Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Grievant, a state employee and a member of a Union, was terminated after he was caught smoking marijuana. The Union contested Grievant’s termination. Concluding that complete termination of Grievant’s conduct was not the only appropriate penalty for his misconduct, an arbitrator reinstated Grievant to his employment and imposed a number of sanctions and conditions short of termination. The trial court vacated the award, concluding that there was a well-defined public policy against the use of marijuana and that the arbitrator’s award violated that policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that reinstatement of the Grievant violated public policy. View "State v. Conn. Employees Union Indep." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of sexual assault and risk of injury. Petitioner failed to appeal from the judgment of conviction. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the trial court had conducted an inadequate canvass and erroneously concluded that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The habeas court granted the petition and ordered a new trial, concluding that the public defender’s office had erred in determining that Petitioner was ineligible for the assistance of counsel. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that Petitioner had advanced a claim of public defender error in the habeas court; and (2) the issue of whether Petitioner’s claims were procedurally defaulted was not properly before the Court. Remanded. View "Newland v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to her two minor children and appointed the Commissioner of Children and Families as the children's statutory parent. The Appellate Court affirmed. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court made an improper comparison between the parenting abilities of Mother and those of the therapeutic foster mother of the children to support the court’s conclusion that Mother had failed to reach a sufficient level of personal rehabilitation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not improperly compare the abilities of Mother and the therapeutic foster mother of the children during the court’s adjudicative phase of its judgment in finding that Mother failed to achieve a reasonable degree of rehabilitation. View "In re James O." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the trial court properly instructed the jury on the use of constancy of accusation evidence; (2) the constancy of accusation doctrine should be modified to address the potential prejudice to defendants caused by the testimony of multiple constancy witnesses; and (3) there is no reason to order a new trial when testimony, such as that presented in the instant case, has been properly admitted under the Court’s former articulation of the constancy of accusation doctrine. View "State v. Daniel W. E." on Justia Law

Child Doe brought a civil action against Mark Tully, alleging that Tully negligently sexually assaulted Doe while he was intoxicated. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company previously issued a homeowners insurance policy to Tully providing that State Farm would defend Tully from claims resulting from an “occurrence” but not from claims resulting from Tully’s intentional actions. State Farm brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no duty to defend Tully under the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm, concluding that Tully’s actions fell outside the scope of the policy and, therefore, State Farm had no duty to defend him under the presumption of intent established in United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Marburg. Tully and Doe appealed, arguing that the evidence that Tully was intoxicated at the time of the incident created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his actions were intentional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence of voluntary intoxication may not negate intent in duty to defend cases such as the case here. View "State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tully" on Justia Law

The trial court found that VitalWorks, Inc. and Cerner Physician Associates, Inc. (together, Defendants) violated the Connecticut Unfair trade Practices Act (CUTPA) by making misrepresentations during the sale of practice management and electronic medical records software to Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. (Plaintiff). The Appellate Court reversed and directed the trial court to render judgment for Defendants on the CUTPA count, concluding that, under applicable choice of law principles, the law of New Mexico, rather than CUTPA, governed Plaintiff’s unfair trade practices claim. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court with respect to its disposition of Plaintiff’s CUTPA claim and otherwise affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in determining that Plaintiff’s unfair trade practices claim is governed by New Mexico law, but the case must be remanded for a new trial so that New Mexico law can be applied to that claim. Remanded to the trial court for a new trial on Plaintiff’s unfair trade practices claim. View "Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexual assault in the first degree. The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in excluding a prospective juror for cause on the ground that he was “not able to speak and understand the English language” within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. 51-217(a)(3), but the error was not prejudicial. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s purportedly improper exclusion of the prospective juror should constitute per se reversible error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Court did not err in determining that the trial court’s excusal of the prospective juror for cause under Conn. Gen. Stat. 51-217(a)(3) was subject to reversal only upon a showing of prejudice; and (2) the improper removal of the prospective juror did not entitle Defendant to a new trial in the absence of a showing of prejudice. View "State v. Gould" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. After Petitioner was released from custody, federal authorities entered a final order of removal based on Petitioner’s felony conviction. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition claiming that his trial counsel’s assistance was deficient because counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky. The habeas court granted the petition and ordered that Petitioner’s conviction be vacated, holding that counsel was required to inform Petitioner that his plea of guilty to an aggravated felony made him subject to mandatory deportation. The State appealed, arguing that Padilla requires only that counsel advise a client of a heightened risk of deportation, not that federal law mandates deportation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, because federal law called for deportation for Petitioner’s conviction, counsel was required to unequivocally convey to Petitioner that federal law mandated deportation as the consequence for pleading guilty. View "Budziszewski v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several offenses after shooting Albert Weibel during an attempted robbery. Before trial, Defendant moved to preclude Weibel from making an in-court identification of Defendant, arguing that in-court identification procedures are unnecessarily suggestive. The trial court denied the motion pursuant to State v. Smith. During trial, Weibel identified Defendant as his assailant. The jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree. The Appellate Court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court should overrule the holding in Smith and hold that inherently suggestive in-court identifications are inadmissible even in the absence of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) first time in-court identifications must be prescreened for admissibility by the trial court; (2) Weibel’s in-court identification was a first time in-court identification and should have been prescreened, and the failure to follow the procedures outlined in this opinion potentially violated Defendant’s due process rights; but (3) any due process violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Dickson" on Justia Law

After hiring Plaintiff, Defendant-employer amended its sales commission plan. At dispute in this case was a revised commission provision, which provided that Plaintiff’s commissions would not be paid unless Defendant had invoiced commissionable amount to the client prior to Plaintiff’s termination. After Plaintiff was terminated, he filed a wage statute claim alleging that the commission provision was contrary to public policy and a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-72. Plaintiff’s remaining two claims were stricken upon Defendant’s motion. After a trial, the court granted judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding that the commission provision at issue was contrary to public policy. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) improperly determined that the commission provision violated public policy and constituted a violation of section 31-72; (2) erred in striking Plaintiff’s claim alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) did not err in striking Plaintiff’s claim alleging wrongful discharge. Remanded. View "Geysen v. Securitas Security Servs. USA, Inc." on Justia Law