Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2001, in New York, Jerry Heller, impersonating a rabbi, presided over the marriage of Robert Gershuny and Kim Gershuny. Heller had fraudulently performed hundreds of marriages in the state. In 2002, the New York legislature passed legislation providing that any ceremony performed by Heller shall be deemed valid and legal from the date the ceremony took place. In 2014, Robert filed an action seeking dissolution of the parties’ marriage. The trial court granted Kim’s motion to dismiss, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage because, under Connecticut law, no marriage existed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court failed to give full faith and credit to the 2002 New York legislation, which rendered the marriage valid under the laws of Connecticut. Remanded. View "Gershuny v. Gershuny" on Justia Law

Brenda Puryear filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on behalf of her minor daughter, Sarah, alleging that Echo Hose Ambulance and the city of Shelton had discriminated and retaliated against Sarah on the basis of her race and color in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Commission’s human rights referee struck the complaint on the ground that Sarah was not an employee under the “remuneration test” used to resolve similar federal causes of action. The trial court dismissed the Commission’s appeal, concluding that the referee properly applied the remuneration test. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Commission appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in applying the federal remuneration test rather than Connecticut’s common-law “right to control” test to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an “employee” under the CFEPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that the remuneration test is the appropriate test for determining whether a volunteer is an employee under CFEPA. View "Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, the former mayor of the city of Hartford, was convicted of bribe receiving, fabricating evidence, and larceny by extortion. The State had charged Defendant with the offenses in two separate informations. Before trial, however, the trial court granted the State’s motion to consolidate the charges, and the cases were tried together for purposes of judicial economy. Defendant filed two motions to sever, arguing that consolidation improperly compromised his right to choose whether to testify on his own behalf in one case but to remain silent in the other case. The trial court denied the motions. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the cases to be retried in two separate proceedings, concluding that the trial court’s refusal to sever the cases had compromised Defendant’s ability to testify in one case, causing him substantial prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to sever the cases because Defendant made a timely and compelling showing that he had important testimony to give in one case and a strong need to refrain from testifying in the other. View "State v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant entered conditional pleas of nolo contendere to one count each of manufacturing a bomb and possession of child pornography in the first degree. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered after the execution of an administrative search warrant at his apartment, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion because the administrative search warrant was invalid and improperly executed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the administrative search warrant was valid because (1) the superior court judge who issued the administrative search warrant had the authority to issue the warrant; (2) the warrant was supported by the requisite probable cause; and (3) there was no error in the issuance of the warrant during an ex parte proceeding. Further, the search was lawful because excessive force was not used during its execution. View "State v. Saturno" on Justia Law

A truck being driven by an employee of Tony’s Long Wharf Transport, LLC was on an intrastate trip entirely within Connecticut when the truck collided with a car being driven by Renee Martinez, causing Martinez injuries. Martinez sued Tony’s for negligence and obtained a judgment that remained unpaid. Martinez sought to collect the unpaid judgment from Tony’s insurer, Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, but Empire denied it was responsible for Tony’s liability under its policy with Tony’s. In dispute between the parties was whether a federally mandated insurance endorsement included in the policy, known as an MCS-90 endorsement, applies only to liability arising during interstate transportation or applies even if the accident occurs during an entirely intrastate trip. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Empire, concluding that the MCS-90 endorsement applies only to accidents occurring while the motor carrier’s vehicle was traveling in interstate commerce. The Appellate Court affirmed on an alternative ground. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the MCS-90 endorsement applies only to liability arising from the transportation of property in interstate commerce, and (2) the particular trip at issue in this case did not qualify as the transportation of property in interstate commerce. View "Martinez v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Department of Motor Vehicles found that Raymond’s Auto Repair, LLC had overcharged for the use of its rotator truck to recover a damaged vehicle prior to the actual towing of that vehicle. The hearing officer ordered Raymond’s to pay a $600 restitution fee. The trial court vacated the reimbursement order, holding that state regulation of the pretowing recovery services at issue was subject to federal preemption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that state regulation of pretowing recovery services, such as Raymond’s use of the rotator truck in this case, was not preempted by federal law. View "Raymond's Auto Repair, LLC v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The Department of Motor Vehicles found that Plaintiff, a towing service, had overcharged for the nonconsensual towing of a motor vehicle trailer and ordered Plaintiff to pay restitution in the amount of $12,787 to the trailer’s insurer. In so finding, the Department rejected Plaintiff’s claim that Connecticut’s statutes and regulations regarding nonconsensual towing services are preempted under 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(C). The trial court reversed in part, concluding that the fees charged by Plaintiff were not subject to state regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment with respect to the determination that state regulation of fees charged for pretowing recovery services provided in connection with a nonconsensual towing is preempted by federal law, holding that state laws regulating the fees charged for recovery services performed in connection with a nonconsensual towing are not preempted by federal law. View "Modzelewski's Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The Indian Spring Land Company (Plaintiff), the owner of an unimproved tract of land, filed an application to construct a gravel access road subject to certain conditions. The Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of the Town of Greenwich (Defendant) granted Plaintiff’s application, subject to certain conditions. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that its road construction activities were “directly related to its farming operations” and were therefore permitted as of right, thus not requiring the approval of a wetlands agency under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-40(a)(1). The trial court concluded that Defendant had the necessary jurisdiction to attach special conditions to Plaintiff’s permit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 22a-40(a)(1); and (2) under the proper interpretation of the statute, Defendant did not have jurisdiction to regulate the construction of Plaintiff’s access road. View "Indian Spring Land Co. v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency" on Justia Law

Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102 authorizes the Commissioner of Correction to collect DNA samples from incarcerated felons in order to maintain a DNA data bank to assist in criminal investigations. In 2005, Defendant pleaded guilty to murder. In 2009, the Department of Correction directed Defendant to submit to the taking of a DNA sample pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102g, but Defendant refused to comply. The State filed a motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to collect the DNA sample from Defendant. The trial court granted the motion. Defendant was subsequently convicted of refusing to submit to the taking of a sample for DNA analysis in violation of section 54-102g(g). The Appellate Court upheld both Defendant’s conviction and the grant of the State’s motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to obtain the sample, concluding (1) section 54-102g is regulatory, rather than punitive, in nature, and therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the State’s motion; and (2) application of the statute to Defendant did not violate his constitutional guarantee of due process or the prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly resolved both of Defendant’s claims. View "State v. Drakes" on Justia Law

Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102 authorizes the Commissioner of Correction to collect DNA samples from incarcerated felons in order to maintain a DNA data bank to assist in criminal investigations. In 1997, Defendant was convicted of robbery and other offenses. More than a decade later, the Department of Correction instructed Defendant to submit to the taking of a DNA sample pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-102g, but Defendant refused to comply. The State filed a motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to collect the DNA sample from Defendant. The trial court granted the motion. Defendant was subsequently convicted with refusing to submit to the taking of a sample for DNA analysis in violation of section 54-102g(g). The Appellate Court upheld both Defendant’s conviction and the grant of the State’s motion for permission to use reasonable physical force to obtain the sample, concluding (1) section 54-102g is regulatory, rather than punitive, in nature, and therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the State’s motion; and (2) application of the statute to Defendant did not violate his due process rights or contravene the ex post facto clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly resolved both of Defendant’s claims. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law