Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was the homeowner’s association for a common interest community. Defendant owned a condominium unit in the community. Pursuant to a "standard collection policy" adopted by Plaintiff in 2011, Plaintiff brought this action seeking to foreclose a statutory lien for allegedly delinquent common expenses, attorney’s fees, and costs. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to vote to commence a foreclosure action against Defendant’s unit or to adopt a standard foreclosure policy pursuant to the notice and comment requirements of Connecticut’s Common Interest Ownership Act. Plaintiff, in turn, argued that its policy was an "internal business operating procedure" rather than a rule and therefore was not subject to the notice and comment procedures for rules. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff’s standard foreclosure policy was an internal business operating procedure, not a rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the standard foreclosure policy is a rule and that the rule-making requirements are jurisdictional. Remanded with direction to dismiss Plaintiff’s action. View "Neighborhood Ass’n v. Limberger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff allegedly suffered heart problems and psychological injuries during the course of his employment with Defendant, FedEx. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner found that Plaintiff’s physical and psychological injuries were compensable and awarded him total incapacity benefits covering a period of forty-seven weeks. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board upheld the Commissioner’s findings and award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly upheld the Commissioner’s determination that both Plaintiff’s physical and psychological injuries were compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act; and (2) the Commissioner’s award was not excessive. View "Hart v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to one count of sexual assault in the first degree. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant requested that he be permitted to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his oral motion to withdraw his plea “without any type of inquiry or evidentiary hearing as to the underlying basis of [his] motion.” The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that the inquiry conducted by the court was sufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without conducting a further inquiry into the underlying basis of Defendant’s motion. View "State v. Anthony D." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count each of conspiracy to commit aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the first degree, and assault in the third degree. The Appellate Court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to vacate the judgment as to two of the conspiracy counts and to render judgment on one of the conspiracy counts, concluding that Defendant’s sentence on all three conspiracy counts, which were based on a single agreement with multiple criminal objectives, violated the double jeopardy clause of the federal Constitution. Both Defendant and the State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in limiting Defendant’s ability to present evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the Appellate Court correctly concluded that vacatur was the appropriate remedy for the double jeopardy violation. View "State v. Wright" on Justia Law

After being sanctioned, Plaintiff, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Connecticut, was suspended from practice before the Appellate Court for a period of six months. Plaintiff filed a writ of error, asserting that the Appellate Court abused its discretion in suspending her from practice because the conduct for which she was sanctioned did not violate rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding (1) the Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion in suspending Plaintiff from the practice of law before the Appellate Court on the basis of her repeated failure to comply with Appellate Court rules and deadlines, and for filing a frivolous appeal; and (2) Plaintiff’s argument that rule 8.4 provides an exclusive list of misconduct for which an attorney may be sanctioned is patently frivolous. View "Miller v. Appellate Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions on statute of limitations grounds. The Appellate Court reversed the convictions, concluding that of the four counts in the operative informations, one count was completely time barred and the other three counts were partially untimely. The court remanded the case for a new trial as to the charges that were not time barred. The State subsequently filed a substitute information charging Defendant with two counts of kidnapping in the first degree. On remand, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the substitute information, ruling that the scope of the remand order precluded the State from amending its information. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) properly concluded that its remand order did not preclude the State from filing the substitute information; and (2) properly concluded that the kidnapping charges in the State’s substitute information were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "State v. Brundage" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. Prior to entering the plea, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle, claiming that the police did not possess a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity. On appeal, Defendant challenged the the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court’s determination that the police possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when they detained Defendant was incorrect. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the police possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain Defendant outside a known drug location where Defendant had previously acted in a manner consistent with drug activity. View "State v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant alleging that they sustained injuries as a result of Defendant’s negligence. The accident underlying Plaintiffs’ claims occurred while Defendant was acting within the scope of his employment with the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity on Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs sought money damages from Defendant personally, not from the Authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity extended to Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant because Defendant was an employee of the Mohegan Tribe and was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. View "Lewis v. Clarke" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, in 2005 and 2007, Defendant was convicted of two offenses. In 2009, the trial court found that Defendant violated the conditions of his probation and sentenced him to serve the entirety of his original 2005 sentence. Later that day, Defendant entered an Alford plea pleading guilty to attempt to commit arson in the second degree. Defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court finding him in violation of his 2005 probation, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he violated the terms of his probation. Defendant did not take a timely appeal challenging his guilty plea to the charge of attempt to commit arson but did file a petition for habeas corpus challenging his guilty plea. The Appellate Court dismissed Defendant’s sufficiency challenge as moot, concluding that Defendant’s guilty plea to the arson charge established that he had violated the terms of his 2005 probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a habeas corpus petition, unlike a direct appeal, does not keep alive a defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to find him in violation of his probation; and (2) the Appellate Court properly determined that Defendant rendered moot his insufficiency of the evidence claim. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to harassment in the second degree and criminal trespass in the first degree and was sentenced to one year incarceration, execution suspended, and two years of probation. Defendant was later charged with violating the conditions of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated the conditions of his probation, continued Defendant’s probation, and added new conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly admitted evidence that Defendant argued should have been suppressed; (2) the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Defendant violated the terms of his probation; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting certain hearsay evidence; and (4) Defendant waived his Second Amendment right to possess firearms when he agreed to the condition of his probation barring him from possessing firearms. View "State v. Maietta" on Justia Law