Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of father as to his minor son. Father and mother currently live in Nigeria. Father appealed and argued that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the son with father pursuant to General Statutes 17a-112 (j) (1). Without updated medical information regarding the son's ability to travel and medical needs, the court concluded that the commissioner did not meet the burden of demonstrating that the department did ‘‘everything reasonable’’ under the circumstances to reunite father with his son. Therefore, the court concluded that the Appellate Court improperly determined that there was adequate evidentiary support for the trial court’s finding that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify father with his son. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re Oreoluwa O." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a series of postjudgment motions related to the parties’ dissolution of marriage. Here, Plaintiff filed a motion for an upward modification of Defendant’s child support obligation, motion for attorney’s fees, and motion for contempt. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion. The trial court, however, granted Defendant’s motion for modification of child support and modified Defendant’s child support obligation by decreasing his weekly obligation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on all issues. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) improperly relied on Dan v. Dan in determining that both alimony and child support orders are subject to the same modification requirements under Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-86 and improperly concluded that Plaintiff was required to show additional circumstances, beyond the increase in Defendant’s income, to justify modification of the child support award; (2) improperly upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude Defendant’s exercised stock options and restricted stock from its calculation of his gross income during the years in question; and (3) properly upheld the trial court’s decision to omit Defendant’s alleged employment perquisites from its calculation of Defendant’s gross income. View "McKeon v. Lennon" on Justia Law

As part of a marriage dissolution settlement agreement, Joyce Styslinger assigned her membership interest in Brewster Park, LLC to William Styslinger (Plaintiff). Plaintiff had the right to receive distributions resulting from Joyce’s membership interest in the LLC, while Joyce remained a member of Brewster Park until Plaintiff was admitted to membership by Michael Weinshel, the other member of the LLC. At the time he filed this action, Plaintiff had requested membership status, but Weinshel had not granted it, and Brewster Park had not made any distributions to Plaintiff despite Plaintiff’s demand. Plaintiff sued Brewster Park and Weinshel claiming breach of fiduciary duty and seeking an order dissolving Brewster Park and the appointment of a receiver to wind up its affairs and distribute its assets. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff lacked standing to seek a dissolution or a winding up of the LLC’s assets. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act granted him standing in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the assignee of a membership interest in a Connecticut LLC does not have standing to seek a winding up of the affairs of the LLC in the absence of the LLC’s dissolution. View "Styslinger v. Brewster, Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a number of crimes in connection with the abduction of his former wife. The trial judge found Defendant competent to represent himself at trial and permitted Defendant to represent himself. A jury subsequently convicted Defendant of all but one of the charges against him. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to reconsider Defendant’s competency to represent himself in light of a new standard that the Court adopted in Defendant’s direct appeal. On remand, the trial judge concluded that Defendant had been competent to represent himself at the time of his trial. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court’s remand hearing was procedurally flawed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court’s decision to resolve the appeal sua sponte on the basis that the remand hearing was procedurally flawed violated Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc. Remanded to the Appellate Court with direction to consider the issue raised in Defendant’s appeal. View "State v. Connor" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of assault in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statements to the police made during his booking violated his Fifth Amendment rights and that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings at the crime scene. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the public safety exception to Miranda, as articulated in New York v. Quarles, applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the circumstances of this case, the public safety exception applied. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the beneficiary of a testamentary trust, entered a long-term care facility in 2012, at which time she applied for financial and medical assistance under Medicaid. The Department of Social Services denied the application for Medical benefits, finding that Plaintiff’s assets, including the trust, exceeded the relevant asset limits. A hearing officer upheld the department’s denial. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trust was not an asset available to her as defined by relevant Medicaid regulations. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the testator intended to create a discretionary, supplemental needs trust and, therefore, the trust corpus and income may not be considered to be available to Plaintiff for the purpose of determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits. View "Pikula v. Dep’t of Social Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a married couple proceeding as self-represented parties, commenced a legal malpractice action against Defendants by way of a complaint and a summons. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the writ of summons failed to provide either a recognizance by a third party or a certification of Plaintiffs’ financial responsibility. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action. The Appellate Court summarily affirmed the judgment of dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to afford Plaintiffs an opportunity to file a bond to avoid dismissal of the action. Remanded. View "Costello v. Goldstein & Peck, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former smoker and cancer survivor, brought an action in federal district court against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company pursuant to Connecticut’s Product Liability Act under theories of strict liability and negligent design. At trial, evidence was presented that Defendant purposefully manufactured cigarettes to increase daily consumption without regard to the resultant increase in exposure to carcinogens. After a jury trial, the district court rendered judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. Defendant appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that Plaintiff’s product liability cause of action was foreclosed by comment (i) to section 402A of the Restatement (Second), Torts because comment (i) precludes liability of a seller of good tobacco. The Second Court certified to the Supreme Court a question of law regarding the preclusive effect of comment (i) on a strict product liability claim. The Supreme Court held (1) the modified consumer expectation test is the Court’s primary strict product liability test and the sole test applicable to this case; and (2) because the obvious danger exceptions to strict liability in comment (i), including “[g]ood tobacco,” are not dispositive under the multifactor modified consumer expectation test, comment (i) did not preclude a lawsuit in this case. View "Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of both intentional and reckless assault in the first degree. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the convictions were legally inconsistent. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that Defendant’s convictions for intentional and reckless assault were legally inconsistent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s convictions were not legally inconsistent under the State’s argument that the assault occurred in two reckless and intentional phases, respectively; and (2) Defendant had sufficient notice that he could be convicted of both reckless and intentional assault, and therefore, the manner in which Defendant was convicted satisfied the requirements of due process. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree. Thereafter, in State v. Salamon and Luurtsema v. Comm’r of Corr. (Luurtsema II), the Supreme Court overruled its overly broad interpretation of its kidnapping statutes and determined the holding in Salamon applied retroactively to collateral attacks on final judgments. Petitioner subsequently filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that there was constitutional error in the kidnapping instruction pursuant to Salamon and Luurtsema II. The habeas court granted a new trial on the kidnapping charge and rejected the Commissioner of Correction’s assertion that Petitioner’s failure to challenge the Court’s long-standing interpretation of kidnapping in his criminal proceedings led to his procedural default. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Luurtsema II’s retroactivity decision compels the conclusion that challenges to kidnapping instructions in criminal proceedings rendered final before Salamon are not subject to the procedural default rule; and (2) Petitioner was entitled to a new trial on the kidnapping charge because the omission of a Salamon instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Hinds v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law