Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. (Plaintiff) submitted a freedom of information request to the University of Connecticut Health Center (Defendant) for correspondence between Defendant and the National Institutes of Health regarding potential noncompliance with federal animal welfare guidelines. Defendant provided sixty-one pages of redacted records. The redactions were names of individuals who had violated federal protocols and federal grant identification numbers that could be used to identify those individuals. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant with the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission). While the complaint was pending, the Commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services (Department) determined that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure of the redacted material could result in a safety risk. The Commission upheld the determination. The trial court sustained Plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that the Commission applied the wrong standard of review when it sustained Plaintiff’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission applied the proper standard of review and properly upheld the Department’s determination. View "People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial with his codefendant, Petitioner was convicted of ten charges arising from a murder and robbery. The Appellate Court affirmed. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation and failing adequately to present a defense at trial. The habeas court granted the petition and ordered that Petitioner’s conviction be set aside, concluding that counsel’s failure to obtain information regarding a stolen cell phone before trial was deficient performance and that the deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner’s defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that counsel’s failure to investigate the issue of the stolen cell phone evidence was not prejudicial under Stickland v. Washington. View "Horn v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Lopez-Gay, with Sabato and others, was at a Danbury nightclub, when her cell phone was stolen. She used an application on her computer to track its location to the Danbury Mall. Danbury police were unable to find it. That day, Sabato asked Mason to drive him to the mall and sold Mason the cell phone. Because the phone was password-protected, Mason was unable to use it. Mason took the phone to a friend, in Newtown, who worked servicing cell phones. Meanwhile, Lopez-Gay again used the tracking application and called the Newtown Police. Mason relinquished the phone when confronted, then sent Sabato a text message telling him that he was at the police station. Sabato replied, telling Mason not to write a statement. After discovering that Mason had made a statement, Sabato sent Mason threatening Facebook messages. Sabato was convicted of attempt to interfere with an officer G.S. 53a-167a (a)1; 53a- 49 (a) (2), and intimidating a witness, G.S. 53a-151a (a) (1). The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the intimidation conviction, but reversed the conviction of attempt to interfere with an officer. Fighting words are the only form of speech proscribed by Section 53a-167a, and Sabatot’s text message contained no such language. The state was precluded from arguing that it constituted a true threat, having never pursued such a theory at trial. Merely asking Mason not to give a statement was constitutionally protected and outside the purview of the statute. View "State v. Sabato" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by a three-judge​ panel and sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer in December, 1992. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in 2003 and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial and appellate counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to raise or sufficiently present several claims. The habeas court rejected each claim. On appeal, the petitioner raised 13 separate issues, most concerning his death sentence, and a few related to his capital felony conviction. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed his death sentence, citing its decisions in State v. Santiago (2015) and State v. Peeler (2016). The court rejected claims that the criminal trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the state used a short-form information to charge him; that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to testimony by an individual who was with petitioner at the time of the murder and who, he alleged, was treated with leniency; and that international law precluded his conviction for a capital felony. View "Reynolds v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

After a court trial, Defendant was convicted of breach of the peace in the second degree and harassment in the second degree. The Appellate Court reversed Defendant’s conviction for breach of the peace on the grounds of insufficient evidence and affirmed her harassment conviction. Both the State and Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Appellate Court (1) erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s breach of the peace conviction; (2) did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s harassment conviction; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider Defendant’s constitutional claims on the ground that they were inadequately briefed. View "State v. Buhl" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes arising from his sexual assault of his three biological children, a daughter and two sons. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the three cases to be tried jointly and by allowing a dog to be present with the daughter during her testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion (1) in permitting the three cases to be tried together because the evidence in each case was cross admissible; and (2) in permitting a dog to sit near the daughter during her testimony to provide comfort and support. View "State v. Devon D." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Jonathan S. Aranow, Shoreline, and Middlesex, alleging that Aranow had left a surgical sponge in plaintiff’s abdominal cavity during gastric bypass surgery. She further alleged that Middlesex was both directly liable for its own negligence and vicariously liable for Aranow’s negligence, and Shoreline was vicariously liable for Aranow’s negligence. At issue is whether plaintiff’s medical malpractice action is barred by the statute of limitations or, instead, the statute of limitations was tolled under the continuing course of treatment doctrine. The court concluded that, to establish that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the continuing course of treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations, plaintiff was required only to present evidence that her abdominal discomfort was caused by the sponge and that she sought continuing treatment for her discomfort from Aranow. In this case, the court concluded that plaintiff has established that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the doctrine applies. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial court that plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Cefaratti v. Aranow" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the Appellate Court's conclusion that he is not entitled to a new trial even though the record provides no support for the ruling of the trial court requiring that he remain shackled during his criminal trial. The court agreed with defendant that he should not have been shackled throughout the trial, but the court concluded that defendant has failed to establish that he was harmed by the shackling because, so far as the record reveals, the jury never saw the restraints. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Brawley" on Justia Law

The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of father as to his minor son. Father and mother currently live in Nigeria. Father appealed and argued that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the son with father pursuant to General Statutes 17a-112 (j) (1). Without updated medical information regarding the son's ability to travel and medical needs, the court concluded that the commissioner did not meet the burden of demonstrating that the department did ‘‘everything reasonable’’ under the circumstances to reunite father with his son. Therefore, the court concluded that the Appellate Court improperly determined that there was adequate evidentiary support for the trial court’s finding that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify father with his son. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re Oreoluwa O." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a series of postjudgment motions related to the parties’ dissolution of marriage. Here, Plaintiff filed a motion for an upward modification of Defendant’s child support obligation, motion for attorney’s fees, and motion for contempt. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion. The trial court, however, granted Defendant’s motion for modification of child support and modified Defendant’s child support obligation by decreasing his weekly obligation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on all issues. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) improperly relied on Dan v. Dan in determining that both alimony and child support orders are subject to the same modification requirements under Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-86 and improperly concluded that Plaintiff was required to show additional circumstances, beyond the increase in Defendant’s income, to justify modification of the child support award; (2) improperly upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude Defendant’s exercised stock options and restricted stock from its calculation of his gross income during the years in question; and (3) properly upheld the trial court’s decision to omit Defendant’s alleged employment perquisites from its calculation of Defendant’s gross income. View "McKeon v. Lennon" on Justia Law