liability theory advanced by Plaintiffs was not precluded. In the present action, the Supreme Court answered (1) the Court declines to adopt the Restatement (Third), but refinements to product liability tests under Restatement (Second) will clarify the plaintiffs’ burden of proof in strict liability cases; (2) while all product liability claims require proof of a “defective condition unreasonably dangerous” to the user or consumer, “unreasonably dangerous” is not determined by consumer expectations under comment (i) to section 402A when such a claim may be brought under a theory of negligence; and (3) punitive damages under the Act are not limited by the common-law rule. View "Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law

Connecticut Energy Marketers Association brought this action against the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection and the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Defendants violated the Environmental Policy Act when Defendants approved a plan for a significant expansion of the use of natural gas in the state without evaluating the environmental impact of an increase in the use of natural gas pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-1b(c). Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss, arguing that no environmental impact evaluation was required because Defendants’ activities did not constitute “actions which may significantly affect the environment” for purposes of section 22a-1b(c). The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss on the ground that the requirement of an environmental impact evaluation in section 22a-1b(c) does not apply to Defendants’ activities in this case. View "Connecticut Energy Marketers Ass’n v. Department of Energy & Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to four count of criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence discovered following the execution of a search warrant at his house because the warrant was issued without a showing of probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, on he basis of the Court’s review of the search warrant affidavit in its entirety, the trial court properly found that the facts submitted were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. View "State v. Holley" on Justia Law

In 2011, the trial court dissolved the marriage of Father and Mother. The judgment incorporated the parties’ separation agreement, which incorporated a parenting plan in which the parties agreed to share custody of the children. The agreement also provided for unallocated alimony and child support. In 2012, the parties entered into a postjudgment parenting plan pursuant to which the children would primarily reside with Father. Father subsequently filed a motion for modification of child support. Thereafter, without permission from the court, Father unilaterally decreased his unallocated support payments to Mother. In response, Mother filed a motion for contempt, which the trial court denied. The court granted Father’s postjudgment motion for modification of child support and also reduced Father's alimony payments. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the trial court improperly denied Mother’s motion for contempt; and (2) the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that the trial court improperly granted Husband’s motion for modification of unallocated alimony and child support. View "Gabriel v. Gabriel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs requested from the Commissioner of Revenue Services a tax refund for the taxable years 2002, 2006, and 2007. The Commissioner denied the request. The trial court upheld the decision of the Commissioner. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the trial court’s award of summary judgment with respect to the taxable year 2002, holding that the form of the trial court’s judgment with respect to that claim was improper; but (2) affirmed the judgment of the trial court in all other respects, holding that the remainder of Plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the judgment were unavailing. View "Allen v. Commissioner of Revenue Services" on Justia Law