Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, filed termination petitions with respect to Mother’s two children, alleging that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. The trial court granted both petitions. The Appellate Court reversed the judgments of the trial court for failure to make written findings required under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-112(k)(4). Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court failed to comply with the statute because it failed to set forth express written findings as to the children’s emotional ties with Mother. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings under section 17a-112(k)(4); (2) as set forth in In re Eden F.; (2) although a trial court shall consider and make written findings regarding the factors enumerated in section 17a-112(k), a trial court’s determination of the best interests of a child will not be overturned on the basis of one factor if the court’s determination is otherwise factually supported and legally sound; and (3) the trial court’s finding as to the children’s best interest in this case was factually supported and legally sound. View "In re Naveah W." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree, two counts of unlawful restraint in the first degree, and being a persistent dangerous felony offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding testimony from Defendant’s expert witness on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the eyewitness in question had sufficient prior familiarity and contact with Defendant such as to make her identification of him reliable, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Defendant’s expert from testifying. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the eyewitness’s previous contact with Defendant made the trial court’s decision to exclude the expert testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness identification an appropriate exercise of its discretion. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, which owned facilities used for earth materials excavation and processing, submitted to the Department of Environmental Protection five individual applications for water diversion permits. The Department requested additional information for all five of Plaintiff’s applications. Plaintiff did not fully comply with the Department’s request. Instead of submitting the requested information, Plaintiff filed a petition for a declaratory ruling to address the scope of the Department’s authority to request information for Plaintiff’s water diversion permit applications. The Commissioner of Environmental Protection deemed all of the Department’s actions authorized under the Connecticut Water Diversion Policy Act (Act). The trial court endorsed in all material respects the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Act does not authorize the Department’s attempts to regulate Plaintiff’s excavation activities; (2) the Act does not authorize the Department to request a wetlands mitigation plan for the alteration of wetlands that had been authorized by prior municipal wetlands permit; and (3) the Department may not delay processing Plaintiff’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit application due to a pending water diversion permit application. View "Tilcon Connecticut, Inc. v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, automobile body shops and an auto body association, brought this class action against Defendant, The Hartford Fire Insurance Company, on behalf of more than 1,000 independent auto body repair shops in Connecticut, claiming that Defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) by requiring its staff motor vehicle physical damage appraisers to use, when appraising auto body damage sustained by Defendant’s insureds, the hourly labor rates agreed on by Defendant and the plaintiff auto body shops instead of rates that more accurately reflect the actual value of those services. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Defendant’s hourly rate practices constituted an unfair trade practice because they offended the public policy found in section 38a-790-8 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court incorrectly concluded that section 38a-790-8 supports Plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim alleging unfair labor rate practices. View "Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of assault in the first degree. Petitioner filed an amended habeas petition alleging that his trial counsel had failed to provide sufficient information to enable him to make an informed decision about whether to plead nolo contendere or to proceed to trial. The habeas court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged errors. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the prejudice standard enunciated in Copas v. Commissioner of Correction that the habeas court applied in this case was inconsistent with federal law concerning the prejudice prong. The Commissioner of Correction appealed, claiming that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the habeas court applied an incorrect legal standard. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Commissioner was not aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Court and Copas has already been overruled sub silencio in subsequent decisions by the Court. View "Carraway v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

John and Jane Couto entered into a contract with Joseph General Contracting, Inc. for the purchase and construction of a home and carriage house. The trial court found that the contract existed also between the Coutos and Anthony Silvestri, the owner and president of Joseph General. After disputes arose regarding the construction of the dwellings, Joseph General sued the Coutos for, inter alia, breach of contract. The Coutos counterclaimed against Joseph General, Silvestri and Landel Realty, LLC. The trial court held Joseph General, Landel and Silvestri each jointly and severally liable for breach of contract and implied warranty, trespass and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Silvestri appealed the propriety of these adverse rulings with respect to his personal liability. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment pertaining to Silvestri in an individual capacity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court as to the claims of breach and contract and implied warranty against Silvestri in his individual capacity and affirmed in all other respects, holding that the Appellate Court (1) erred in determining that Silvestri had incurred contractual obligations to the Coutos in his individual capacity; and (2) properly determined that Silvestri could be held individually liable for alleged violations of CUTPA. View "Joseph Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Couto" on Justia Law

The Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Monroe approved the application of Handsome, Inc. for a special exception permit to construct an industrial building in the Town, subject to thirty-six conditions. After the permit’s expiration date passed, the Commission denied Handsome’s application for a permit extension. The trial court concluded that the Commission must approve the application for a permit extension. The Commission ultimately granted Handsome’s application to extend the permit, subject to five other “requirements” and several “clarifications” relating to the original permit approval. Handsome and its principal officers appealed, challenging the imposition of conditions they alleged had not been part of the original permit. The trial court directed the Commission to approve the special exception permit conditioned only upon the conditions as recited by the Commission in its original decision. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that Plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the Commission’s decision and therefore did not have standing to bring the appeal. View "Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case died when the motorcycle he was operating collided with Defendant’s vehicle. Blood test results indicated that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the collision. Plaintiff, as the administratrix of the estate of the decedent and in her individual capacity, brought this action against Defendant. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, including an award of compensatory and punitive damages to the decedent’s estate and loss of consortium and punitive damages to Plaintiff in her individual capacity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting expert testimony pertaining to Defendant’s drug use; (2) precluding Defendant from offering evidence as to the full extent of his criminal punishment related to the accident; (3) admitting evidence of Defendant’s postaccident conduct; and (4) failing to strike Plaintiff’s testimony that she intended to fund a charitable scholarship and help her daughter. View "Fleming v. Dionisio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-73a(a)(2). The United States Department of Homeland Security subsequently commenced removal proceedings against Plaintiff on the ground that he was convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. The immigration judge determined that section 53a-73a(a)(2) is not a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute does not require that the actor know that his actions were not consented to by the victim. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that resolving the issue of what mens rea was required for the lack of consent element of the statute was necessary to determine whether the plaintiff had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding section 53a-73a(a)(2). The Supreme Court answered (1) section 53a-73a(a)(2) is not a strict liability offense with respect to the lack of consent element; and (2) the mens rea applicable to the element of consent in section 53a-73a(a)(2) is criminal negligence. View "Efstathiadis v. Holder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly forced him to choose between his constitutional right to counsel and his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf after defense counsel stated that he would be self-represented if he testified against their advice. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant waived his right to counsel when he elected to testify at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not represented by counsel during his testimony; and (2) Defendant was entitled to a new trial because he did not voluntarily relinquish his right to counsel. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Francis" on Justia Law