Justia Connecticut Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, the trial court, incorporating by reference the terms of the Wife and Husband’s separation agreement, entered a judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. The agreement required the payment of unallocated alimony and child support until the death of either party, Wife’s remarriage, or cohabitation. In 2011, Defendant filed a motion arguing that the unallocated alimony and child support obligation had terminated four years earlier because Wife at that time was cohabitating. The trial court ordered that Husband’s support obligations were suspended during the time of Wife's cohabitation - a period of four months - but that, otherwise, Husband continued to owe her unallocated alimony and child support. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Wife’s period of cohabitation permanently terminated Husband’s support obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly construed the agreement to require the permanent termination of the unallocated support obligation immediately upon Wife's cohabitation. View "Nation-Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of capital felony and arson murder, among other offenses. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his due process rights were violated because the State had failed to disclose a note written by a police detective containing details concerning the length of time that the fire burned inside the victim’s apartment prior to being discovered. First habeas counsel failed to pursue the claim, and consequently, the first habeas court rejected that claim as abandoned. Petitioner subsequently filed this habeas petition, alleging that the State withheld the evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and that his first habeas counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue and prove that claim. The second habeas court dismissed the claim. The Appellate Court remanded. The third habeas court rejected the petition. The Appellate Court reversed in part and remanded with direction to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was deprived of a fair trial because his rights under Brady were violated and that Petitioner’s first habeas counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to establish that violation. View "Lapointe v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of possession of narcotics with intent to sell. Petitioner later filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him, pursuant to Padilla v. Kentucky, that his plea of guilty and subsequent conviction would constituted an aggravated felony under federal law and result in his almost certain deportation and permanent removal from the United States. After a trial, the habeas court granted the amended petition, concluding that Padilla applied retroactively to Petitioner’s guilty plea and that Petitioner was misadvised and prejudiced under Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Padilla does not apply retroactively to Petitioner’s guilty plea under federal law; and (2) Petitioner cannot prevail on alternative grounds. View "Thiersaint v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act alleging that Defendant, her employer, had engaged in sexual harassment and disability discrimination and had unlawfully terminated her on the basis of her national origin, religion, and race. The trial court granted summary judgment on all counts in favor of Defendant. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed with respect to Plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment in the workplace and affirmed in all other respects, holding that Plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex. Remanded. View "Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of narcotics, conspiracy to possess narcotics, conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to sell, and other drug-related offenses. Defendant appealed, challenging her conviction on the three narcotics offenses. The Appellate Court reversed the conviction of conspiracy to possess narcotics on double jeopardy grounds but affirmed the judgment as to the remaining charges. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that she waived any appellate claim regarding structural error and seeking reversal of her conviction on the two remaining narcotics charges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellate Court erred in determining that Defendant implicitly waived her instructional claims even though she had filed a request to charge for the instructions, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several drug-related offenses. The Appellate Court determined that Defendant’s convictions of the lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess narcotics and the greater offense of conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to sell constituted a violation of the double jeopardy clause. The court vacated Defendant’s conviction for the lesser included offense. The court also vacated Defendant’s sentence for the greater offense and remanded for resentencing on that charge in accordance with the aggregate package theory. The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court, holding that, although the trial court had the discretion to resentence Defendant, it was improper under the circumstances of this case for the Appellate Court to order the trial court to hold a resentencing hearing, as Defendant’s total effective sentence was not altered by the Appellate Court’s decision. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and risk of injury to a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor improperly commented on his right not to testify during her closing argument at trial. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prosecutor did not engage in any impropriety and that her comments were within the constitutional limits prescribed by the Fifth Amendment. View "State v. Ruffin" on Justia Law

During a regular meeting, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Monroe convened for an executive session to discuss “legal matters regarding general enforcement” before reconvening and extending a zoning permit previously issued to Handsome, Inc. Handsome and its principal officers filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC), claiming that the zoning commission’s executive session violated Connecticut’s Freedom of Information Act (the Act). The FOIC determined that the executive session was unlawful under the Act. The trial court reversed, determining that the zoning commission’s executive session was permissible under the pending claims or pending litigation exception of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the zoning commission’s executive session was not justified under the Act’s pending claims or pending litigation exception. View "Planning & Zoning Comm’n v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant pleaded guilty to two charges of possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana. In 2011, during his probation period, Defendant was again charged with possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana. Later that year, the legislature enacted No. 11-71 of the 2011 Public Acts (P.A. 11-71), which changed the penalty for possessing less than one-half ounce of marijuana from a potential term of imprisonment and/or a large fine to a small fine. Defendant subsequently petitioned for the destruction of the records of his two 2009 convictions pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-142d, which allows for the erasure and destruction of records pertaining to a conviction that has later been decriminalized. The trial court denied relief. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that, after the passage of P.A.11-71, the possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana was not “decriminalized” within the meaning of section 54-142d. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that P.A. 11-71 decriminalized the possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana for purposes of section 54-142d. View "State v. Menditto" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case was killed by her former boyfriend, Mark Tannenbaum, shortly after Tannenbaum was released from police custody. Plaintiff, the adminstratrix of the decedent’s estate, filed this action against the town of Watertown and three police officers. Five years later, Plaintiff withdrew her initial action and commenced the present action against the town and John Carroll, alleging that Carroll, the ranking officer at the time of Tannenbaum’s release from police custody, released him without proper conditions and restrictions. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Appellate Court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-593 did not save this case from the statute of limitations where she failed to name Carroll as a defendant in her original action and, therefore, would have failed to obtain a judgment in that action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carroll’s absence from the original action did not entitle Plaintiff to use section 52-593 to save this case. View "Finkle v. Carroll" on Justia Law