Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Meriden granted a variance to Mark Development, LLC to use a parcel of real property located in a regional development zone as a used car dealership on the grounds that the effect of applying the Meriden Zoning Regulations was so severe as to amount to a practical confiscation. Plaintiffs, the City of Meriden and two of its officers, appealed from the Board’s decision granting the variance. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ appeal in part and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to sustain Plaintiffs’ appeal, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been deprived of all reasonable uses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court correctly found that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been practically confiscated. View "Caruso v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the widow and presumptive dependent of Decedent. Decedent was employed as a photograph engraver and was later diagnosed with disabling pulmonary fibrosis as a result of his work exposure to toxins. Decedent filed a timely claim for benefits and subsequently died from his illness. The claim was not accepted nor were benefits paid before Decedent’s death. Just over one year after Decedent’s death, Plaintiff filed a claim for death and survivor benefits. Thereafter, Defendants accepted Decedent’s underlying claim for benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff’s claim for benefits was timely filed under the Workers’ Compensation Act and ordered Defendants to pay survivor benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board reversed, finding that a dependent filing for survivor’s benefits must file a separate claim for benefits within one year of the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was not required to file a separate notice of claim for survivor benefits because the timely filing of Decedent’s notice of claim for benefits under the Act satisfied the limitation period for claims under the Act. View "McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. Defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial on the ground that his mother had tampered with the jury by approaching a juror outside the courthouse and speaking to him about the evidence in the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the presumption of prejudice in jury tampering cases set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Remmer v. United States remains good law in cases of external interference with the jury’s deliberative process via private communication, contact, or tampering with jurors about the pending matter; and (2) the State carried its burden of proving that the actions of Defendant’s mother did not lead to the reasonable possibility that any juror’s ability to decide this case fairly and impartially was affected. View "State v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, among other crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment followed by probation. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence for first degree sexual assault was illegal because section 53a-70(b)(3) requires that persons convicted of that offense be sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by a period of special parole. The trial court agreed with Defendant and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and special parole for his conviction of first degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 53a-70(b)(3) requires only that any period of special parole that may be imposed shall, along with the accompanying term of imprisonment, constitute a total sentence of not less than ten years. View "State v. Jason B." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, among other crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of twelve years for his conviction of sexual assault in the first degree, followed by probation. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Conn. Gen. Laws 53a-70(b)(3) because the sentence did not include a period of special parole. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence was proper because section 53a-70(b)(3) does not require that persons convicted of first degree sexual assault be sentenced to a period of imprisonment and special parole; rather, it provides that if the court elects to impose such a sentence, then the total combined period of imprisonment and special parole must constitute a total sentence of not less than ten years. View "State v. Victor O." on Justia Law

After an investigation, the Department of Children and Families found that an alleged perpetrator was responsible for sexual abuse and emotional neglect of Plaintiff and placed the alleged perpetrator’s name on the central registry. After an administrative hearing, the hearing officer found there was insufficient evidence to support the Department’s finding of substantiation and, therefore, removed the alleged perpetrator’s name from the central registry. Plaintiff subsequently requested that the hearing officer reconsider the decision reversing the substantiation finding. The hearing officer denied Plaintiff’s request, finding that Plaintiff lacked standing to seek reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed, and the trial court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action. View "Isabella D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Decedent was a passenger in his own vehicle when the vehicle was involved in an automobile accident, killing Decedent. The vehicle was being driven by Decedent’s friend (Driver) at the time of the accident and was insured by Insurer. Driver was a covered permissive driver under the policy. The executrix of Decedent’s estate (Estate) filed a wrongful death action against Driver. Insurer subsequently filed this declaratory judgment action against Estate and Driver seeking a ruling that the policy did not provide coverage for Estate’s claims against Driver and that Insurer had no duty to defend Driver. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Insurer, concluding that an exclusion in the policy unambiguously barred Estate’s claims against Driver. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusion at issue was void and unenforceable due to its failure to comply with the clear and unambiguous requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. 38a-335(d). Remanded. View "Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Sharon DeNunzio and Peter DeNunzio were the parents of Douglas DeNunzio, who for many years has manifested symptoms of mental distress. Sharon and Peter divorced when Douglas was a minor. Shortly after Douglas’ twenty-first birthday, Peter filed an application in the probate court seeking to be appointed as Douglas’ conservator. The probate court found by clear and convincing evidence that Douglas needed a conservator and appointed Defendant as conservator. The trial court and appellate court affirmed the probate court’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent that the probate court considered Douglas’ “best interests” in these conservatorship proceedings, in addition to the statutory factors adopted in P.A. 07-116, Sharon’s substantial rights were not prejudiced because the statutory factors were considered and supported the probate court’s selection of Defendant as conservator; and (2) Plaintiff’s substantial rights were not prejudiced by the probate court’s consideration of the guardian ad litem’s report, which was not admitted into evidence. View "DeNunzio v. DeNunzio" on Justia Law

A nearly century old dispute among neighbors in a housing development along the Long Island Sound over access to the shore has given rise to numerous actions, two of which have reached the Supreme Court over the past decade. At issue in the present consolidated appeals was whether certain prior actions barred, via the doctrine of res judicata, two claims in Plaintiffs’ consolidated quiet title actions. The trial court denied Defendants’ motions for summary as to those claims pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claims were not sufficiently similar to those asserted in the prior actions such that they should have been brought in the same action; and (2) Plaintiffs were not in privity with other lot owners involved in prior actions. View "Wheeler v. Beachcroft" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s statements to her husband were not protected by the marital communications privilege pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-84b. Specifically, the court determined that Defendant’s statements were not “induced by the affection” of the marital relationship, and therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting the statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s statements were not “induced by the affection, confidence, loyalty, and integrity of the marital relationship,” as required by section 54-84b(a), Defendant’s communications fell outside the marital communications privilege. View "State v. Davaloo" on Justia Law