Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the Supreme Court upheld the judicial dissociation of Plaintiff, Thomas Brennan, from Brennan Associates (the partnership). Plaintiff subsequently brought this action seeking to have his interest in the partnership valued and bought out by the partnership. The trial court awarded Plaintiff $6.9 million for his interest in the partnership and $3.5 million in interest on that award. The partnership and remaining partners (collectively, Defendants) appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) should have valued Plaintiff’s interest in the partnership as of 2009, when the Court upheld Plaintiff’s dissociation, instead of 2006, when the trial court rendered the judgment of dissociation; and (2) incorrectly determined that interest accrued on Plaintiff’s buyout award from the date of the judgment of dissociation, as Plaintiff was not entitled to interest on his buyout award until the award became due and owing. Remanded. View "Brennan v. Brennan Assocs." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, intentional assault in the first degree and reckless assault in the first degree. The intentional and reckless assault in the first degree convictions were based on the same conduct. the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s convictions for intentional and reckless assault in the first degree were not legally inconsistent because the two mental states required to commit the offenses related to different results; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of intentional assault in the first degree. View "State v. Nash" on Justia Law

A skilled nursing facility (Plaintiff) terminated an employee (Employee) on the ground that she had failed to make a timely report of an allegation of resident abuse. An arbitrator agreed with Plaintiff that the Employee had improperly delayed reporting an incident of suspected abuse but ordered the Employee reinstated based upon its determination that Plaintiff had just cause to suspend Employee without pay for one month. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the arbitration award reinstating the Employee’s employment violated Connecticut’s clear public policy requiring the prompt reporting of any incident of suspected abuse of a nursing home resident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration award requiring the reinstatement of the Employee did not violate this public policy. View "Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case died after being hit on the head by a log and falling backward onto the sidewalk while working for the Department of Transportation (Defendant). Plaintiff, the decedent’s wife, filed this action seeking damages for wrongful death and loss of consortium. The trial court rendered judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment in favor of Defendant, holding (1) the trial court improperly determined that Defendant had assumed a greater duty of care than reflected in industry standards, and (2) Defendant’s actions were not the proximate cause of the death of the decedent. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court used the wrong standard in its determination of liability and damages, but (2) the Appellate Court erred in its determinations of the conclusiveness of the industry standard, foreseeability, and proximate cause. Therefore, the matter must be returned to the trial court for a new trial in which the proper standard is applied. View "McDermott v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against a hospital and a registered nurse, alleging that Defendants negligently discharged Plaintiffs’ suicidal son and that they suffered severe emotional distress when they discovered that their son had hung himself only thirty-five minutes after his discharge. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs’ bystander emotional distress claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs suffered severe and debilitating emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ alleged negligence. View "Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application to the Department of Transportation (Department) for authority to operate two motor vehicles in a new intrastate livery service. The Department denied Plaintiff’s application, finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving the statutory requirement that his livery service would improve present or future “public convenience and necessity.” The trial court affirmed the Department’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s appeal from the Department’s denial of his permit application, holding that the Department improperly interpreted the “public convenience and necessity” provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 13b-103(a). Remanded for a new hearing. View "Martorelli v. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public housing project and other narcotics and firearm charges. The Appellate Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the possession charge; and (2) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to sell narcotics within 1500 feet of a public housing project. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient to satisfy the State’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to sell narcotics at a particular location within 1500 feet of a public housing project. View "State v. Stovall" on Justia Law

John McConnell created a trust naming his three children - James McConnell, Kathleen Hewitt, and Amy Sheridan - as beneficiaries. A decade later, Hewitt filed an application for, inter alia, a trust accounting and removal of a trustee. Plaintiffs in error represented Hewitt during the proceedings on the application. The probate court approved a stipulated agreement authorizing certain distributions to Hewitt and Sheridan from the trust. McConnell appealed, claiming that he did not receive notice of the probate proceedings and would not have consented to the terms of the stipulated agreement if he had had the opportunity to participate. The trial court issued an order to show cause why McConnell’s appeal should not be sustained and the probate court’s order vacated. The court ordered the Plaintiffs in error to appear at the hearing on the order to show cause. The plaintiffs in error appeared at the hearing and testified about their involvement in the proceedings before the probate court. Thereafter, the plaintiffs in error filed this writ of error challenging the trial court’s authority to order that they appear in court. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that the trial court’s order was not a final judgment from which a writ of error may be brought. View "McConnell v. McConnell" on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Children and Families filed a neglect petition seeking an order of temporary custody of Cassandra C., a minor, after medical providers reported that Cassandra and her mother were refusing to obtain appropriate medical treatment for Cassandra, who had been diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma. The trial court granted the order and placed Cassandra in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families, directing Respondents to cooperate with Cassandra’s medical care providers. Thereafter, Cassandra started chemotherapy but ran away before the treatment could be completed. The Commissioner moved to reopen the evidence to consider evidence regarding whether Cassandra was competent to make life-death decisions regarding her medical care. After a hearing, the trial judge ordered that Cassandra remain in the custody of the Department and authorized the Department to make all medical decisions for her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge’s finding that Cassandra was not competent to make her own medical decisions at the time of the underlying events was not clearly erroneous; (2) this was not a proper case in which to decide whether to adopt the mature minor doctrine, which allows a sufficiently mature minor to refuse medical treatment; and (3) Respondents’ constitutional rights were not violated. View "In re Cassandra C." on Justia Law

Old Colony Construction, LLC failed timely to complete a public works contract with the Town of Southington. The Town elected to terminate the contract on the basis of convenience. Old Colony subsequently filed suit against the Town alleging breach of contract. The Town counterclaimed seeking liquidated damages for breach of contract. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Old Colony on its breach of contract claim and in favor of the Town on its liquidated damages counterclaim. The court awarded the Town liquidated damages and permitted the set off of those damages against the damages awarded to Old Colony for the Town’s failure to pay sums due under the contract’s termination for convenience provision. Old Colony appealed, arguing that the Town was barred from collected liquidated damages because termination for convenience precludes any default based remedies available for termination for cause and because the Town’s contribution to the delay rendered the liquidated damages provision unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly awarded liquidated damages and properly denied Old Colony’s request for an equitable adjustment in the contract. View "Old Colony Constr., LLC v. Town of Southington" on Justia Law